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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court plays a critical role in resolving clashes be-
tween majority' and minority2 interests and perspectives. The Equal
1. This Article defines a "majority" as a social group that experiences social life from a
position of privilege, "normal" status, or dominance relative to other groups. For example,
Whites, men, heterosexuals, and Euro-ethnics are "majorities" under this definition. A
"majority" does not necessarily contain more than half of the members of the society. Ac-
cording to this model, there is no single "majority," since the meaning of this term will vary
depending on the social context. This term does not imply that all members of any partic-
ular majority group share the same perspective. While members of particular groups may
tend to share certain views based on their common experiences, there is often a great deal
of variation within a group. Also, all of us belong to multiple groups, some of which may
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Protection Clause, and at times the Due Process Clause,' have become
key vehicles for considering the most problematic intergroup conflicts
that divide our society. In the last four terms, the Court has heard
cases dealing with affirmative action in government procurement pro-
grams,4 legislative districts designed to increase minority representa-
tion,5 state sponsored male-only military schooling,6 and a state
constitutional amendment that would have proscribed antidiscrimina-
tion legislation protecting gay men and .lesbians.? While the Court
has declined to challenge California's anti-affirmative action referen-
dum (Proposition 209)8 and Arizona's English-only state constitu-
tional amendment,9 these unresolved disputes remain areas of likely
future conflict. The Court's ability to resolve such majority-minority
disputes in a manner that furthers democratic values is key to our pol-
ity's ability to be inclusive and equitable as it becomes increasingly
diverse.
be "majority" and others which may be "minority." Such is the case, for example, of Afri-
can American males. Our identities are shifting, multilayered, and complex. See infra Part
II for further discussion of these concepts.
2. This Article defines a "minority" as a social group that, having been constructed by
society as different, experiences a relatively subordinate social identity and social status,
which often results in fewer opportunities for economic and social advancement. It is usu-
ally true, but not essential, that a "minority" group is comprised of fewer than half of the
members of the population. As noted, members of minority groups do not necessarily
share identical views, and all of us belong to multiple and shifting majority-minority
groups. See infra Part II.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
5. Lawyer v. Department ofJustice, 117 S. Ct. 2186 (1997); Abrams v.Johnson, 117 S.
Ct. 1925 (1997); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (Shaw I1); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw 1).
6. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (VM).
7. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
8. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 711 (9th Cir.) (upholding Prop-
osition 209 as constitutional), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
9. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997) (postponing adju-
dication of federal constitutional questions until the Arizona Supreme Court ruled defini-
tively on the construction of the amendment). The Arizona Supreme Court resolved this
issue in Ruiz v. Hul, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998), holding that the English-only amendment
violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.
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This Article argues, however, that the approach the Supreme
Court has taken in resolving majority-minority disputes is inconsistent
with the proper role of the Court in a pluralist democracy1° and there-
fore threatens both the legitimacy of the Court and the ability of our
polity to resolve these important issues. The Court's privileging of
majority views over those of the minority (or the "other") is critical,
not so much because it causes the Court to reach the "wrong" result in
key battleground civil rights cases, nor even because the Court has
adopted the "wrong" view of the world, but instead because the Court
has failed to recognize the multitude of views and perspectives that
exist in our society. This Article faults the Court not so much for its
selection of the majority perspective, but for its failure even to recog-
nize that it has made a choice and for its failure to attempt to reason
with the alternative point of view. 1
This Article proposes an alternative adjudicative approach that
integrates "outsider" insights of majority-minority differences into an
interpretive framework grounded in a pluralist model of democracy.
The proposed "relational framework"' 2 resolves these problematic
cases by emphasizing pluralist democratic values of inclusiveness and
10. The terms "pluralist" and "democracy" have varying meanings. By "pluralist," this
Article refers to what it claims as a social fact, that American society is made up of different
majorities and minorities whose perspectives and values will likely differ because of their
differing social experiences. See infra Part II. By "democracy," this Article means the form
of self-government that includes both majorities and minorities, in which all participate in
formulating the polity's values. This model of democracy, in the context of a constitu-
tional democratic regime, means that the formulation of constitutional values should be
inclusive of the perspectives of both majorities and minorities. See infra Part IV. Thus, as
applied in this Article, "pluralist" is descriptive because it describes American society demo-
graphically, while "democracy" is normative because it sets as a guideline the ideals of
coparticipation and inclusion.
11. This Article therefore also criticizes the Court when, on rare occasions, it adopts a
minority perspective and fails fully to address the alternative majority epistemology. See
infra Part V.B (discussing gender stereotype cases).
12. Professor Minow's and Professor MacNeil's relational approaches, the former in
the context of difference theory, the latter in contract theory, have been helpful in devel-
oping the ideas presented in this Article. See generally infra Part IV.
See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERI-
CAN LAw 379 (1990) [hereinafter MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE]; Martha Minow,
The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 33 n.12
(1987) [hereinafter Minow, Justice Engendered] (describing her own work as the "social-
relations approach"). Professor Minow explains that the relational approach:
emphasize [s] the basic connectedness between people and the injuries that result
from social isolation and exclusion. The relational focus also assists an under-
standing of difference as a function of comparisons between people ... [and]
rejects distinctions drawn between people which express or confirm the distribu-
tion of power in ways that harm the less powerful.
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra, at 379.
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participatory coequality in determining the constitutional values of
the polity. This model requires the Court both to recognize and to
engage the majorities and minorities that will be most affected by the
Court's decision. The model also calls upon the Court to structure its
decisions narrowly, so as to allow citizens to work out their own resolu-
tion to moral, political, and epistemological disputes13 to the greatest
extent possible.14
From time to time, it becomes obvious that we are a society of
many perspectives, at times sharply at odds with each other. For ex-
ample, the current attack on affirmative action programs reveals a
deep racial divide. Most Whites, but not all, oppose affirmative action
as a policy of group quotas or preferences.15 Most racial minorities,
but not all, support affirmative action as a way to combat institutional
and unconscious racial discrimination. 6 On the gender front, the
media has helped to popularize the notion that men and women com-
municate and perceive differently, and that men and women have dis-
Like Professor Minow's work, this project begins from the proposition that difference
is "socially constructed," and that this social text is the proper framework for analyzing
majority-minority conflict in constitutional case law.
Professor MacNeil's theoretical work on relational contract norms also employs the
relational interpretive approach. See LAN R. MAcNEIL, THE NEw SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN IN-
QUIRY INTO MODERN CoNTRACTruAL RELATIONS 10-35, 70 (1980) (arguing that contract law
should acknowledge that commercial relationships are relational rather than discrete, and
that contractual relations involve "such broad norms as distributive justice, liberty, human
dignity, social equality and inequality, and procedural justice").
13. This Article uses the term "epistemology" to describe the conflicts in perspective
between majorities and minorities that are reflected in constitutional law. This Article
claims that minorities and majorities, because of their differing social experiences, will view
the social phenomena that divide them, which in most cases will be the experience of
discrimination, very differendy.
14. This Article argues, nonetheless, that the Court must continue to issue decisions
that protect minorities' rights so as to permit them to continue to participate in these
discussions. See infra Part IV.C.2.a.
15. See Affirmative Action: Republicans Praising Supreme Court's Ruling, ATLANTAJ. CONST.,
June 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6529562 (reporting that close to 80% of Whites ex-
pressed the view that "qualified minorities should not receive preference over equally qual-
ified whites"); see also DINESH D'SouzA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY 215 (1995) (arguing that affirmative action is equivalent to group quotas); Daniel
Yankelovich, How Changes in the Economy Are Reshaping American Values, in VALUES AND PUB-
LIC POLICY 16, 29-33 (HenryJ. Aaron et al. eds., 1994) (advocating that because Americans
value individualism and meritocracy highly, policy makers should reconsider affirmative
action policies).
16. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT
IN AMERICA'S "RACIAL" CRISIS 147-69 (1997) (examining poll data on affirmative action pro-
grams); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innova-
tive Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953, 953 (1996) (describing a "broad-based assault on affirmative
action").
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tinct values and different orientations toward problem solving.17 For
cultural conservatives, gay and lesbian "coming out" marches capture
society's declining moral values, while for gay men and lesbians them-
selves, participation in such marches constitutes an important act of
self and collective affirmation.
The O.J. Simpson verdict continues to be a palpable testament to
the wide gulf between African Americans' and White Americans' faith
in the fairness of the criminal justice system and to their contrasting
views as to the shape and contours of racism. A majority of Whites
consider Mr. Simpson guilty of the crime, while a majority of African
Americans consider him innocent."8 One interpretation of this star-
fling cultural event is that it reflects an epistemological divide. Whites
and African Americans can live in the same country and yet their di-
vergent social experiences cause Whites and racial minorities to inter-
pret the same set of facts in radically different and irreconcilable
ways. 1
9
Such conflicts appear to depict a polity hopelessly divided, at
odds with itself, and intolerant of the diversity that exists within it. At
a superficial level, Americans appreciate their cultural diversity. At a
deeper level, however, they are uneasy that important differences be-
tween majorities and minorities do not appear reconcilable. Recent
poll data reflect that two-thirds of all Americans describe race rela-
17. See, e.g., JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS 59-91 (1992)
(teaching couples how to communicate better in light of gender differences); Malcolm
Gladwell, Listening to Khakis: What America's Most Popular Pants Tell Us About the Way Guys
Think, THE NEW YORKER, July 28, 1997, at 54 (discussing how Levi Strauss & Co. marketed
its Dockers collection by focusing on the way men talk to each other); Deborah Tannen,
How to Give Orders Like a Man, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994 (Magazine), at 46 (challenging the
assumption that talking in an indirect way, which is characteristic of women's mode of
communication, reveals character flaws). See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFrERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (analyzing through
psychological research and literary texts the different modes in which men and women
describe the relationship between self and other).
18. African Americans were far more likely than Whites to believe the defendant's
claim that the Los Angeles police department had conspired to "frame" Mr. Simpson.
Whites also became distrustful of African American's views of justice when the criminal
trial in which jurors were predominantly African American resulted in a verdict of not
guilty. See Maria Puente, Poll: Blacks' Confidence in Police Plummets, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 21,
1995, available in 1995 WL 2929771 (citing a poll that African Americans' confidence in
police and the justice system has "dropped significantly in the past two years"); David K
Shipler, Living Under Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at A2 (citing polls that show three-
quarters of African Americans agree with the "not guilty" criminal verdict in the Simpson
case, compared with only one-third of Whites, while three-quarters of Whites agree with
the liability found in the civil trial, compared with less than one-third of Blacks).
19. See infra notes 184-196 and accompanying text (discussing the distinct "social
spaces" experienced by majorities and minorities as the foundation for distinct epistemolo-
gies).
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tions as "not so good" or "poor. ' 20 In a pluralist democracy, both ma-
jorities and minorities must be able to understand the sources of
majority-minority conflict, so that they can come to tolerate these con-
flicts as reasonable disagreements.
Part I of this Article shows that the Court's decisions in key inter-
group conflict cases dealing with civil rights often involve, at an episte-
mological level not always clearly articulated in case law, a contest of
social texts. Majorities and minorities variously describe and account
for the social phenomena of discrimination, stereotypes, and privilege
that divide them. Specifically, Part L.A examines the paradigmatic ma-
jority-minority divide-racial discrimination-and focuses on the
Court's opinions in two early cases: Washington v. Davis21 and Keyes v.
School District No. 1.2 2 This analysis shows that the Court has con-
structed racial discrimination, based on Whites' experience of this so-
cial dynamic, as a conscious, casuistic, individualistic, culpable, and
solvable phenomenon. Yet, racial minorities experience and know racial
discrimination to be an unconscious, diffuse, systemic, and negligent
phenomenon. Part I.B revisits the key sexual orientation case, Bowers
v. Hardwick,23 which remains good law after Romer v. Evans.24 In Bow-
ers, the Court accepted and legitimized the culturally conservative ma-
jority's moral and religious perspective that same-sex relations are
deviant.2
5
Part II draws on work done by social scientists, feminists, and race
theorists to explain why majorities and minorities develop distinct
epistemologies. It argues, in brief, that these differences result from
the fact that majority and minority groups occupy different social
space, and that their knowledge, similarly, is "socially positioned."
Therefore, as long as we can foresee that minorities' social experience
will be significantly different from majorities', the law should take into
account that majorities and minorities will continue to have different
ways of knowing.
Part III addresses the question of how judges are able to privilege
one epistemological framework over others. Incorporating the work
of legal realists, critical legal theorists, and critical race studies, it maps
20. See ABC News/ESPNpolI Apr. 4, 1997, available in WESTLAW, POLL File (reporting a
telephone survey of 609 respondents conducted between Feb. 21 and Feb. 24, 1997, in
which 2% reported race relations in the United States are excellent, 30% good, 45% not so
good, and 21% poor).
21. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see infta notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
22. 413 U.S. 189 (1973); see infta notes 51-77, 92-100 and accompanying text.
23. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see infra notes 138-171 and accompanying text.
24. 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see infra notes 426-473 and accompanying text.
25. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-94, 195-96.
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how epistemological privileging can remain unarticulated and largely
invisible, even to judges who are well-meaning and concerned about
social division. Because judges, like the rest of us, are shaped by cul-
tural ideology, their "common sense" of the social world will be drawn
from their own social position. Moreover, their reliance on a legal
method that emphasizes abstraction and doctrinal construction per-
mitsjudges to insert the relevant social text. In addition, our method
of constitutional adjudication presupposes "win-loss" thinking, a mode
of reasoning and conflict resolution that discourages reflection about
how epistemological issues divide majorities and minorities.
Part IV sets out an interpretive "relational framework" that reaf-
firms the foundational values of democracy. It focuses on the pluralist
model of democracy developed in John Rawls's Political Liberalism and
elaborated by other political scientists.26 Part IV.A argues that the
democratic foundational principles of coequal participation and in-
clusion should lead judges to engage both majority and minority epis-
26. SeeJOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (paperback ed. 1996) [hereinafter RAWLS,
LIBERALISM]. Rawls's model incorporates a civic ethic of coequality, coparticipation, and
reciprocity; see also BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY. PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A
NEW AGE 117 (1984) (describing strong democracy as participatory democracy that forms a
self-governing community of citizens "who are made capable of common purpose and mu-
tual action by virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory institutions"); AMY GUTMANN
& DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 2 (1996) (setting forth "reciproc-
ity"-reasoning beyond one's self-interest in order to address those who reasonably disa-
gree-as a principle of deliberative democracy); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:
CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 78, 102 (paperback
reprint 1990) (elaborating the concepts of reciprocity, public justification, and overlap-
ping consensus).
Rawls's pluralist model of democracy does not share some of the weaknesses of other
models of communicative democracy that emphasize deliberation and individual transfor-
mation, such as civic republicanism. See infra Part IV (elaborating on the pluralist model).
In contrast to Rawls's pluralist model, civic republicans see individual transformation and
the formulation of unified values and goals as an eventual outcome of the process of civic
deliberation. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988)
(advocating republican constitutionalism as an effort to make "political communities
sources of contestable value and self-direction"); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justifi-
cation for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1511, 1513 (1992) (examining how inter-
est groups engaged in civic deliberation form and inform administrative processes); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554 (1988) (stating that civic
republicanism is based on the belief that the process of deliberation can help reconcile
disparate conceptions of the public good through discussion and dialogue). But see Der-
rick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1610
(1988) (analyzing why "black Americans may struggle to find reasons to allay their skepti-
cism" with the revival of republicanism); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic
Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L, REV. 801, 803 (1993) (criticizing civic republicanism because it
requires the abandonment of many protections of civil liberties); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1721 (1988) (criticizing civic republicanism for
"recast[ing] private associations as participants in a common public life ... [so as] to mute
their potential deviance from and opposition to dominant norms").
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temologies in intergroup conflict cases. Part IV.B then uses Rawls's
concepts of "reciprocity" and "overlapping consensus" to describe a
reconstructed model of public reason that would assist judges to re-
solve majority-minority conflict cases. Part IV.C discusses the relation-
ship between the Court's role in adjudicating majority-minority
conflict cases, and the role played by the rest of the polity in resolving
such disputes. It argues that it is critical for the Court to facilitate
majority-minority discourse throughout the polity by setting parame-
ters for the polity's discussions, by providing an example of what a
judge's public reason ought to mean, and also by not cutting off dis-
cussion that ought to take place in the polity at large.
Part V applies the relational framework to three significant and
recent sets of majority-minority cases: the Court's approach to homo-
sexuality in Romer v. Evans-,27 its handling of gender disparities in Mis-
sissippi University for Women v. Hogan 8 and United States v. Virginia
(VMI);29 and its explication of race issues in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena3° and City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.3 This Part finds both
cause for hope and much room for improvement in these decisions.
On the positive side, it argues that the Court's decisions in the sexual
orientation and gender cases demonstrate that it has the capacity to
deal with the complexities of majority-minority dynamics and even to
engage the epistemology of "the other." This Part contends that
Adarand has some positive aspects, because it calls upon state actors to
make narrow, reasoned decisions in the difficult affirmative action
area. On the other hand, Part V also argues that the Court must work
much harder at not only understanding and engaging the epistemol-
ogy of "the other," but also in limiting its intrusions into the political
sphere.
Part VI, finally, argues that the relational model is not necessarily
inconsistent with the "color-blind" approach urged by the Court in its
recent affirmative action and voting rights decisions. It contends that,
while tension exists between these approaches, the Court would not
need to abandon its "color-blind" analysis to adopt the concept of
judging urged in this Article.
This Article concludes that majority-minority conflict is in urgent
need of care by judges, and that judges, women and men of good
faith, can meet the demands of this difficult task. However, there is
27. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
28. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
29. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
30. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
31. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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also cause for concern. In order forjudges to succeed in this pluralis-
tic endeavor they must possess ajudicial temperament, a commitment
to neutrality, openness of intellect, and a belief in moderation. Thus,
the current push among some sectors of this society to select judges
on the basis of ideological litmus tests undercuts what is attitudinally
necessary to face the modern challenge: the connection of unlikes as
coequals.
I. MAJORITY-MINORnTY CONFLICT CASES: THE PROBLEM OF
EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRIVILEGING
Race, gender, sexual orientation, and cultural identity discrimina-
tion cases are often vehicles for claims made by minority groups that
their treatment in society is not what it should be. In these cases, ma-jority and minority epistemologies collide. In gender discrimination
cases, for example, the collision is caused by disagreement as to
whether social norms that construct women's "normal" preferences,
"natural" physical capabilities, or "traditional" roles oppress women's
liberty, reduce economic opportunities, and relegate them to a
subordinate social identity.3 2 In cultural identity cases, the epistemo-
logical collision is caused by the assumption that homogeneity-in-
32. The epistemological conflict in gender cases is determined by the significance of
the construction of gender as it impacts on women's equality of opportunity. See, e.g.,
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (finding that Tide
VII did not override a California statute requiring employers to pay women pregnancy
disability leave); Gelduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (holding that California's
unemployment insurance that excluded pregnancy from covered workers' benefits for "dis-
ability" was not sex-based discrimination); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139(1872) (rejecting a challenge to Illinois's proscription of women from entry into the legal
profession on the ground that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not cover such
rights of citizenship); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that an Indianapolis ordinance that banned commerce in pornographic
material on the basis that such acts discriminate against women violated the First Amend-
ment because the state may not "ordain preferred viewpoints... and silence opponents"),
affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). For examples of commentary on these issues, see BARARA
ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY
xliii (2d ed. 1996) (exploring the ways that law and society have caused discrimination
against women, and possible legal remedies); RUTH COLKER, PREGNANT MEN: PRACTICE,
THEORY, AND THE LAw xi (1994) (tackling "two issues that are central to many versions of
modern feminist theory-the anti-essentialism critique and equality theory"); CATHERINE
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 91-98 (1994) (discussing the conflict between the law of equality
and the law of free speech in the context of pornography and specifically the decision in
American Booksellers); Margaret A. Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 47 (1997) (looking at "how a feminist account of state power can compre-
hend women as public actors and as subjects of governmental significance").
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stead of diversity-is the norm that the law should maintain. This
conflict is most visible in the language cases.33
A. Race-Based Epistemologies and Antidiscrimination Doctrine
Brown v. Board of Education4 is the key case that shapes our think-
ing of constitutional adjudication of minority-majority antidiscrimina-
tion issues. 35 How broadly or narrowly Brown should be interpreted
has been and continues to be contested. One version interprets Brown
narrowly. From the antidiscrimination perspective, 36 Brown stands for
33. In the case of Spanish-speaking Latinos, the issue is whether the majority can target
Spanish speakers or otherwise resist the intrusion of Spanish into the public sphere. See,
e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 361 (1991) (plurality opinion) (concluding that
the prosecutor's dismissal of jurors from a petit jury because of bilingualism and other
traits associated with Latino ethnicity was not discriminatory under the Equal Protection
Clause); Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 929 (9th Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (holding that a state constitutional amendment that mandated that this "'State and
all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English and in no other language'" was
overbroad and thus violated the First Amendment), vacated sub nom. Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that, while an English-only rule in the workplace can exacerbate
existing tensions, it "does not inexorably lead to an abusive environment for those whose
primary language is not English"); Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 941
(E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that Title VII does not protect people's ability to express their
cultural heritage by speaking their native tongue), affd, 86 F.3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996). For
commentary, see Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Ac-
cents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Prod-
uct of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1347, 1355
(1997) (examining "the manner in which litigants and judges discuss English-only rules");
Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism,
and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 279 (1992) (reviewing the "legal history docu-
menting the interaction between the dominant culture and other American cultures with
respect to language"). See generally Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous]
Americanus: The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV.
1493, 1495 (1998) (explaining "the cultural ideology that has made homogeneity an unex-
pressed assumption and mandate in law").
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. See CAss R. SUNsTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 18 (1996) (stating
that "for some people, any general theory about the constitution must fail if it entails the
incorrectness of Brown").
36. The antidiscrimination principle, which constitutional scholars locate as originat-
ing in a line of cases including Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and ultimately Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
stands for the proposition that the Constitution proscribes classification and other deci-
sions on the basis of race. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (holding that classifications that
target disfavored groups are "suspect," but that the detainment ofJapanese Americans dur-
ing World War II survived an equal protection challenge for reasons of national security);
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74 (holding that a neutral housing ordinance violated the Four-
teenth Amendment because it was applied only to deny laundry permits to Chinese individ-
uals); see also Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 1 (1976) (defining the antidiscrimination
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the proposition that the use of racial classifications by State govern-
ment in segregating African American children in public schools is
presumptively suspect and cannot be justified by a compelling state
interest." This interpretation supports the Court's current "color-
blind" interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, according to
which any official color conscious decision making, whether benign or
discriminatory, should be subject to strict scrutiny.3" From a broader
perspective, however, which commentators have alternatively de-
scribed as "antisubordination," o "antisubjugation, ' '40 "anti-caste,"41 or
"substantive equality, '42 the Brown Court held that what was formerly
principle as "the general principle disfavoring classifications and other decisions and prac-
tices that depend on the race (or ethnic origin) of the parties affected").
37. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (concluding that "in the field of public education the doc-
trine of 'separate but equal' has no place").
38. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-38 (1995) (holding that
strict scrutiny applies to color-conscious remedies such as affirmative action).
39. This interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause looks at the dynamics between
social groups and pushes beyond the claim of an individual litigant. See Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1004 (1986)
(discussing "the premise that equal protection doctrine needs to do a better job under-
standing blacks' and women's visions of equality and needs to have a framework that more
effectively deals with the affirmative action cases"); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. Ar'. 107, 123-24 (1976) (arguing that the Equal Protection
Clause affords some recognition both of the role of social groups and the hierarchy among
them, and asserting that an individualized concept of antidiscrimination is overly narrow);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 48 (1977) (suggesting that "[t]he chief target of the
equal citizenship principle is the stigma of caste").
40. See LAURENCE H. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1515 (2d ed.
1988) (describing the antisubjugation principle as one that "aims to break down legally
created or legally reinforced systems of subordination that treat some people as second-
class citizens").
41. See Paul R. Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle-Toward a Constitutional Standard for
Review of Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 3 (1983) (arguing that, at the core of the Equal
Protection Clause, there is an anti-caste principle according to which "each person has the
right to be free from the continuing effects of caste discrimination in the laws, programs,
official decisions, government, and community affairs of these United States"); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. Rev. 317, 351 (1987) (arguing that because "separate incidents of racial stigmati-
zation do not inflict isolated injuries but are part of a. . . pervasive pattern of stigmatizing
actions that cumulate to compose an injurious whole"); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2413-14, 2440 (1994) (arguing that the anti-caste principle
encompasses a narrower band of minorities, excluding gay men and lesbians, but ex-
tending to African Americans and women, and that eliminating caste-like relations-in-
cluding economic structural disadvantage-is primarily a task for the government's
political branches).
42. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 3 (1989) (describing the Equal Protection Clause as embodying the princi-
ple of "equal citizenship" that "[elach individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by
the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member"); Fiss, supra
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considered "separate but equal" was per se unequal because official
state segregation inflicts stigmatic harms upon African American chil-
dren that reinforce structural and unconscious discrimination.43 This
interpretation connects the state's discriminatory acts (official segre-
gation) to maintaining stigmatization of the social identity of a disfa-
vored minority (African American children). In a controversial
passage, the Court asserted that: "To separate them from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may af-
fect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
44
The Court unfalteringly followed a broad vision of Brown for al-
most two decades. The Court expanded Brown's broad integration
remedy in cases like Green v. County School Board4" and Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.46 McLaughlin v. Florida4 7 and Lov-
ing v. Virginia48 expanded the constitutional meaning of Brown and
required the state to meet a "very heavy burden"49 when it singled out
racial minorities for treatment that was permissible when engaged in
by Whites but not racial minorities.5 °
note 39, at 147-51 (suggesting a "group-disadvantaging principle" that includes a redistrib-
utive strategy as well as an "ethical view against caste"); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doc-
trine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1062 (1978) (emphasizing that substantive equal protection
focuses "on ends and purposes, and not just means or legislative rationality"); see also
Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitu-
tional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1734 (1989) (arguing that the constitutionality of
affirmative action cannot be evaluated "without (at least implicitly) subscribing to a partic-
ular conception of substantive equality").
43. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (discussing the broader,
psychological effects of segregation on minority children).
44. Id. at 494. Justice Thomas, among others, has recently repudiated this passage,
stating that "[pisychological injury or benefit is irrelevant to the question whether state
actors have engaged in intentional discrimination-the critical inquiry for ascertaining vio-
lations of the Equal Protection Clause." Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
45. 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (holding that school boards have "the affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch").
46. 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971) (sanctioning the far-reaching busing remedy involving ele-
mentary as well as secondary schools in order "to achieve the greatest possible degree of
actual desegregation").
47. 379 U.S. 184, 184-86 (1964) (striking down a Florida statute that levied heavier
penalties on interracial versus same race cohabitation).
48. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (striking down laws prohibiting interracial marriage).
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 11 (striking down a miscegenation statute because it "rest[s] solely upon dis-
tinctions drawn according to race"); see McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188 (striking down a stat-
ute prohibiting interracial cohabitation because it "treats the interracial couple .
differently than it does any other couple").
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Keyes v. School District No. 151 was the first case to sharply limit the
reach of Brown. The Court did so by reconstructing and narrowing
what discrimination had meant under Brown. In Keyes, the issue posed
was whether the Denver School District, which had no prior history of
de jure segregation but was de facto segregated, could be obligated to
undertake remedial actions under Brown.12 The trial record had es-
tablished that the non-White schools were "educationally inferior," re-
ceiving fewer resources, including less well-trained personnel, while
the predominantly White schools fared far better." The school dis-
trict maintained that such de facto racial segregation had been the
result of neutral decision-making criteria, particularly the school
board's policy of favoring local neighborhood schools.54
The Keyes Court held that, in de facto segregation cases, plaintiffs
needed to show that the school district had had "segregative intent."55
Under the facts of Keyes, the Court was willing to infer intent because
there had been a crucial lower court finding that district officials had
intentionally maintained segregated core city schools.56 The Court
ruled that this intent could be ascribed to the rest of the district; how-
ever, the Board could rebut such a presumption.57
The introduction in Keyes of the requirement of discriminatory
intent is pivotal. The Court introduced the concept of discriminatory
intent because Denver school board officials never had enunciated a
policy of maintaining racial segregation. 58 Thus, in Keyes, the Court
addressed the appropriate burden of proof absent de jure segrega-
tion. While the Court acknowledged that de facto segregation was dif-
ferent from de jure segregation, it failed to recognize the impact of
the heightened burden of proof required to show segregative intent.
The circumstantial proof offered in Keyes of a "systematic program of
51. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
52. Id. at 191-202 (noting that the northwest corner of the Denver school district was
almost entirely White, while the southwest corner was almost entirely Latino and African
American). Professor Rachel Moran offers a sociological analysis of the Keyes litigation. See
Rachel F. Moran, Courts and the Construction of Racial and Ethnic Identity: Public Law Litiga-
tion in the Denver Schools, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 153 (Lawrence M.
Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1996).
53. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 193.
54. Id. at 205-07.
55. Id. at 193, 197-98. The Court applied a shifting burden approach, so that once
plaintiffs were able to show segregative intent within a significant segment of the school
system, there was a presumption of such intent district-wide, and the school authorities
then had the burden of showing that their other actions were not similarly motivated. Id.
at 207-08.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 208-09.
58. Id. at 191.
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segregation affecting a substantial portion of students, schools, teach-
ers, and facilities"' 59 has proven difficult for subsequent plaintiffs to
duplicate.6 °
The Keyes Court failed to acknowledge that the pragmatic effect
of its ruling was to narrow prior interpretations of Brown. The main
body of the opinion authored by Justice Brennan is workmanlike, dis-
cussing at great length burdens of proof, without intimating what
their impact would be on race relations litigation.61 Justice Powell's
concurrence,62 however, deals in a more straightforward manner with
the problems of imposing proof of intent in cases of the more com-
mon phenomenon of de facto segregation. Justice Powell candidly
stated that most school districts are de facto segregated,63 and that
"there is . . . not a school district . . . with any significant minority
school population, in which the school authorities-in one way or the
other-have not contributed in some measure to the degree of segre-
gation which still prevails."64 He observed that the search for proof of
segregative intent will subject future courts to "murky, subjective judg-
ments, that will tender "fortuitous, unpredictable and even capri-
cious'' 66 results.
Justice Powell's concurrence also addressed the appropriate ex-
tent of desegregation remedies. He advocated for "reason, flexibility,
and balance."67 Powell appeared solicitous of both African American
and White parents' interests when he listed the parade of horribles
that busing remedies under Brown could trigger: widespread busing
that "risk[s] setting in motion unpredictable and unmanageable social
consequences"; 68 the specter of overzealous potential plaintiffs med-
dling in local school board decisions;69 and the eventual "disman-
fling" of public school systems.70
59. Id. at 201.
60. See DERICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 561 n.18 (3d ed. 1992) ("Keyes'
requirement that plaintiffs in districts with no history of de jure segregation prove that the
school board intentionally segregated students has proved to be a formidable burden
61. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200, 207-13.
62. Id. at 217-53 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 218, 232, 252-53.
64. Id. at 252-53.
65. Id. at 227.
66. Id. at 233.
67. Id. at 239.
68. Id at 250.
69. Id. at 233-35.
70. Id at 250.
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Justice Powell's parade of horribles, however, is not as neutral as
it may appear, even if it is prescient. Powell's concerns strike themes
that reflect White parents' views on busing. Powell cites parents' pri-
vate interests in guiding their children's education.71 This privacy-
based right would become a mantra in White parents' subsequent de-
fiance of court ordered busing.72 His concern that parents might be
unable to afford private education73 would become very real for White
parents who would choose to resist busing en masse by opting out of
the public school system. 74 His concern that busing could weaken lo-
cal community influence on school boards75 is a concern that African
American parents were not in a position to feel, because they viewed
litigation as the only effective means of having local school board offi-
cials take note of their interest.76 More importantly, Powell does not
acknowledge what was at the time African American parents' main
reason for pursuing racial desegregation remedies. For these parents,
integration, even if achieved at the cost of busing, seemed to offer a
way to solve what they viewed as inferior educational opportunities for
their children.77
Washington v. Davis,78 decided three terms later, solidified the
Keyes Court's limitation of racial remedies in another area, employ-
ment discrimination, by imposing a similar burden on the plaintiff to
show discriminatory intent.79 Davis challenged the employment appli-
cant screening tests used by the District of Columbia police; the rec-
71. Id. at 246-47, 251.
72. See, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 890, 898 (6th Cir. 1972) (Weick, J.,
dissenting) (urging that court ordered busing frustrates American couples' choice of
neighborhood schools and infringes upon their privilege of association). See generally Paul
Gerwitz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983) (discussing the limits of ideal reme-
dies in the face of real opposition to desegregation).
73. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 247 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Professor Moran documents that at the time of the Keyes litigation, the Denver
school district had a majority White student body. As of 1991, the school district had be-
come 40% Latino and 20% African American. See Moran, supra note 52, at 155-56.
75. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. See Moran, supra note 52, at 166.
77. See id. at 157-59. Professor Moran notes that the Keyes controversy was spearheaded
by middle class African American parents who perceived that the school district's de facto
segregative practices would block their children's advancement. The NAACP Legal De-
fense Fund initiated the litigation only after citywide elections succeeded in placing an-
tibusing candidates in control of the school board. Latino parents were not initially part of
the litigation because they were not as confident as African American parents that the
integration remedy would result in improved educational opportunities.
78. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
79. Id. at 241 (finding that the disparate racial impact of a police department's written
personnel test was not unconstitutional absent a showing of "the necessary discriminatory
racial purpose").
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ord showed that the screening test had a disproportionate impact on
African American applicants."s The prior decisions of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co."l and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody82 had established that,
under Title VII, once the plaintiff had demonstrated a disproportion-
ate racial impact, the employer had the burden of demonstrating the
nexus between its employment screening devices and job qualifica-
tions."s Davis indicated that this shifting burden approach-accord-
ing to which a showing of disparate racial impact was sufficient to
make a prima facie case-was limited to Title VII, and that a challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause required a showing of purpose or
intent to discriminate.8 4
To support its holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires
more than a disparate racial impact, the Davis Court offered a reinter-
pretation of equal protection cases, including the recently decided
Keyes, to support the claim that discriminatory intent had always been
an important doctrinal requirement of a discrimination claim.8 5 The
Court cited Strauder v. West Virginia,6 an early case that struck down
West Virginia's categorical exclusion of African Americans from petit
juries. The Court claimed that Strauder stands for the proposition that
intent to discriminate can be shown by the categorical exclusion of a
racial minority group; the Court contrasted such categorial exclusion
to a racially disparate impact from which a discriminatory purpose
may not necessarily be inferred. 7 Strauder is a curious choice because
it better supports the proposition that the Court should be on guard
80. Id. at 235-36.
81. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
82. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
83. Id. at 425; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
84. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
85. Id. at 239-45.
86. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (holding that a statute that rendered African Americans
ineligible for jury service violated the Equal Protection Clause), overruled on other grounds by
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
87. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 ("'A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be
proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the prescribed race . . . .'" (quoting
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945))). Strauder placed the purpose of the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments in their historical context, namely, "to protect an
emancipated race." Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. The Strauder Court continued:
This is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose;
namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many gener-
ations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race en-
joy[s].... It was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the
civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that
race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it
should be denied by the States.
Id. at 306 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873)).
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for actions by the majority to single out a disfavored minority based on
a supremacist ideology8 8 or, more generally, racial hostility.89
A more candid justification as to why the disproportionate effect
test must not be recognized in equal protection doctrine appears at
the end of the Davis opinion. Citing a law review article, the Court
contended that the Griggs disparate impact position would have "far
reaching . . . consequences" in the way America conducts business.90
The Court implied that virtually every aspect of states' decision mak-
ing from welfare to taxes to bridge tolls could be subject to court in-
tervention and modification under the disparate impact rule of Griggs
and Albemarle.9 1
Davis and Keyes can be understood as cases that bring the Court
face to face with the immensity of the racial inequality problem. The
Court had to address the following sorts of issues: the extent to which
remedying racial problems might tax judicial resources, particularly
judicial institutional credibility with the majority White population;9 2
the discomfort to Whites of continuing the trajectory of earlier case
law that attempted to address race discrimination more systemically; 3
and the pervasiveness of biased practices that the Brown Court was will-
ing to contemplate originated with Plessy. 4 Although the Court ac-
cepted the premise that a disparate impact test would have
unacceptably far-reaching consequences,9" it failed to provide ajustifi-
88. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306 (describing as the purpose of the Civil War Amend-
ments the anticipation that "those who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject
race would, when suddenly raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy
and positive dislike, and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the
distinctions that had before existed").
89. Id. ("Discriminations against [African Americans] had been habitual. It was well
known that in some States laws making such discriminations then existed, and others
might well be expected.").
90. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 & n.14 (citing Frank I. Goodman, DeFacto School Segregation:
A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REv. 275, 300 (1972)).
91. Specifically, the Court said:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent
compelling justification ... would be far reaching and would raise serious ques-
tions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and
to the average black than to the more affluent white.
Id. at 248.
92. Id. at 248 & n.14; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 250-52 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
93. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242-45; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 251 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
94. Davis, 426 U.S. at 246; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 252-53 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
95. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
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cation to racial minorities for why the Court should not recognize
such a remedy. While the Court appeared to recognize the continu-
ing and far-reaching impacts of discrimination on racial minorities,
nevertheless the results of these cases indicate a belief that these solu-
tions had already gone too far.9 6
In Keyes and Davis, however, the Court failed to acknowledge the
experience of racial minorities. The requirement of showing discrimi-
natory intent9 7 not only raises the burden of proof for claimants,98 but
more importantly, reshapes what the Constitution recognizes as dis-
crimination. The Court did not articulate the social facts of the phe-
nomenon of discrimination. But by doctrinally defining the intent
element as conscious, casuistic, individualist, and culpable, the Court
required plaintiffs to prove what Whites view as discrimination. 9 By
contrast, the antisubordination prong of Brown interpreted discrimi-
nation as a broad systemic practice, a social text concordant with how
racial minorities experience discrimination, as unconscious, diffuse, sys-
temic, and negligent.1 00 The Court in Keyes and Davis failed to reason
and justify across the color line. Instead, these cases mark the begin-
ning of an epistemological racial divide, which then became incorpo-
rated into equal protection jurisprudence.
1. Conscious versus Unconscious Discrimination.--As Professor Law-
rence has argued, unconscious discrimination is insidious and more
pervasive than conscious discrimination.1"1 According to psycholo-
96. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text (discussing the tension between the
identification of racial injustice and the failure to provide a satisfactory remedy in Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Keyes). See generally ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CON-
STITUTION 130-50 (1992) (defending the Court's retreat from difficult racial matters).
97. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
98. See, e.g., Keyes, 413 U.S. at 261 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("'[I]ntent' .. . is difficult
enough to ascertain under the most favorable of circumstances. Far greater difficulty is
encountered if we are to assess the intentions with which official acts of a school board are
performed over a period of years." (citation omitted)). See generally BELL, supra note 60, at
834-75 (discussing the issue of discriminatory intent in the context of employment law);
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1110-19 (1989)
(describing the intent requirement in Davis and other cases as inconsistent with the pro-
cess theory on which it is grounded).
99. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (refusing to recognize de facto segregation as unlawful
absent a purpose or intent to discriminate); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 202 (describing discrimina-
tion as a series of discrete acts with "racially identifiable bases").
100. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (describing the stigmatic
harms of systematic segregation).
101. Lawrence, supra note 41, at 322 (arguing that "[t]raditional notions of intent do
not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are influenced in large part by fac-
tors that can be characterized as neither intentional.., nor unintentional"); see also Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
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gists, unconscious racial discrimination can affect almost any interac-
tion between Whites and racial minorities.1 1 2  Negative racial
stereotypes can affect Whites' decision making in a myriad of areas,
particularly areas where subjective judgments about character, motiva-
tion, and intellectual ability come into play.' A White decision
maker need not be aware that she is making harsh judgments when
the subjects are racial minorities rather than Whites.'0 4 These subjec-
tive judgments can be rationalized, which enables Whites to maintain
an egalitarian self-image' 0 5 and yet to continue to participate in un-
conscious discrimination, which, just as efficiently as the conscious va-
riety, impedes the progress of racial minorities' access to equal
opportunity. Substantial empirical data document the pervasiveness
and frequency of racial discrimination in a variety of areas, including
denial of credit, car purchases, and employment performance
evaluations. 
0 6
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1164 (1995) (arguing that Title
VII jurisprudence is inadequate to address subtle, unconscious forms of bias); Ann C. Mc-
Ginley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the Dis-
tinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARiz. L. REv.
1003, 1011 (1997) (providing a new conceptual framework to decide Title VII cases that
includes "the historical legacy of slavery" and "the presence of invisible white privilege").
102. See David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of
the Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 127, 133 (John F. Dovidio
& Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (setting forth a cognitive perspective and defining a
stereotype as "a cognitive structure that contains the perceiver's knowledge, beliefs, and
expectancies about some human group" (emphasis omitted)).
103. Id. at 148-49 (noting that, because stereotypes may serve as a basis for hypotheses
about individuals, they may influence subjective judgments).
104. See Samuel L. Gaertner &John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 102, at 61, 73-80. Gaertner and Dovidio devised
several studies showing that Whites may discriminate against racial minorities and yet con-
tinue to believe themselves to be nonprejudiced and egalitarian. In one such study, high
and low prejudiced (scored by an attitudinal test) White male college students rated Afri-
can American and White individuals who were alternatively introduced as their
subordinate or supervisor. Id. at 73-75. Both low and high prejudiced Whites negatively
rated their Black supervisor. Id. at 75. Post-experimental evaluations revealed that they
perceived the Black supervisors to be significantly less intelligent than themselves,
although the test as devised imparted no information about the subjects' intelligence. Id.
Gaertner and Dovidio concluded that "many whites, truly believing that they are nonpreju-
diced and nondiscriminating, may presently be participating in the continued restriction
of opportunities for blacks and other minorities by opposing programs that threaten their
own advantaged status and by misperceiving the relative competence of those who have
traditionally occupied lower-status positions." Id. at 75-76.
105. Id. at 66-73 (concluding that White individuals will discriminate against Blacks in
situations where the relevance of non-race-related elements are heightened because this
context allows White individuals to rationalize a negative response).
106. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 13941 (1993) (exploring the significance of the in-
creasing class and residential isolation between Blacks and Whites); Margalynne Arm-
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By removing from judicial scrutiny a great portion of those indi-
vidual decisions that are motivated unconsciously by racial bias or in-
directly have a discriminatory impact, the intent requirement arguably
removes the possibility of judicial confrontation with Whites' own in-
grained racial stereotypes, in-group preferencing behavior, and the ef-
fects of "neutral" decision making that nonetheless have a racial
impact. 10 7 Because the Court has adopted a White perspective, the
Court has truncated a necessary racial dialogue, which might proceed
along the following lines: If racial stereotypes are so ingrained and so
pervasive, is the judiciary the proper institution to take on the im-
mense task of ferreting out unconscious discriminatory thoughts?
How can subjecting Whites to the constant anxiety of being discov-
ered as "unconscious" discriminators improve race relations? This dis-
cussion would not necessarily solve the problem of ongoing
unconscious discrimination, which may require individual transforma-
tion. Such a discussion, however, would capture and bring to a con-
scious, public level the kinds of social interactions that harm racial
minorities. By adopting the White perspective without discussion, the
Court has foreclosed this possible dialogue.
2. Intentional versus Negligent Discrimination.-The intent require-
ment assumes a cause and effect relationship between the action (con-
strong, Privilege in Residential Housing, in STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE
REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 43-66 (1996) [hereinafter
PRIVILEGE REVEALED] (discussing residential segregation and its effect as a racial privilege).
For a discussion of discrimination in the context of historical employment practices,
see ToMAs ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY
IN CALIFORNIA 13-14, 25-26, 72, 100-04 (1994) (describing how in the early 1900s racial
attitudes, combined with a developing agricultural economy, resulted in a system of occu-
pational and residential segregation in California, where Asian Americans, Native Ameri-
cans, and Mexican Americans were relegated to agricultural labor, while Whites had access
to skilled occupations); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAK-
ING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 144-50 (1991) (discussing how in pre-Industrial
America certain occupations remained off-limits to racial minorities, particularly African
Americans).
For a discussion of discrimination in the context of the tax code, see Gwen Thayer
Handelman, Acknowledging Workers in Definitions of Consumption and Investment: The Case
of Health Care Law, in TAXING AMERICA 119, 138-41 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows
eds., 1996) (arguing that current tax policy ignores and harms the working class); Beverly
I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. REV.
751, 768 (raising the question of whether the IRS systematically favors Whites over Blacks);
John A. Powell, How Government Tax and Housing Policies Have Racially Segregated America, in
TAXING AMERICA, supra, at 80, 83 (analyzing how the tax code has penalized African Ameri-
cans and aided the White community "by subsidizing and reifying racial segregation and
racial inequality in the distribution of resources").
107. See generally Lawrence, supra note 41, at 326 (discussing different theories of uncon-
scious attitudes that ultimately result in racism).
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duct motivated by discriminatory intent) and a result (discriminatory
harm). As evidenced by the Keyes case, a series of individual, discrete,
"neutral" decisions, when taken together, can result in a segregated
and substantively unequal school district."' 8 In favoring "neighbor-
hood" choice policies, the Denver school officials could claim that
there was no conscious intent to segregate. However, in Keyes, given
segregated residential patterns, school officials were probably aware
or should have been aware that such policies would tend to perpetu-
ate school segregation and a status quo in which Whites had substan-
tially better access to quality schools. 109 As Alan Freeman has noted,
the causality requirement of the antidiscrimination doctrine does not
capture the concept of "negligent discrimination," an intermediate
range where Whites do not intend harm, but have some awareness of
the effects of actions which are not entirely neutral, and which, there-
fore, will perpetuate a status quo advantageous to Whites.110
The intent requirement removes from judicial scrutiny cumula-
tive effects of individual decisions that, on the whole, substantively dis-
advantage racial minorities. Keyes makes it possible for White parents
to rationalize systemic advantages of a public education system, with-
108. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 234-35 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (noting the multitude of "routine decisions" that can affect
the extent of school segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 28 (1971) (noting that "'racially neutral'" assignment of public school students may "fail
to counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation").
109. The circumstantial evidence introduced in the Keyes litigation convinced the trial
judge that the school board's decision making was not racially neutral. The school district
assigned minority teachers to schools with a predominant minority enrollment and situ-
ated new schools in portions of the school districts that would draw enrollment of primar-
ily one racial group. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 69-73, 79-80, 83 (D. Colo.
1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), modified, 413 U.S. 189
(1973).
110. Freeman, supra note 42, at 1055-56. This is Professor Lawrence's view as well:
[T]he existing intent requirement's assignment of individualized fault or respon-
sibility for the existence of racial discrimination distorts our perceptions about
the causes of discrimination and leads us to think about racism in a way that
advances the disease rather than combatting it. By insisting that a blameworthy
perpetrator be found before the existence of racial discrimination can be ac-
knowledged, the Court creates an imaginary world where discrimination does not
exist unless it was consciously intended. And by acting as if this imaginary world
was real and insisting that we participate in this fantasy, the Court and the law it
promulgates subtly shape our perceptions of society. The decision to deny relief
no longer finds its basis only in raw political power or economic self-interest; it is
now justifiable on moral grounds. If there is no discrimination, there is no need
for a remedy; if blacks are being treated fairly yet remain at the bottom of the
socioeconomic ladder, only their own inferiority can explain their subordinate
position.
Lawrence, supra note 41, at 324-25 (footnote omitted).
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out having to question the history of racial relations that has resulted
in a present day system that privileges them.1 11 Race relations cannot
advance if Whites can make such a wide range of decisions without
considering the potentially harmful effects of their actions. 1 2 To ra-
cial minorities, this doctrinal position communicates majorities' lack
of compassion and unwillingness to deal with the present effects of
past discrimination.
3. Individual Autonomous Acts versus Socially Constructed Actors.-
The intent requirement also assumes that discrimination consists of
individual acts that are clearly discernible and patently culpable. Yet,
individuals are socially constructed actors. We exist in an environ-
ment that not only tolerates, but teaches, encourages, and supports
negative stereotypes about racial minorities,"l3 as well as the "privi-
lege" of a White social identity.11 4 We are not conscious of these influ-
ences, because they are so pervasive and so rooted in our social
context that they now form part of a common cultural ideology-a
sense of how the social order is and should be.11 Racial knowledge
and the consequences thereof, as well as negative categories of racial
social identity, inevitably influence social transactions between majori-
ties and racial minorities.
1 1 6
111. See supra notes 51-77 and accompanying text.
112. See Freeman, supra note 42, at 1054-56 (describing how the view of racial discrimi-
nation as the conduct of misguided individuals rather than a social phenomenon makes
.even illusory progress in the quest for racial justice impossible"); Lawrence, supra note 41,
at 344-55.
113. See supra notes 102-105 (discussing social scientific studies of stereotypes).
114. See Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in
PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 106, at 7, 8 (discussing how legal language and doctrine
have not recognized the pervasive notion of privilege); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But
Now I See". White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 953, 957, 969, 970-71 (1993) (advocating that Whites become conscious of their race
as the subtext of apparently neutral White decision making); Peggy McIntosh, White Privi-
lege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in
Womens' Studies, in POWER PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22, 23 (1995) (pro-
viding a personal account of facing up to White privilege as "an invisible package of
unearned assets").
115. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 33, at 1527 (describing how cultural practices of
Whites allow them to be unaware of the privileges and dominance into which they are
born); Jeffrey Prager, American Racial Ideology as Collective Representation, 5 ETHNIC & RACIAL
STUD. 99, 103 (1982) (claiming that differences between Whites and Blacks have histori-
cally been a "central organizing cultural principle in American life" and that "[t ] he essen-
tial features seen to distinguish whites from blacks-in terms of character, capacities, spirit,
etc.-have become deeply and inextricably woven into the cultural fabric of the nation").
116. See Flagg, supra note 114, at 969 (noting that "[t]here is a profound cognitive di-
mension to the material and social privilege that attaches to whiteness in this society" and
describing the tendency of Whites not to be conscious of their race or this privilege as "the
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Keyes and Davis reconstruct racial discrimination into individual
atomistic acts, each discretely motivated, capable of isolation, and de-
void of connection to a history of racial caste and a social context that
supports racial privilege.1 17 The Court did not explain why this inter-
pretation of race relations is mandated by the Equal Protection
Clause. In Keyes, Justice Powell's concurring opinion's parade of
White parents' horribles provides a glimpse as to what may be the
Court's concern.1 1 In Davis, the rationale appears to lie in the
Court's slippery slope argument that discriminatory racial impact
could reach into every aspect of American lives. 19
Why was this retreat from Brown's broader view of stigmatic harm
and social context necessary? These passages imply that the Equal
Protection Clause should not be interpreted so broadly as to chal-
lenge actively the ideological common sense that orders a social world
in which Whites enjoy superior status.12 ° Sociologists who have stud-
ied Whites' racial attitudes report that Whites want to remain racially
innocent.1 21 If this is so, it can be anticipated that Whites would resist
attempts to recast apparently "normal" everyday interaction into a
transaction that carries with it racial significance.' 22 According to the-
transparency phenomenon"); Janet Ward Schofield, Causes and Consequences of the Colorblind
Perspective, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 102, at 231, 233-35, 250
(setting forth research on a four-year study of peer relations at a middle school, and con-
cluding that, although the effort to be color-blind "may ease initial tensions and minimize
the frequency of overt conflict," it also poses the danger of "refus[ing] to recognize and
deal with the existence of intergroup tensions").
117. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (omitting any discussion of the his-
torical oppression faced by Black job applicants and holding a facially neutral police re-
cruitment test constitutionally valid); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973)
(recognizing that the school board's racial segregation policy concerning one particular
neighborhood could reach beyond the targeted schools, but nonetheless requiring an ini-
tial showing of intentional discrimination before remedial action is required).
118. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
120. Cf Freeman, supra note 42, at 1065-67 (arguing that even a narrow, color-blind
interpretation of Brown cannot avoid a broader notion of substantive equal protection that
takes into account the historical context of racial domination).
121. See RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATrERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF WHITENESS 46 (1993) (reporting interviews with five women and noting that their recol-
lections, while failing to mention people of color, turned out to be only apparently all
White, and that race functioned as an unconscious filter for their perceptions).
122. Cf id. at 70 (noting that, in different ways, interviewees became "more cognizant of
the [racial] patterning of their earlier experiences" only upon being interviewed and ques-
tioned); SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA 77-109 (1990) (implying that unarticulated White guilt, which influences Whites'
thinking about African Americans, is a major factor in impeding honest racial dialogue).
But see Annalee Newitz, White Savagery and Humiliation, or A New Racial Consciousness in the
Media, in WHITE TRASH 131, 132-33 (Matt Wray & Annalee Newitz eds., 1997) (suggesting
that White racial identity is aware of its internal contradictions, and that "there is certainly
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ories of power relations, this kind of challenge would be deeply desta-
bilizing to Whites and their sense of self and sense of social order.
123
Some even suggest that challenges to White dominance trigger anxi-
ety.124 Would challenging the majority's sense of social order and trig-
gering the majority's innate resistance to this topic lead to better race
relations? Is the judiciary's pursuit of White responsibility in cases
where causality is amorphous a proper judicial role, and could this
type of inquiry further impact negatively on race relations? These
questions cannot be part of a constitutional dialectic because the
Court responded to Whites' unease with the potentially broad impact
of Brown and Griggs by removing vast areas of interaction between
Whites and racial minorities from constitutional discourse.
125
4. Culpability.-By making the judicial inquiry one of locating
culpable intent, the Court participates in reinforcing the myth of
White racial innocence. Sociologist Ruth Frankenberg reports that
Whites have come to understand racism as removed from them.1
26
This "White innocence" reconceptualizes racism into something in
which only others engage. 127 Thus, under the Court's analysis, racial
injustice can be localized and limited to blameworthy individual actors
or attributed to blameworthy acts of past (racist) decision makers. 28
All other Whites can claim nonculpability. By legitimizing the con-
a self-critical, and self-conscious, aspect to white identity, however faint, which demon-
strates that whites are able to see themselves in the same way oppressed racial groups often
see them").
123. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS &
OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 92-94, 158-59 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980) (asserting that
power relations are constructed through discourses that constitute and reinforce power).
124. See Newitz, supra note 122, at 133 (positing that White racial identity is character-
ized by contradictions that manifest themselves as "fears about the unattainability of a total
'white power,' and a crippling sense of guilt caused by an (often repressed) acknowledge-
ment of white racism").
125. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (holding that the Court cannot
find legislation furthering a neutral purpose invalid despite ramifications that may be
more beneficial or burdensome to one race than another); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 111, 117-119.
126. FRANKENBERG, supra note 121, at 238.
127. See id. (arguing that evasion of color and power is a dominant racial discursive
practice in the United States); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 297, 310 (1990) (explaining that the affirmative action debate is framed in the rheto-
ric of White innocence, and that this perspective avoids dealing with problems of uncon-
scious racism); Wildman & Davis, supra note 114, at 8-20 (explaining that the ability to
avoid the consequences of racial power is a form of White privilege).
128. See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 246 (rejecting the contention of Negro police candidates
that their poor performance resulted from the discriminatory design of a recruitment test,
and emphasizing that the police department made affirmative efforts to recruit Negro
candidates).
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cept that White culpability can be limited to conscious atomistic acts,
the Court de-emphasizes the larger context of White responsibility. If
Whites can continue to enjoy privilege without questioning why it ex-
ists, race relations cannot advance. 129 Without recognition that con-
struction of Whiteness, as privileged and virtuous, is directly related to
the construction of racial minorities as inferior and nonvirtuous, 130 we
will be unable to close the racial gap.
In sum, the manner in which the Court has constructed discrimi-
nation pragmatically relieves the Court from having to address very
difficult issues that are particularly discomforting to Whites. Racial
minorities' experience with racism leads them to view racism as a sys-
temic and pervasive phenomenon.1 3 ' For minorities, discrimination
insinuates itself as daily racial "microaggressions. 13 2 A majority of Af-
rican Americans report experiencing discrimination in their everyday
lives. 13 3 On the other hand, Whites live in an America in which they
129. Cf Newitz, supra note 122, at 150 (criticizing the current deconstructionist White
studies literature as a type of "self-punishment 
. . . [that] absolve[s] whites of their guilt
without explicitly suggesting that they do more [about oppressive social practices] than
criticize themselves").
130. The construction of minority racial identity is related to and dependent on the
construction of White identity. See Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,1370-74 (1988) (describing the qualities that are culturally ascribed to African Americans
as the antinomy of the qualities ascribed to Whites); Lazos Vargas, supra note 33, at 1555(describing the dominant ideology that racial minorities are unwilling to assimilate and to
work their way up from poverty as having developed in relation to the White ethnic immi-grant narrative); Martha R. Mahoney, The Social Construction of Whiteness, in CRITICAL WHITE
STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 330, 330 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,1997) (describing race as a relational concept and pointing out that "'good' neighbor-hoods are equated with Whiteness and 'black' neighborhoods are equated with
joblessness").
131. SeeJOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS
EXPERIENCE 15 (1994) ("When our respondents talk about being black in a country domi-
nated by whites, they do not speak in abstract concepts of discrimination or racism learned
only from books, but tell of mistreatment encountered as they traverse traditionally whiteplaces."); JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND
THE SOUL OF THE NATION 72-75 (1995) (recompiling and analyzing attitudinal data show-ing that African Americans are conscious of ongoing systemic discrimination against them
and yet continue to pursue the "American Dream," and that more affluent African Ameri-
cans see more systemic racial discrimination than do poor African Americans); see also
HARRY H. L. KITANO & ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICANS: EMERGING MINORITIES 195 (2d
ed. 1995) (reporting that 80% of African Americans, 64% of Hispanics, and 57% of Asians
perceive prejudice against their group).
132. Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggresion, 98 YALE LJ. 1559, 1565-66 (1989) (defining
microaggressions as subtle nonverbal exchanges that insult Blacks and exercise a cumula-
tive effect).
133. See ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 11-26 (1993) (chronicling en-
counters of successful, well-educated Blacks with inescapable "racial demons"); WILLIAM H.
GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (3d ed. 1992) (depicting the spectrum of discrimina-
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can assume that they will enjoy fairness and can proclaim that racial
minorities are also subject to the same fair treatment.1 1 4 For Whites,
racism exists in the abstract, as "'racism-in-the-head,"' while for racial
minorities, racism is concrete, as "'racism-in-the-world."' ' "5 The dis-
crepancy between Whites and minorities in conceptualizing discrimi-
nation and talking about racism reflects different life conditions that
cannot be ignored, assumed away, or reconciled. Rather, this episte-
mological divide reflects a troubled and complex interrelationship."
6
Yet the Court has premised its view of discrimination on the White
perspective, while failing even to recognize the existence of an alter-
native point of view.'3 7
B. Sexual Orientation: Deference to Tradition
Bowers v. Hardwick1P was a controversial and, for the gay and les-
bian community, devastating decision. An article appearing in the
popular gay and lesbian press, Close to the Knives, exemplifies the depth
of feeling that this decision engendered:
A number of months ago I read in the newspaper that there
was a Supreme Court ruling which states that homosexuals in
America have no constitutional rights against the govern-
ment's invasion of their privacy. The paper stated that ho-
mosexuality is traditionally condemned in America and only
people who are heterosexual or married or who have fami-
lies can expect these constitutional rights. There were no
editorials. Nothing. Just flat cold type in the morning paper
tion faced by Blacks from the perspective of two African American psychiatrists); HOCH-
SCHILD, supra note 131, at 73 (noting psychological reports that African Americans who
have made it socially and economically still feel rage at the constant prejudice and discrimi-
nation and concomitant loss of dignity they experience).
134. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 131, at 61 (noting that in 1994, a majority of White
Americans believed that race relations were getting better); EUSABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE
ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES 97 (1996) (citing a survey by the National Opinion Research Cor-
poration according to which 66% of the Nation's population in 1944, and 69% in 1956,
reported that most Blacks were treated fairly).
135. Lynne Duke, Blacks and Whites Define Word 'Racism'Differently, WASH. POST, June 8,
1992, available in 1992 WL 2183750 (quoting Judith Lichtenberg); see also Bob Blauner,
Talking Past Each Other: Black and White Languages of Race, in RACE AND ETHNIC CONFLrCT:
CONTENDING VIEWS ON PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 18, 19, 22-23 (Fred
L. Pincus & Howard J. Ehrlich eds., 1994) (describing the various ways that Whites and
African Americans differ in how they conceptualize and talk about discrimination, making
a meaningful dialogue difficult, if not impossible).
136. See supra notes 121-122, 124, 126-127, and 129 (discussing the writings of Ruth
Frankenberg, Annalee Newitz, and Shelby Steele).
137. See infra Part V.C.2 (criticizing epistemological exclusion in recent affirmative ac-
tion cases).
138. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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informing people of this. In most areas of the U.S.A. it is
possible to murder a man and when one is brought to trial
one has only to say that the victim was a queer and that he
tried to touch you and the courts will set you free. When I
read the newspaper article I felt something stirring in my
hand; I felt a sensation like seeing oneself from miles above
the earth or like looking at one's reflection in a mirror
through the wrong end of a telescope. Realizing that I have
nothing left to lose in my actions I let my hands become
weapons, my teeth become weapons, every bone and muscle
and fiber and ounce of blood become weapons, and I feel
prepared for the rest of my life.139
Bowers v. Hardwick involved a defendant, Michael Hardwick, who
was arrested under Georgia's sodomy statute (written in gender neu-
tral terms) for performing oral sex with his long-term lover in the pri-
vacy of his own home.14 The way that the Court framed the issue is
key: Does the Due Process Clause confer a "right of privacy that ex-
tends to homosexual sodomy" that is "beyond the reach of state regu-
lation"?14' The Court answered in the negative, holding that the
Georgia state statute and the attorney general's selective prosecution
of gay men would receive only rational basis review under the Due
Process Clause.142 The Court offered two reasons to support the stat-
ute's constitutionality under this standard. First, the Court asserted a
supposed factual justification, namely, that proscriptions against ho-
mosexual consensual sodomy have "ancient roots."' 4 3 Second, the
Court concluded that, although its previous cases had identified a fun-
damental right to decide whether to beget a child, these cases did not
support Hardwick's position because "[n]o connection between fam-
139. DAVID WOJNAROW1CZ, CLOSE TO THE KNIVES 80-81 (1991), reprinted in LESBIANS, GAY
MEN, AND THE LAw 152 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993); see alsoJanet E. Halley, Romer v.
Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 429, 435 (1997) ("'I don't think about sex when I read
Hardwick and I don't think about what sex acts are at issue. I think how they hate me."'(quoting Letter from William B. Rubenstein)); William B. Rubenstein, Introduction to LESBI-
ANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra, at xv, xvii (noting that "it is still illegal for lesbians and
gay men to express love to one another").
140. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79
VA. L. REv. 1551, 1612 (1993) (discussing the factual background of Hardwick's arrest).
141. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189-90. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Pro-ject et al. at 8-9, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140) (arguing on thebasis of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), that sexual conduct between con-
senting adults in the privacy of one's home is a basic right that merits heightened scrutiny
under the Due Process Clause).
142. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
143. Id. at 192 (citing Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosex-
ual Activity, 40 U. MiAMi L. REV. 521, 525 (1986)).
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ily, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity
on the other has been demonstrated."
144
Both the rendition of the supposedly relevant facts and the ra-
tionale of the Court's decision can be read, as the author of the ex-
cerpt at the beginning of this section does, as variations of the same
concept: that homosexuals, because of their sexual practices, are per
se deviant, and that the state can regulate them as a class under the
criminal code, because their sexual conduct is criminal-like.
45 With
respect to the Court's factual assertion, Justice White's majority opin-
ion is anchored in the view that Western tradition has historically dis-
favored homosexual sodomy, 14 6 a historical fact disputed by gay and
lesbian historians. 147  Justice Burger's concurrence cited "firm[ ]
root [s] in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards" as one justifi-
144. Id. at 191.
145. See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1079-80 (1988) (arguing that
the majority opinion and Burger's concurrence used a conception of "homosexuality" as
immoral and criminally harmful, rather than as an identity or a normal variation of human
sexuality, and that these definitions imply political value choices); Janet E. Halley, Reason-
ing About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1748
(1993) (observing that sodomy as a bad act and homosexual identity are unified in the
Bowers majority opinion by Justice White's "persistent, implicit invocations"); Nan D.
Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 541-44 (1992) (arguing that in
Bowers the Court carelessly embarks on a slippery slope that connects a subset of prohibited
acts with the denial of rights to a class).
146. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (noting that sodomy was a criminal offense at common law
and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 states when they ratified the Bill of
Rights).
147. See Goldstein, supra note 145, at 1082-84 & n.65 (detailing the history of the sod-
omy statute in Georgia and concluding that a 1784 version did not implicitly include sod-
omy); Halley, supra note 145, at 1751-56 (recounting the "common place" critique of the
Bowers justices as poor historians); Hunter, supra note 145, at 541-43 (locating the Bowers
Court's "misreading of history" in its failure to understand that the Framers were as intoler-
ant of consensual heterosexual sodomy as they were of consensual homosexual sodomy).
There has been a great deal of scholarship on this subject, arguing that the proscription
against homosexual sodomy is a post-World War II innovation. See, e.g., JOHN BOSWELL,
CHRISTIANITY, SocIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 23 (1980) (documenting that the
social and legal intolerance of gay male sodomy is a post-World War II innovation); Allan
Brub4, Marching to a Different Drummer: Lesbian and Gay GIs in World War II, in HIDDEN
FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 383, 383-84 (Martin Bauml
Duberman et al. eds., 1989) (identifying the adoption of military policy addressing homo-
sexuality during World War II as a turning point in the lives of American homosexuals, and
contending that proscription against homosexuality in the military "made homosexuality
of increasing concern to federal institutions"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence
and the Apartheid of the Closet, 1946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 703, 706 (1997) (claiming
that post-World War II American law contributed to the creation of "the closet," as heter-
osexuals developed an increasingly hostile attitude towards private homosexual lifestyles).
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cation for Bowers,1 48 a marked departure from the Court's usual
strictly secular role.
The Court's second justification purports to be based on the ra-
tional claim that its prior cases on privacy and procreation do not sup-
port Hardwick's position because there is "[n]o connection between
family . . . and homosexual activity."' 4 9 This conclusion, however, is
again based on the Court's own construction of the nature of homo-
sexuality. There can only be no connection between homosexual "ac-
tivity" and family if one concludes that the spiritual love and intimacy
experienced in same-sex relationships is unlike the spiritual love and
intimacy experienced by opposite sex couples. 5 ° The Bowers majority
opinion, as well as the dissents, never consider how a same-sex rela-
tionship might look to those engaged in such a relationship and how
this might be similar to heterosexual love.'' Rather, the majority
reduces same-sex love relationships to "acts of ... sodomy,"' 5 2 which
the Court holds (under rational basis review) can justifiably be classi-
fied as criminal conduct.' 5 3 The Court's reasoning is circular: (1)
there can be no constitutional proscription of selective persecution of
gay men under state sodomy statutes, because (2) there is no connec-
tion between family and homosexual activity because (3) same-sex
couples engage in sodomy, which, (4) according to criminal law and
tradition is deviant. 154
The Court's adoption of the view that homosexuals, because of
the way they engage in sexual relations, are inherently deviant goes
beyond "choosing" between two controversial truths held by majorities
and minorities, whose interests may or may not be inimical to each
148. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring). But see Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F.
Supp. 859, 866 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (acknowledging that the Reconstructionist Movement of
AmericanJudaism sanctions same-sex relationships), affjd, 114 F.3d 1097 (lth Cir. 1997)
(en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
149. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
150. SeeJohn M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation, "9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETH-
ICS & PUB. POL'Y 11, 27-31 (1995) (arguing that same-sex love is deviant because only the
physical union of the male and female sexual organs can result in moral sexual intimacy).
151. See MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 103-08 (1996) (criticizing Bowers for its failure to recognize the shared values
of homosexual intimacy and heterosexual love).
152. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192; see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 120-123 (1967) (ac-
cepting the INS argument that a homosexual could be deported on the grounds that ho-
mosexuality indicates a "psychopathic personality").
153. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
154. Id. at 191-94; see also Cain, supra note 140, at 1618, 1628 n.405 (laying out inconsis-
tencies in the Court's argument).
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other. Bowers "essentializes" homosexuals into a sexual act, sodomy.' 5 '
By sanctioning the state's selective prosecution of sodomites who are
homosexuals, the Court normalizes and legitimizes the homophobic
ideology that rationalizes discrimination, ostracization, and ultimately
violence against gay men and lesbians.' 56
According to Professor Young-Bruehl's recent innovative theories
about prejudice, there is more than one kind of prejudice." 7
Prejudices play out in social settings as "ideologies of desire," back-
lashes against movements of equality that are rooted in an uncon-
scious rejection of these movements. 158 In the case of homophobia,
what unifies the various prejudices is their focus on sodomy.'59 For
example, what Young-Bruehl calls the "narcissistic homophobe" con-
demns "not just passive or penetrated male homosexuals, but the act
of anal penetration and homosexuality per se."' 6 This kind of an-
tihomosexuality wants to control sexual behavior rigidly. 6 ' What
Young-Bruehl calls the "obsessional homophobe" visualizes homosex-
uals as "a lower or lesser human type .. .monsters or deviants from
the two norms of male and female."' 62 The more extreme "obses-
sional" homophobes target gay men based on a belief that they molest
155. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511, 547-50
(1992) (describing how majority culture essentializes gay men and lesbians into one-di-
mensional sexual beings, and arguing that gay culture involves more than a sexual choice);
Halley, supra note 145, at 1737 ("Sodomy in these formulations of homosexuality as a spe-
cial right is such an intrinsic characteristic of homosexuals, and so exclusive to us, that it
constitutes a rhetorical proxy for us."); Hunter, supra note 145, at 543 ("Homosexual sod-
omy . . . not only becomes the totality of sodomy, it also becomes the totality of
homosexuality").
156. See, e.g., Cheryl Lavin, Death of a Sailor: Allen Schindler's Brutal Murder Made Him a
Symbol in the Fightfor Gay Rights, Cn. Tam., Aug. 10, 1997 (Magazine), available in 1997 WL
3576939 (noting that, in the 1992 beating death of Naval officer Allen Schindler, his assail-
ants justified their violence because the victim was gay); Guy Trebay, Beyond the Fence: Con-
juring the Lives of Martyr Matthew Shepard, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 3, 1998, at 28 (asserting
that the 1998 beating death of college student Matthew Shepard was motivated by Shep-
ard's homosexuality and reporting that the assailants' girlfriends alleged that Shepard
made a pass at them, and that the assailants intended to "teach [Shepard] ... not to come
on to straight people").
157. YOUNG-BRUEHL, supra note 134, at 15-26, 152-59, 435.
158. See id. at 30 ("Prejudices institutionalize at deeper and more inchoate individual
and social or political levels the differences between 'us' and 'them' that movements for
equality address.").
159. See id. at 445 (noting that homosexuals "are imagined as hypersexual, archaically
libidinous and promiscuous and are defined by their sexuality").
160. Id. at 439.
161. Professor Finnis makes this argument. See Finnis, supra note 150, at 27-31.
162. YOUNc-BRuEHL, supra note 134, at 446.
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children and attempt to persuade children and youth to adopt their
immoral homosexual lifestyle. 63
One need not endorse Professor Young-Bruehl's social psychoan-
alytic theory that prejudice is a projection of individuals' latent ideolo-
gies of desire to recognize that the dominant image that drives various
forms of antihomosexuality, including violence, is the image of homo-
sexuals as deviants and sodomites.' 6 4 This image feeds the narrative
that gay men and lesbians need to be put into their place (the closet)
lest they infect the rest of society.' 65 The Bowers decision ratifies the
claim that homosexuals are per se deviant; that their conduct can be
criminalized even if it is taking place in the privacy of the home, be-
cause it is inherently immoral; that state attorneys general who wish to
safeguard the morals of the public can selectively prosecute gay men
and lesbians. This Supreme Court opinion serves to strengthen the
resolve of those who will not tolerate homosexuals in their midst.166
Bowers has a second unfortunate consequence. It promotes a ster-
eotypical social image of gay men and lesbians. Bowers essentializes
gay men's and lesbians' social identity into one aspect of the human
personality, the manner in which homosexuals physically express sex-
ual love.' 6 7 Post-Bowers, in order to gain the right not to be the object
of prejudice, gay men and lesbians must show that they are not sod-
omites, or do not think or talk as if they were sodomites. 16' This bifur-
163. Id. at 447-48.
164. See Fajer, supra note 155, at 544 (opining that the majority of the Supreme Court
equates homosexual status with sodomy); Halley, supra note 145, at 1746-49 (same);
Hunter, supra note 145, at 543 (same).
165. SeeEskridge, supra note 147, at 705 (describing the "closet" as "the classic metaphor
for homosexual secrecy" that has been used in both protective and threatening ways).
166. SeeShaharv. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 n.25, 1110-11 (llth Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(citing Bowers, and rejecting a constitutional challenge to a Georgia Attorney General's
firing of an attorney solely because she was a lesbian who participated in a commitment
ceremony with another woman), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998). Despite the effect of
the Court's opinion, there is evidence that antigay sentiment is neither uniform nor wide-
spread. A recent report by the Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
analyzing various poll data concludes that disapproval of gay men and lesbians is decreas-
ing, and that there is a general trend toward greater tolerance. In 1997, the gap between
those who believe that a gay lifestyle is acceptable versus nonacceptable had narrowed;
43% believe gayness is acceptable while 52% think it is not. See ALAN S. YANG, NATIONAL
GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INSTITUTE, FROM WRONGS TO RIGHTS: PUBLIC OPINION
ON GAY AND LESBIAN AMERICANS MovEs TOWARD EQUALITY 21, 24 (1998).
167. See Cain, supra note 140, at 1625 (opining that judges refuse to recognize gay and
lesbian equal protection claims based on the Bowers decision because they assume that all
gay men and lesbians engage in homosexual sodomy); Fajer, supra note 155, at 544 ("A
majority of the Supreme Court appears to share the view that gay men and lesbians are
sexual creatures divorced from intimacy, relationships, and family."); id. at 512-14, 544-46.
168. See Cain, supra note 140, at 1624-25 (stating that to prevail in an equal protection
action supporting gay and lesbian rights, a litigant should distinguish homosexual status
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cation of human identity into status, which post-Bowers might be
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, and sexualized con-
duct, which can be criminalized under Bowers, dehumanizes gay men
and lesbians. For gay men and lesbians to gain acceptance into main-
stream society, they must forego that part of their selves that loves
sexually.' 69
In sum, the Bowers Court chose a construction of gay and lesbian
social identity that marginalizes the humanity of a minority group.
Yet, as in the race context, the Court chose one viewpoint without
even recognizing the existence of a competing epistemology or point
of view. tT The Court truncated the dialectic that needs to take place
between gay men and lesbians and members of the majority by failing
to recognize that the important cultural traditions are debatable.
Every society must be able to deliberate about which norms must be
preserved because these norms account for the moral strength of soci-
ety, and which norms should be revised because of changing condi-
tions and values. Gay men and lesbians should be afforded the
opportunity to demonstrate how apparently "neutral" social norms
and long-standing "traditions" can function to ostracize them, perpet-
uate negative stereotypes, and, at the extreme, create conditions of
violence. At the same time, judges should recognize that not all who
object to gay civil rights are homophobes. There are those who hold
strong moral convictions that homosexuality and homosexual sodomy
are immoral. These moral conservatives should be able to voice their
desire not to be placed in social and political situations in which they
feel themselves to be involuntarily witnessing or condoning immoral
conduct. The process of beginning to reconcile these interests cannot
occur if the Court has already weighed in on the side of intolerance.
The very visibility of gay men and lesbians in such a dialogue could
transform ideologies on which prejudice is based. 171
This Part has analyzed a select group of controversial intergroup
conflict cases, and shown that in these decisions the Court has inter-
from homosexual conduct in order to overcome the judicial presumption that all lesbians
and gay men engage in homosexual sodomy).
169. See id. at 1641 (noting that the emphasis on status as distinct from conduct "de-
emphasize [s] the importance of gay men and lesbians of... the love and affection they
feel for their partners"); Fajer, supra note 155, at 549 (same);Janet E. Halley, The Politics of
the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv.
915, 919-23 (1989) (same).
170. Cf Halley, supra note 169, at 915-17 (arguing that, by refusing to secure protection
of homosexual rights based on substantive due process, the Court in Bowers deferred to the
majority, contrary to the spirit of process-based judicial review).
171. See YOUNc-BRUEHL, supra note 134, at 452-53 (explaining that the increasing self-
assertiveness of gay men and lesbians may help to overcome homophobia).
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preted social reality from only one perspective-that of the majority.
For the majority, this choice often goes unnoticed, because there is no
dissonance between the Court's chosen social text and how majority
group members themselves experience social life. The decisions reflect
majority epistemology. Minorities, by contrast, perceive the Court's
lack of reasoned justification for its choice of the majority perspective
(and nonacknowledgment of minorities) as "choosing sides." From
minorities' perspective, what they read in the Court's decisions differs
greatly from their own life experience, specifically how they experience
discrimination or sexual orientation. The Court's justifications-for re-
sults that favor the majority cannot be accepted because they are dis-
sonant with the experiences of minorities and ultimately oppressive.
The remainder of this Article will discuss the consequences of this
epistemological privileging for the Court's legitimacy and for the pol-
ity as a whole and will offer a more salutary model of public reason.
II. WHY WE CAN EXPECT MAJORITIES' AND MINORITIES'
EPISTEMOLOGIES TO CONTINUE TO DIFFER
The legitimacy critique elaborated thus far is based on the propo-
sition that epistemologies of majority and minority groups are differ-
ent. This Part provides a theoretical framework found in the work of
social scientists and other theorists that demonstrates not only why
majority and minority groups view the world differently, but also why
social and psychological forces will continue to keep these views
separate.
Some social scientists describe differences between majorities and
minorities as socially constructed. This seemingly simple idea carries
with it many implications, some of which have come to form part of
mainstream legal thinking, others of which remain deeply controver-
sial. Those who are involved in the study of majority and minority
relations, such as cultural ethnologists, race theorists, feminists, soci-
ologists, and postmodernists (including critical legal theorists), apply
this concept of social construction in a variety of ways. 17 2
172. Critical Legal Studies (CLS), Critical Race Theory (CRT), feminists, and the grow-
ing LatCrit and White Critical Studies movements are all based on this idea. CLS describes
how rules of law play an ordering function in which certain discourses can claim greater
legitimacy and normalcy over others. SeeJames Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal
Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 769-780, 779 (1985) (arguing that
the relationship between knowledge and power is at the core of all authoritative dis-
courses); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory
and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. LAw & Soc. CHANGE 369, 370 (1982-1983) ("[T]he
legal system is an important public arena through which the State attempts-through ma-
nipulation of symbols, images, and ideas-to legitimize a social order. . . ."); Gary Peller,
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Part I's case analysis introduced the argument that difference is
socially constructed. This idea is implicit in the claim that members of
majorities, as well as minorities, are social actors.1 73 Because as social
actors we order the social world around ideological frameworks, we
continue to perceive and understand social dynamics in a way that
permits us to remain unconscious of an existing unequal order.' 74 We
may occasionally recognize our degree of separateness, as Ruth Frank-
enberg's work suggests, but such recognition can be quickly rational-
ized so that we remain comfortable within our social ideological
framework.
1 75
The social construction of difference is maintained and legiti-
mized because cultural ideology1 76 (social knowledge) provides a
The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1182 (1985) ("[L]egal thought is a
representational discourse which purports to represent social relations in a neutral man-
ner.... [L]egal discourse can present itself as neutral and determinate only to the extent
that it denies its own metaphoric starting points and instead pretends to reflect the positive
content of social relations.").
Feminists study the social construction of gender and how gender norms order social
relations between men and women. See, e.g., CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODI-
FIED 32 (1987) (claiming that "gender is socially constructed as difference epistemologi-
cally"); Baldwin, supra note 32, at 48-49, 160-62 (discussing institutionalized, structural
general oppression in the public sphere of women's lives).
Developing LatCrit scholarship, like CRT, concerns the critique of legal rules and
doctrines from the perspective of ethnic minorities and, more specifically, Latinos/as, as
well as alterativejurisprudential approaches that do not overlook the interests and partic-
ularities of these communities. See generally Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of
Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 745-46 (1994) (containing a thoughtful and lucid sum-
mary of CRT scholarship and the multiplicity of issues, methodologies, and central ideas
that such scholarship is currently addressing); Francisco Valdes, Latina/o Ethnicities, Critical
Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9
LA RAZA L.J. 1, 4-12 (1996) (encouraging development of critical legal discourse focusing
specifically on concerns of the Latino community).
White critical studies puts at issue Whiteness as a racial status. Recent work by sociolo-
gists and legal theorists has focused on how Whites can reconceptualize their privileged
position in order to further social justice goals. See, e.g., DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TowARDS THE
ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY 12-17
(1994) (opining that a better understanding and approach to eradicating race and class
oppression can be gained by examining Whiteness within American society); Mahoney,
supra note 130, at 330-32 (identifying aspects of Whiteness that could both undermine the
construction of privilege and oppression and unite "Whites along with people of color, in
opposition to privilege"); supra note 114.
173. See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of negative
racial stereotypes in the context of social interactions).
174. Cf Hamilton & Trolier, supra note 102, at 133 (defining a stereotype as a cognitive
structure that contains the perceiver's expectancies and beliefs about a certain group).
175. FRANKENBERG, supra note 121, at 231-35, 232 ("In times of perceived threat, the
normative group may well attempt to reassert its normativity by asserting elements of its
cultural practice more explicitly and exclusively.").
176. Sociologist Jeffrey Prager describes ideology as follows:
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"common sense"'7 7 (truth) as to why and how minorities are different.
Cultural ideology is constructed around social narratives that rein-
force and maintain relations of social inequality (power). 7 8 For ex-
ample, in Bradwell v. Illinois79 the Court depicted women as needing
patriarchal protection from public life. In Bradwell, the Court upheld
a statute proscribing women's entry into the legal profession.1 8 0 In his
concurrence, Justice Bradley wrote that the basis for denying such en-
try was that women's activity outside the family was "against the nature
[I]deology comes to be mistaken for reality. The images that are evoked concern-
ing racial groups come to be the prism through which observation of the real
social world is conducted. Only the passage of time and the emergence of new
understandings reveal how previous efforts to comprehend ... differences serve
to justify and, in a limited sense, legitimate inequity.... [A]ny racial ideology is
inadequate in so far as it cannot comprehend the individual in the group. What
stands for explanation at the ideological levels easily dissolves when confronted
with social reality .... [Ildeology ... represents the dominant, more or less
culturally universal scheme by which the social order is understood and
explained.
Prager, supra note 115, at 100-02 (citation omitted); see Clifford Geertz, Ideology as a Cul-
tural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS BY CLIFFORD GEERTZ
193, 193-233 (1973) (arguing that the function of ideology is to provide authoritative con-
cepts that render culture meaningful, and images by which it can be sensibly grasped);
RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 39 (2d ed.
1993) ("[I]deology often makes cultural facts appear natural, social analysis attempts to
reverse the process. It dismantles the ideological in order to reveal the cultural, a peculiar
blend of objective arbitrariness... and subjective taken-for grantedness (it's only common
sense-how could things be otherwise?")); YOUNG-BRUEHL, supra note 134, at 97 (empha-
sizing that ideology functions at an unconscious level to (i) operate against self-conscious-
ness and thereby avoid rigorous reasoned examination, and (ii) protect against revealing
internal contradictions that are pervasive and self-reinforcing).
177. Antonio Gramsci, a Marxist, believed that hegemony was embedded in the popular
system of ideas and practices, what he termed "common sense." See ANTONIO GRAMScI,
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 198-99, 212 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell
Smith trans., 1971) (describing "common sense" as the apparently spontaneous feelings of
the masses that have been formed by the traditional popular conception of the world,
which is a "historical acquisition"); see also SUE GOLDING, GRAMSCI'S DEMOCRATIC THEORY.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A POsT-LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 110-11 (1992) (describing Gramsci's con-
cept of "common sense" as the incoherent notion of the masses that conforms to their
social and cultural position, but which also serves as the starting point for revolutionary
action). The interplay between knowledge, truth, and power is most famously made by
Foucault. See generally Foucault, supra note 123 (interweaving the relationship between
knowledge (as socially constructed), "truth" (not always an objective truth), and social
power (which permeates every social relationship)); see also Steven L. Winter, The "Power"
Thing, 82 VA. L. REv. 721, 742 (1996) ("The social phenomenon of power is possible only
because it is a shared hermeneutic phenomenon: It is a contingent product of common
ways of understanding and living in a social world, a function of reciprocally enacted roles,
routines, institutions and understandings.").
178. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 40 ("Gender is also a question of power,
specifically of male supremacy and female subordination.").
179. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
180. Id. at 139.
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of things,"' 81 and that it was "repugnant" to permit a woman's inde-
pendence from her family and her husband.182 Justice O'Connor fre-
quently cites Bradwell to illustrate the principle that traditional notions
about women's differences contribute to the unequal status of
women. 
183
In order to understand how minority and majority communities
acquire distinct epistemologies, the key insight is that social position
influences what we experience, how we interpret this experience, and
how we construct knowledge.1 84 In the terms of feminist "standpoint"
theory, social position "situates knowledge."' 185 In the aggregate, indi-
vidual minorities share a band of social space from which they experi-
ence social life differently from majorities.1 86 It is this experience that
181. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring); see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420
(1908) ("[W]oman's physical structure, and the functions she performs in consequence
thereof, justify special legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which she
should be permitted to toil.").
182. Bradwell 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring); see also Muller, 208 U.S.
at 421 ("[H]istory discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man...
[a]s minors, though not to the same extent ... needing especial care that her rights may
be preserved."). For a discussion of these cases, see Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schnei-
der, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLiTICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 117, 117-39 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
183. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 n.10 (1982) (cit-
ing Bradwell for the proposition that "[h]istory provides numerous examples of legislative
attempts to exclude women from particular areas simply because legislators believed wo-
men were less able than men to perform a particular function"). Justice O'Connor seems
to view Bradwell as the paradigmatic example of gender discrimination. See Sandra Day
O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1550 (1991) (noting that, until the last
half of the twentieth century, the Court generally accepted the separate and unequal status
of women, and citing Bradwell); see also infta Parts V.B.1-2 (discussing Justice O'Connor's
analysis of gender stereotypes).
184. See Pierre Bourdieu, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Exist-
ence of Groups, 32 BERKELEYJ. Soc. 1, 3 (1987) (asserting that, from the social scientific view,
"what exists is not 'social classes' as understood in the realist [sense] .... but rather a social
space in the true sense ... that the fundamental property of a space is the reciprocal
externality of the objects it encloses").
185. See NANCY C.M. HARTSOCK, MONEY, SEX, AND POWER 226 (1983) ("[T]he systematic
differences between the accounts of power produced by women and men can be taken to
be indications of systematic and significant differences in life activity."); Sandra Harding &
Merrill B. Hintikka, Introduction to DISCOVERING REALITY. FEMINIST PERSPECrIVES ON EPISTE-
MOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE iX, X (Sandra Harding
& Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983) ("Women's experience systematically differs from the
male experience upon which knowledge claims have been grounded."). See generally Susan
Hekman, Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited, 22 SIGNS 341, 342 (1997)
(arguing that feminist standpoint theory's notion of situated knowledge makes possible a
politics of difference).
186. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT Xiii (1990) (illustrating that
minority groups, in order to gain acceptance, often convey their ideas according to major-
ity norms that distort the minority perspective); IRIs MARION YOUNG, INTERSECTING VOICES:
DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, AND PoLicY 25 (1997) (describing the experi-
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creates a distinct epistemology, not minority status or identity. 187
Under this theory, social scientists can make generalizations about mi-
nority experience, as well as the epistemology founded upon that ex-
perience, based on observations of how individuals encounter a
common social space, and how others relate to them.188 However, any
generalization will be subject to multiple interpretations (all of which
may be reasonably accurate) because it will be an external interpreta-
tion of the meaning of aggregate individual social experiences.
What does this qualitatively different social space look like? First,
individuals experience socially constructed difference constantly.189
When groups are labeled as different from the universal ideal, this
label creates and reinforces dynamics of inequality, in the form of
privilege/domination for the majority and relative nonprivilege/sub-
ordination for the minority.19 The majority uses its social power to
create a social identity for the nonconforming "other." '91 Those who
are different are essentialized into a socially constructed identity that
ence of minority social groups in terms of "[t ] he collective otherness of serialized existence
... [that is] often experienced as constraint, [so that] ... [m]embers of the series experi-
ence themselves as powerless to alter this material milieu [of their experience]"); Patricia
Hill Collins, Comment on Hekman's "Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited":
Where's the Power?, 22 SIGNS 375, 378 (1997) (arguing that social standpoint theory is suited
to explain dilemmas of class and race in light of the fact of segregation among classes and
race).
187. Some race theorists and feminists have argued that the minority perspective should
be privileged. See COLLINS, supra note 186, at xii-xiii (arguing that social justice demands
should be looked at from the perspective of Black feminists); MariJ. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324 (1987)
("Looking to the bottom-adopting the perspective of those who have seen and felt the
falsity of the liberal promise-can assist critical scholars in the task of fathoming the phe-
nomenology of law and defining the elements of justice."). But see Randall L. Kennedy,
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745, 1781-84 (1989) (criticizing the
essentialist racial perspective position). This Article rejects the proposition that status
alone can result in a "minority perspective," because a minority may not experience a
subordinate social position for various reasons. See infra notes 198-207 and accompanying
text (discussing the multiplicity of identities within minority social space).
188. See supra notes 185-186 and infra note 194.
189. Cf Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Diversity, Multiculturalism, and Affirmative Action:
Duke, The Nas, and Apartheid, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1141, 1145 (1992) ("Race thus cannot be
eliminated by the actions of any one individual because it lives in the combined activities of
black and white people. This is the box that race has created for all of us .. ").
190. See MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 111 ("The attribution of
difference [to the person who does not fit in] hides the power of those who classify and of
the institutional arrangements that enshrine one type of person as the norm, and then
treat classifications of difference as inherent and natural while debasing those defined as
different."); see also supra note 114 (describing White privilege).
191. See IRs MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 59 (1990) ("Cul-
tural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant group's experience and cul-
ture, and its establishment as the norm.").
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becomes the counterimage of the dominant, universal ideal.' 92 For
example, women are expected to be supportive and passive in accord-
ance with their essentialized social identity. Those who do not fit this
identity of "otherness" are treated with suspicion, further marginal-
ized as deviant, and are often the objects of heightened hostility."'o
To be labeled as different implies being trapped into socially con-
structed boxes-woman, African American, lesbian, Latino/a. Social
identity boxes place the individual, regardless of her personal prefer-
ences or self-identification, into categories that implicate general so-
cial judgments of lesser worth, less capability, and subordinate status.
These "boxes" differ in the quality of (relative) subordination: stigma
(race and handicapped status); caste (African Americans and other
racial minorities at the time of Jim Crow); stereotypes (gender); devi-
ancy (homosexuality); and coercive assimilation (Native Americans
and other cultural or racial minorities such as Latinos and Asian
192. See Crenshaw, supra note 130, at 1373-74 (describing how law and custom create
.races" out of broad ranges of human traits, assigning negative images to African Ameri-
cans as counterparts to positive images for Whites, such as "industrious-lazy").
Women's social identity has been created as care-givers, passive, supportive, submis-
sive, and nonthreatening. This social image supports and reinforces women's subordinate
power and status. See MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY. ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY
9-10 (1983) (arguing that women are confined by various modes of service); MACKINNON,
supra note 172, at 25 (stressing that the social treatment of women results in
powerlessness).
Recently, scholars have argued that the immigration debate feeds off foreignized so-
cial identity as well as nativistic impulses, resulting in a direct impact on these minority
communities. See RoSALO, supra note 176, at 209-14 (describing the media representation
of Latinos in terms of their continued definition by the majority, so as to expose the "myth
of immigration as a cultural stripping away"); Nancy Cervantes et al., Hate Unleashed: Los
Angeles in the Aftermath of Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 1, 8, 9 (1995) (noting
that complaints filed with the Los Angeles County Commission of Human Relations
demonstrated a 23.5% increase in hate crimes against Latinos since the enactment of Prop-
osition 187 and concluding that Proposition 187 "[has] transformed everyday life for Lati-
nos of every status, including those born here and those whose ancestors have lived in the
U.S. for generations"); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Rela-
tions: "A Magic Mirror"Into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1136-40, 1144-47, 1154-58
(1998) (arguing that the current political movement targeting illegal immigrants, "a/k/a
Mexican immigrants," is a reflection of the majority's discomfort with Mexican Americans
as a distinctive cultural group).
193. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 130, at 1383 (describing how the feeling of some
Whites that Blacks have "gotten too far" has produced a "backlash attitude" against eco-
nomically successful Blacks). See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE
BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975) (describing how
social discipline mechanisms reflect and support a hierarchy of social power); RACE-INC
JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CON-
STRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (containing essays by various au-
thors on the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill confrontation, which served as a vivid example of
this social phenomenon).
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Americans)."' Thus, difference, discrimination, and prejudice all in-
volve multiple dynamics. What these phenomena share is the quality
of "otherness" and complete omission from the norm.
Second, as Charles Taylor writes, occupying relatively
subordinated social space affects how minorities see themselves:
The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition
or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a
person or group of people can suffer real damage, real dis-
tortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to
them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of
themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict
harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in
a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.19 5
Third, social attribution of difference has economic and capital
accumulation implications. Sociologists have investigated how race
and gender have been used to deny minorities access to occupations,
as well as other social capital venues, so that they become unable to
progress up the economic ladder, obtain higher paying occupations,
amass capital, and gradually become "full citizens" in the sense that
American capitalism provides context to this term. These sociologists
conclude that occupations which provide opportunities for economic
and social advancement generally have been limited to Whites and
men.
1 9 6
194. See FRYE, supra note 192, at 1-16 (describing insidious forces that confine and shape
the life experience of oppressed persons); YOUNG, supra note 191, at 59 ("Those living
under cultural imperialism [a system of apparently self-evident stereotypes that permeate
society] find themselves defined from the outside, positioned, placed, by a network of
dominant meanings they experience as arising from elsewhere, from those with whom they
do not identify and who do not identify with them."). See generally ERVING GOFFMAN,
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2-7, 24-32, 48-49 (1963) (describ-
ing the components of "stigma," including its origin in physicality, its subsequent social
construction as a negative trait, its social visibility, and its internalization by the stigmatized
individual); supra notes 114, 116, 127 (describing the dynamic of privilege/nonprivilege).
195. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTicuLTURALISM: EXAMINING THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
196. See ROEDiCER, supra note 106, at 55-60 (discussing how from the beginning of our
history certain occupations remained off-limits to racial minorities, particularly African
Americans); see also ALMAGUER, supra note 106, at 13-14, 25-26, 72, 100-04 (discussing the
historical, sociological, and economic forces that contributed to the occupational and resi-
dential segregation of Mexican Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans in
California).
A similar kind of segregation is evidenced in what sociologists term occupational sex
segregation. See COMMITrEE ON WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT AND RELATED SOCIAL ISSUES, WO-
MEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THEJOB 1-32 (Barbara F. Resken & Heidi
I. Hartmann eds., 1986) (discussing occupational sex segregation); Nancy Barrett, Women
and the Economy, in THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1987-88: A REPORT IN DEPTH 100, 100-05 (Sara
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These are the principal dynamics that define minorities' relatively
subordinate social space. Individual minorities, however, may func-
tion differently in this space
Professor Iris Marion Young's concept of "serialized collective
identities" indicates that when we theorize about minorities' social
space, we are generalizing about common elements that individual
minorities experience in common with other members of the class.
19 7
Within such relative subordinate social space, each minority individ-
ual can, within limits, exercise effort to escape negative social identity
or to blur social boundaries.1"8 For example, minority individuals can
distance themselves from undesirable social identities. They can as-
similate or adopt cultural views and modes of expression aligned with
the dominant group. They can attempt to "pass." '199 They may be
able to distance themselves psychologically from discriminatory social
experiences as unrelated to their social identity.200 Another way to
lessen the impact of relative subordinate social space is to emphasize
the more privileged social identity among the many to which each
minority individual belongs.20 1 For example, Audre Lorde wrote that
she was "a forty-nine-year-old Black lesbian feminist socialist mother of
E. Rix ed., 1987) (noting that women earn lower wages than men in part as a result of
traditional perceptions of women's social roles).
197. See YOUNG, supra note 186, at 26 (suggesting that "[m]embership in serial collec-
tives defines an individual's being, in a sense . . . together in series with others similarly
positioned").
198. Id. at 31 (indicating that "[a person] can develop a sense of herself and member-
ship in group affiliations that makes different serial structures important to her in different
respects, or salient in different kinds of circumstances").
199. See Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1595, 1602 (1989) (illustrating the tendency of minorities to assimilate characteristics of
the dominant group in order to prevent feelings of uneasiness); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness
as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1707, 1710-15 (1993) (sharing her grandmother's experience
of portraying herself as White in order to secure a job and economic security as a depart-
ment store employee); Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire"?: Assimilation and the
Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1259, 1266 (1997) (relating his choice to re-
main identified as a Chicano and his brother's choice to pass as White). Similarly, if we
consider gay men and lesbians a cultural group, the decision to stay "in the closet" is a
form of "passing" because it enables these individuals to avoid being located in a stigma-
tized group. See Eskridge, supra note 147, at 705 (describing the "closet" as a place where
"private skeletons and personal secrets are hidden").
200. See GRIER & COBBS, supra note 133, at 154-80 (noting that minorities must adopt
psychological mechanisms that allow them to distance themselves from daily "microaggres-
sions" in order to maintain psychological health).
201. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege in the Workplace: The Missing Element in
Antidiscrimination Law, in PRIVLEGE REVEALED, supra note 106, at 161, 161-76 (describing
Professor Wildman's own multiple memberships as a professor, White woman, Jew, and
pioneer for justice); Wildman & Davis, supra note 114, at 7-24 (describing the multiple
identities we inhabit as strands in a Koosh ball); Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness!
Difference Debate: A Post-Modem Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory,
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two, including one boy, and a member of an interracial couple. '20 2
Although she was able to choose how she moved in and out of her
multiple social identities, she noted that she was limited in escaping
her minority social space: "I usually find myself a part of some group
defined as other, deviant, inferior, or just plain wrong. "203
This multiplicity of identities and limited agency within minority
social space means that some individuals within a "serialized collec-
tive" will experience minority status more harshly, while others might
not experience it at all.204 It follows that the serialized collective expe-
rience is not a unified, easily definable experience, but a series of indi-
viduals experiencing a similar social life. 205  As sociologists and
feminists have argued, social identity and social groups are dynamic
and complex; generalizing about group status is fraught with the dan-
gers of overstating one's case and not sufficiently accounting for the
multiplicities of a collective minority identity.20 6 Because such an
identity will be amorphous, difficult to define, and dynamic, both fem-
inists and race theorists have developed multiple interpretations of
the social significance of gender and race.20 7
The controversy within the minority legal academy unleashed by
Professor Randall Kennedy's article, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia,
in which he criticized the scholarship of critical race theorists Derrick
Bell, Richard Delgado, and Mari Mastuda,2 ° s illustrates the apparent
1991 DuKE L.J. 296, 306 (describing the multiple cultural memberships, both privileged
and unprivileged, of her African American male colleague).
202. AUDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUT-
SIDER 114, 114 (1984).
203. Id.
204. See YOUNG, supra note 186, at 27 ("Membership in the series does not define one's
identity.").
205. See id. (defining "seriality" as the unreflective reproduction of ongoing historical
social structures, against which individual differences within a group may emerge).
206. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
xi, 3 (1990) (contesting any general classification of "woman"); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN,
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 162-64 (1988) (argu-
ing that feminist theory must take into account differences among women).
207. See generally BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 32, at 386, 388 (discussing various defini-
tions of the terms "gender" and "sex"); Baldwin, supra note 32, at 48 (analyzing feminist
accounts of women in different social roles); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color,
100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2008-11 (1991) (describing the "voice of color" as including Randall
Kennedy's view, which assimilates "meritocratic majoritarian standards," as well as Derrick
Bell's, Richard Delgado's, and Mari Matsuda's, which are concerned with the class implica-
tions of racial minorities).
208. Kennedy, supra note 187, at 1788-1810. Kennedy's critique is often cited with Ste-
phen Carter's. See Stephen Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, I RECONSTRUCTION No. 1,
1990, at 6. The Harvard Law Review published a reply to Kennedy in Colloquy, Responses to
Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 I-HARv. L. REv. 1844, 1844-86 (1990)(presenting commentary by Scott Brewer, Milner S. Ball, Robin D. Barnes, Richard Del-
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confusion and difficulty in interpreting a minority epistemology. This
controversy revolves around when and under what circumstances a
scholar can claim to be voicing a minority perspective. Kennedy ar-
gued that critical race scholars exhibit "a tendency to evade or sup-
press complications that render their conclusions problematic ....
[T]hey fail to support persuasively their claims of racial exclusion or
their claims that legal academic scholars of color produce a racially
distinctive brand of valuable scholarship."2 9 Among his claims, he
contended that these minority scholars placed too much emphasis on
an experienced commonality of "oppression."210
Professor Alex Johnson's article, The New Voice of Color, reconciles
this apparent schism between these varying interpretations of minority
experience. 211 He argues that there is an important commonality in
Kennedy's and critical race scholars' interpretation of the salience of
race. They all believe that there exists a unique racial experience that
affects racial minorities-racial prejudice-and that society, as cur-
rently structured, needs to eradicate unequal treatment based on
race.21 2 AlexJohnson explains that Bell, Matsuda, and Delgado speak
from a communalistic perspective2 1 3 and from an egalitarian ideol-
ogy.214 They wish to improve the circumstances of those in minority
communities who are most disadvantaged.2 a5 On the other hand,
Kennedy's interpretation of racial experience is individualistic
216 and
gado, and Leslie G. Espinoza); see also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersec-
tions, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1993) (addressing
Kennedy's essentialism critique); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative
Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DuKE LJ. 705 (criticizing Randall Kennedy's positions from a
CLS perspective).
209. Kennedy, supra note 187, at 1749.
210. Id.; see id. at 1764 (asserting that Bell fails to engage competing hypotheses to ex-
plain the small number of professors of color in elite law schools); id. at 1770 (accusing
Bell of overstating the relative influence of racial prejudice); id. at 1774 (finding fault with
Delgado's failure to provide examples of writings by scholars of color that were overlooked
by White authors); id. at 1776 (arguing that Delgado too easily accepts the merit of minor-
ity scholarship); id. at 1778 (claiming that Matsuda overstates a "special" or "distinct" mi-
nority legal scholarship and stigmatizes other minority scholars by claiming that minority
scholars speak as "victims of racial oppression").
211. Johnson, supra note 207, at 2010.
212. Id. at 2043.
213. Id. at 2040, 2045-47 (explaining that on the "communalist" position, the injurer
(society) rather than the individual victim is responsible for remedying injustice, and that
critical race scholars believe that responsibility for solving the plight of scholars of color
lies within the White male dominated academy).
214. Id. at 2035 (asserting that Delgado and Matsuda conflate race and socioeconomic
class membership).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2040-42 (describing "individualism" as de-emphasizing the injurer's responsi-
bility for remedying the injury); see id. at 2045 (claiming that Randall Kennedy and Ste-
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meritocratic.2 7 He does not make claims for the entire community of
racial minorities; rather, he insists that the individual voice of African
American conservatives and neoconservatives be given as much weight
as the voice of egalitarian progressives such as Bell, Delgado, and
Matsuda.2 1 s
This debate, as Johnson points out, contests how the minority
perspective should be represented within the legal academy. How-
ever, each side embodies a perspective that has been shaped by a ra-
cial experience. Kennedy believes, as do the critical race scholars he
criticizes, that racism exists,2" 9 and that stigmatization and the experi-
ence of "otherness" are painful to racial minorities.2 2 ° Finally, he val-
ues the distance that "outsiderness" can provide in scrutinizing
majoritarian norms.2 21
As this debate shows, what makes a minority experience distinct
and a minority epistemology possible is its quality of "otherness."
Marginalization and its manifestations-rejection, stigma, and individ-
ual acts of discrimination-are remembered and internalized long af-
ter the single moment or event that gave rise to the painful event
passes.22 2 The experience is long remembered and shapes one's con-
sciousness. For example, Professor Stephen Carter who, like Ken-
nedy, resists being stereotyped as a minority scholar,223 nonetheless,
writes powerfully about the experience of discrimination.2 2 4 In turn,
it is the multiplicity and commonality of alienating experiences that
eventually produces a self-conscious group.225  Sharing such social
phen Carter point to scholars of color as being largely responsible for their plight in the
academy).
217. Id. at 2036 (arguing that Randall Kennedy has adopted majoritarian standards); see
Kennedy, supra note 208, at 707-11 (criticizing Randall Kennedy for adopting a mer-
itocratic regime, which assumes that the individual with the greatest merit will not encoun-
ter significant racial prejudice).
218. Kennedy, supra note 187, at 1784 (accusing Matsuda of"slight[ing] the heterogene-
ity of people of color"); see id. ("Delgado completely overlooks the contributions of black
conservative intellectuals who vigorously oppose race-based preferential treatment.").
219. Id. at 1767, 1787, 1794.
220. Id. at 1767, 1780, 1787.
221. Id. at 1795.
222. See Collins, supra note 186, at 377-78.
223. See Carter, supra note 208, at 31.
224. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLEcrIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE AcrION BABY 47-49 (1991)(describing the experience of attending an elite institution and having all Whites assume
his inferior intellectual abilities).
225. See PAULO FREIRE & ANTONIO FAUNDEZ, LEARNING TO QUESTION: A PEDAGOGY OF
LIBERATION 80-81 (Tony Coates trans., 1989) (arguing that the dominated classes within
capitalist society are minimized and downgraded by a putatively national culture); YOUNG,
supra note 186, at 27 (arguing that self-conscious groups emerge in response to the isolat-
ing nature of serialized experience).
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space produces a collective of individuals who share a common sense
of how they interpret the social dynamics that affect them.
Despite inhabiting a distinct social space, minorities also share in
the majority's epistemology. For example, African Americans who un-
derstand that they are constantly subject to discrimination still strive
for the American Dream and hold the same values in ways not signifi-
cantly different from the White majority." 6 Where they differ from
Whites most markedly is in how they interpret the discriminatory dy-
namics that make their life experience substantially different from
Whites.
2 27
In sum, the concepts of "majority" and "minority" are not defined
by the number of members in a group, but by the social, cultural, and
political experiences of the members of the group. Because group
status is based on serialized collective experiences, and because each
of us belongs to multiple groups, it is clear that there will be many
variations within any group, and that many of us may be part of a
majority in certain contexts and part of a minority in many others.
This Article makes an empirical claim. Even though majorities and
minorities share a common culture and many common social exper-
iences, minorities' continuous encounters with discrimination, stereo-
types, and privilege cause them to experience social life from a
radically different vantage point. It is this commonality of social ex-
periences that gives rise to a different minority epistemology, which
becomes most salient and palpable when we, as a polity, discuss issues
of discrimination.
For the foreseeable future, majorities and minorities, particularly
those discussed here, Whites-racial minorities, men-women, heter-
osexuals-gays, will continue to exist as distinct epistemological com-
munities, albeit difficult to define, because they will continue to
inhabit qualitatively different social .;pace.228 For the foreseeable fu-
226. See HOCHSGHILD, supra note 131, at 57-65 (reporting data that shows that two-thirds
of Whites believe in the American Dream, while one-half of African Americans do, and that
the latter tend to blame themselves for failure even while recognizing the existence of
racism).
227. Id. at 57 (contrasting the White perception that discrimination is decreasing with
the Black perception that discrimination occurs often and still is increasing).
228. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 33, at 1563-67 (explaining the cultural and racial hier-
archy constructed by the White ethnic narrative of "melting pot" assimilation by exploring
psychology, social group dynamics, history, political theory, and sociology and concluding
that majorities will continue to resist assimilation by racial minorities); cf NATHAN GLAZER,
WE ARE ALL MULTICULTURALISTS Now 5-21 (1998) (discussing the inability of America to
assimilate African Americans into the mainstream as driving the phenomenon of multicul-
turalism). But see NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT:
THE NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS, JEWS, ITALIANS, AND IRISH OF NEW YORK CITY 13-14 (2d ed.
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ture we can expect that socially constructed majorities and minorities
will continue to differ significantly, particularly regarding how they
describe discrimination. Thus, as Parts IV and V will argue, judges
would better serve the polity if they were to recognize the existing
majority-minority divide and frame the divide in ways that would allow
the polity to understand better this ongoing source of disagreement.
III. How JUDGES ARE ABLE TO ENGAGE IN
EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRIVILEGING
The intergroup conflicts discussed in Part I involve confronta-
tions between majority and minority perspectives, which, although
unarticulated, appear to be inimical to each other. The Court, con-
sciously or unconsciously, and apparently at times without necessarily
recognizing the social import of its act, chooses the epistemology of
the dominant group. What are the dynamics that lead judges, who are
supposed to be neutral, and who we assume to act in good faith, to
rely on one epistemological construct to the exclusion of others? This
Part addresses this question.
A. The Realist/CLS Critique
Judges can consciously or unconsciously dictate outcomes by
choosing the relevant social text. For example, in hindsight we can
recognize that Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education are
paradigmatic examples of how the Court's socially positioned descrip-
tion of racial relations can be outcome determinative.2 29 With nota-
ble exceptions, judges' choices of social text tend to favor the
dominant epistemology. Why?
1. Equality as Contextual. -Assertions of equality only have mean-
ing when we specify what comparison we are making and why we are
1970) (describing a social dynamic among White ethnic groups of assimilation); Randall
Kennedy, How Are We Doing with Loving? Race, Law, and Intermarriage, 77 B.U. L. REv. 815,
818 (1997) (arguing that White-Black relations are improving, as signaled by increasing
intermarriage between Blacks and Whites).
229. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (refusing to invalidate dejure
segregation as enforced inferiority because any stigma resulted "not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction on
it"), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) with Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-
95 (finding racial segregation inherently unequal in part because of its infliction of stig-
matic harms). In Plessy and Brown, the Court did not explain, justify, or support its selec-
tion of social text. In these cases, the justices inserted their own common sense of the
social world, not to be manipulative, but because this common sense seemed the appropri-
ate criterion by which to evaluate the issues of equality before them.
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making it.2"' In the abstract, the Equal Protection Clause appears to
be an atomistic and discrete concept: "No State shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."2 '
However, the Court has never applied this textual interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause, because the analysis of equal protection
claims cannot be undertaken in a vacuum.23 2 We are conscious that A
and B can never be treated exactly alike. To make a determination of
whether A and B are treated sufficiently alike we must devise a taxo-
nomic scheme that categorizes what differences are relevant.
2. Judges as Socially Situated Actors.-Judges provide the relevant
context for equal protection analysis, both in terms of social text and
in terms of the relevant doctrinal issues and policy concerns. Judges'
own "ideology," the unstated assumptions of their common sense of
the world, will shape which context judges find relevant in difficult
cases. 233  According to CLS theorists, judges are "socially con-
structed. '2 34 Although judges interpret the law in good faith, they do
so according to their own social experiences, which are positioned
according to gender, race, class, and culture.23 5 Such socially posi-
230. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537, 577-81 (1982)
(arguing that equality appears to be an independent norm but in fact incorporates sub-
stantive rights); cf Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment . .. language is prohibitory; but every prohibition implies the existence of
rights. .. ."), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
231. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
232. See, e.g., Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306 (recognizing the prejudice and discrimination
faced by recently freed slaves and concluding that enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was necessary to protect the supposedly "equal" citizens from the abuses of the
states).
233. SeeJ.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1134-38 (1991) (argu-
ing that one of the premises of the CLS project is that judges are socially positioned and
influenced by social forces that are not consciously articulated); Harris, supra note 172, at
749 (suggesting that CLS questions "real reality" and instead posits that "ideology is all
there is"); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology,
36J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 522 (1986) (describing a judge's reasoning process as "both free
and bound-free to deploy work in any direction but limited by the pseudo-objectivity of
the rule-as-applied, which he may or may not be able to overcome").
234. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 233, at 1142 (arguing that, once the social construction
of the subject is assumed, the jurisprudential problems become "how undesirable forms of
blindness can be avoided [as well as] the dangers . . . of determinism"). The legal realist
school first advanced this proposition. SeeJEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 100-
18, 137-38 (1935) (arguing that judges come to cases with biases, and that the process of
judging is a manifestation of the judge's individual personality and values, concealed by
the language of "compelling mechanical logic").
235. See Balkin, supra note 233, at 1192 (contending that a judge is "destined to see the
law according to her own ideological perceptions and beliefs"); see also KEVIN L. LYLES, THE
GATEKEEPERS: FEDERAL DisTiCr COURTS IN THE POLrrICAL PRocEss 21 (1997) (referring to
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tioned ideology is the "common sense" that each of us uses to order
what we perceive.2"6
3. Equality as Cultural Ideology.-Equality is an important Ameri-
can symbol. De Tocqueville considered equality to be the central or-
ganizing principle of American democracy, shaping morals and laws,
opinions, feelings, customs, and all institutions in American society.237
De Tocqueville described democratic peoples as having a "strong and
general" passion for equality that, at times, turns into "delirium. '238
What de Tocqueville observed is still measured by modern pollsters.
Americans overwhelmingly believe that equality before the law makes
the American democratic system better than any other political system
on earth.239
Because equality is a core American cultural value,judges can jus-
tify a result by claiming that it accords with equality without providing
public justification for the contextual values that the judge is applying
in her analysis. In this sense, the Court's statements about equality are
self-legitimating. 240 For example, Part V.C argues that in the affirma-
tive action cases, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson C0.24 1 and Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena,242 the Court supported its conclusion to apply
strict scrutiny review mainly by generalized statements, anchored in
cultural ideology, concerning the individualized nature of equality. 243
The Court's individualistic formulation of equal protection draws its
persuasive strength by reifying cultural values-individuality, neutral-
ity, and equality-instead of analyzing them within a contemporary
a survey in which 67.6% of the judges interviewed admitted that they allow personal atti-
tudes to affect discretionary judgments of the court).
236. This is the sense in which sociologists Prager and Rosaldo and psychologist Young-
Bruehl employ the term. See supra note 176 (setting forth sociologists' definitions of
ideology).
237. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3-11, 475-76, 643 (J.P. Mayer &
Max Lerner eds. & George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835).
238. Id. at 475.
239. See Yankelovich, supra note 15, at 23-24 (reporting on polls that show Americans
place a high value on having the same rules ofjustice apply to one and all, rich and poor,
Black and White).
240. See JEAN-FRAN4¢oIs LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWL-
EDGE 47 (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minnesota Press 1984)
(1979) (discussing the process of self-legitimation within the context of science and the
law).
241. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
242. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
243. See infra notes 593-635 and accompanying text.
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social context. This reification substitutes for the exactness that pub-
lic reason requires."'
B. The Legal Method Allows Judges Substantial Discretion
While CLS theorists posit that constraints upon judicial discretion
are limited, positivists and legal process theorists argue that the legal
method is itself a form of constraint. On this view, judges must decide
difficult cases within the accepted method of the legal profession.
They must cite precedent, decide cases in accord with general princi-
ples of law, and provide public justifications for their outcome.2 4 5
Thus, the legal method orders how judges decide cases.24 6
The reply to this argument is that the legal method affords a
great deal of flexibility within its methodological constraint.2 4 7 Judges
select the relevant frame of discussion, (re)interpret precedent, and
emphasize which policy concerns matter. Accordingly, even as the
legal method constrains the range of outcomes, CLS theorists' in-
sights continue to apply. Judges can and do manipulate the legal
method, either consciously or unconsciously, to produce outcomes
that accord with their own epistemologies. 24 8 The abstraction of the
legal method, together with the apparent objectivity of law, permits
judges to make ideological choices that, in conforming with the re-
quirements of the legal method, appear to be neutral and rea-
244. See infra notes 610-626 and accompanying text (discussing the deficiencies of
Adarand and Croson from the point of view of public reason).
245. The legal process school was concerned with providing a framework that could
legitimately limit judges' wholesale discretion. This school developed theories of adjudica-
tion that emphasized the process ofjudging and how to arrive at reasoned and principled
opinions. These theorists claimed that if judges framed the appropriate criteria, distilled
objective facts, and correctly reasoned, the outcome of such processes would be neither ad
hoc nor willful. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 147-49, 1149-71 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958); Herbert Wechsler, Towards
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11 (1959) (arguing for the appli-
cation of reasoned criteria in constitutional law adjudication).
246. See Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 11 (1986) (arguing
that judges are "public officials situated within a profession, bounded at every turn by the
norms and conventions that define and constitute that profession"); see also Richard B.
Cappalli, The Disappearance of Legal Method, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 393, 444 (1997) (discussing the
values of the legal method).
247. See Kennedy, supra note 233, at 522 (demonstrating how judging is simply a process
by which a judge "achieve[s] an outcome").
248. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 124-25 (1990) (arguing
that the legal method constrains but that judges can manipulate outcomes).
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soned.2 49 The following three subparts illustrate how judges can
make such choices.
1. Choosing Social Text Without Providing Public Justification. -In
Washington v. Davis, Justice White, writing for the majority, argued
that Title VII's disparate impact doctrine should not be applied to the
Fourteenth Amendment because this application would bring too
much of the social order under judicial scrutiny.25 ° Yet Justice White
did not rely on robust data for this factual conclusion but instead cited
a law review article.25 '1 Again writing for the majority, Justice White, in
Bowers v. Hardwick, framed the relevant legal question as whether the
Constitution protects homosexual sodomy.25 2 Both the majority opin-
ion and Justice Burger's concurrence described an existing and histor-
ical social and moral terrain in which homosexual sodomy was
condemned.2 53 However, this historical text is disputed.254 Justice
White also categorically asserted that same-sex relationships cannot be
viewed in the same way as heterosexual familial relationships.2 5 Yet,
this "factual" assertion is based on a social and moral text held by only
a portion of the polity.256 In both opinions, Justice White chose the
relevant concerns meriting the solicitude of the Equal Protection
Clause in accord with a majority perspective.
2. Hiding Behind Institutional Prudential Concerns. -Another way
that the Court adopts a majority epistemology is through its use of the
institutional competency argument. The Court is ever aware of the
institutional problems posed by intergroup conflict cases. However,
this concern for institutional credibility, with notable exceptions such
as Brown, is a concern about the Court's legitimacy with the dominant
group. For example, Professor Bickel has argued that in such contro-
versial cases as Plessy and Brown, the Court should exercise "passive"
virtue, and refrain from deciding cases where the outcome might be
deeply against existing social and political beliefs that cannot gain
249. See supra note 172 (citing sources in the critical legal studies school); see also Pierre
J. Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1627, 1634 (1991) (describing American
legal formalism as an effort at "depersonalization and deprivileging of the individual
subject").
250. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 143, 146, 148 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
256. SeeYang, supra note 166.
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"widespread acceptance." 2 7 To do otherwise would push the "rather
miraculous American phenomenon of ... judicial [review] . . . past
[its] natural limits." 258 This concern with institutional prudence cuts
only one way. It always favors the majority's perspective. 25 9 For exam-
ple, in his Keyes concurrence, Justice Powell evinces concern with the
overbreadth of the busing remedy and how it could intrude into areas
in which the Court had traditionally exercised deference. However,
such deference accounts only for the risks that the Court might incur
by unsettling what the majority White population believes to be tradi-
tion and the appropriate judicial role in interfering with the realm of
privacy, which in turn is affected by the majority's view of appropriate
racial relations. 261 Similarly, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court cited in-
stitutional prudence as a reason why the Court should not challenge
the majority population's view that gay and lesbian private sexual ac-
tivity should be criminalized.2 61
Institutional prudence can serve as a shield for the Court against
having to intervene in difficult epistemological confrontations be-
tween the dominant group and the minorities. A less charitable inter-
pretation of institutional deference is that it represents judicial
participation in maintaining unequal social relationships.
3. Manipulating Doctrinal Precedent.--Finally, the majority opin-
ion in Washington v. Davis exemplifies how precedent can be inter-
preted to support a retrenchment of minorities' civic rights. The
Davis majority decision does not discuss why the Court, after a decade
of interpreting employment discrimination remedies expansively and
aggressively,2 6 2 decided to reverse a trend it had followed without hesi-
tancy. The majority opinion holds that the broad antidiscrimination
remedies available under Title VII cases would not be extended to
constitutional equal protection violations. The majority opinion
257. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF PoLrrics 56-65, 199-207, 235-43 (2d ed. 1986).
258. See id. at 204.
259. Cf Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE LJ. 1063, 1064 (1980) (arguing that even process theory, which attempts to pro-
tect discrete and insular minorities, presupposes "a full theory of substantive rights and
values").
260. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
261. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) ("[If all laws representing essentially moral choices are to
be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.... We
are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this
basis.").
262. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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chose to narrowly interpret a line of cases 2 6 3 to stand for the proposi-
tion that racial remedies are premised on the ability of the Court to
find segregative intent and that "[d] isproportionate impact... is not
the sole touchstone." 26 4 Telling is the Court's reliance on recent cases
to make its argument. Post-Brown, these cases were ambiguous when
decided, and better demonstrate the Court's struggle to establish the
parameters of the antidiscrimination doctrine.265 Cases such as Palmer
V. Thompson,266 in which a plurality of the Court let stand a local deci-
sion to keep swimming pools segregated, continue to be ambiguous.
Yet, the concurring opinion purported to find in such ambiguity the
precedent on which to anchor a turn toward a more restrictive inter-
pretation of racial discrimination remedies.
C. The Court's Method of Constitutional Adjudication Obfuscates
Intergroup Conflict
The Court's approach to constitutional adjudication examines in-
tergroup relational disputes only as they arise in the context of the
claimant's particular assertion of rights against another individual or
entity. Virtually all such transactions involve some past violation of
individual rights. The adversarial approach, particularly when taken
in combination with the rights-oriented method of constitutional ad-
judication, causes the Court to analyze intergroup relations in an arti-
ficially limited context, as a "win-lose" struggle for rights.
1. Bipolar Adversarialness.-The bipolar adversarial context of
constitutional litigation obliges judges to focus their analysis on the
parties and the specific facts of the case at hand. Even so, judges fre-
quently appear to be conscious that their interpretation of "individ-
ual" rights in a discrete context may have a far-ranging impact on
relations between majorities and minorities. However, the bipolar
structure shapes the discourse, and the Court's concern for inter-
263. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52 (1964)).
264. Id. at 242.
265. See id. at 239 (citing Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945) to establish that
Strauder requires a "purpose to discriminate"); id. at 240 (citing Wright, 376 U.S. at 56, 58 to
establish that racial purpose is necessary to establish a gerrymandering case); id. (citing
Keyes, decided three terms earlier, for the proposition that a school desegregation remedy
"must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose").
266. Id. at 244 and n.ll (citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971), and
arguing that Palmer should not be interpreted to render legislative purpose "irrelevant in
constitutional adjudication"). The Court also cited to Wright and Keyes, which were very
recently decided.
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group relation emerges in muted and often confusing tones. Brown
reveals a Court aware that its decision about an issue of individual
rights will affect race relations.267 The Brown opinion does not ad-
dress the needs of the individual plaintiff and defendant. Instead, it
appears to address both Whites and African Americans. The Court
recites the abject state of African American public education since
Plessy.268 This acknowledgement of educational inequality implicitly
functions as a justification for the need to reassess the doctrine of sep-
arate but equal. The Court appears to intimate that the impact of
Plessy on African American children's public school education, and
the substantive disparity that it engendered between the races, was not
foreseen by Plessy.26 9 In Brown, however, there is no explicit acknowl-
edgement of the havoc wreaked by Plessy on race relations. Because its
foundation is ambiguous, Brown is a weaker decision than if it had
confronted post-Plessy race relations directly. Also, in Washington v.
Davis, the Court's analysis implies that the Court's prior doctrinal in-
terpretations of Title VII's burden of proof requirement, if extended
for the purposes of applying the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
would be impracticable from a race relations standpoint. This impli-
cation appears to form the core justification for the result.2 70 Because
of the bipolar structure of the litigation, the Court does not find itself
obliged to address how its opinion will impact on race relations. As a
result of this omission, the opinion appears to lack concern for how
the legal outcome will impact racial minorities. These cases fail to
articulate clearly why the Court chooses a doctrinal path that could
prove harmful to majority-minority relations. Because intergroup
conflict is not the central focus of these decisions, there cannot be an
ongoing dialogue regarding these issues.
2. Rights Discourse.-The rhetoric of rights easily distorts the
complexity and dynamic nature of social group relations and the in-
terdependent nature of individuals and distinct groups within demo-
267. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1955) ("The Court knew, of course, that its judgment [in Brown]
would have an unparalleled impact on the daily lives of a very substantial portion of the
population, and that the response of many of those affected would be in varying degrees
hostile.").
268. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 n.6 (1954) ("[I]n the North segregation
in public education has persisted in some communities until recent years. It is apparent
that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem . . ").
269. Id. at 491 (emphasizing that the analysis of issues involving segregation and equal
protection should be based on the present status of public education because "we cannot
turn the clock back to .. . when P/essy... was written").
270. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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cratic polities.2 7' Rights rhetoric lends itself to simplistic
formulations; it sacrifices nuance for absolutism, the long run for
short run, and particular interests, both individual and group, over
majority-minority cohesion.2 7 2 Our legal, cultural, and historical tra-
ditions have led us to a construction of rights as individualistic and
atomistic 2 71 Sociologists have argued that individualism is one of our
most important cultural ideological values and forms part of the
American self-image as independent and exceptional.2 74 This individ-
ualistic culture pushes us toward an individualistic understanding of
rights.
The use of rights rhetoric in intergroup conflict cases results in a
win-lose presentation of the issue. One group's "gain" necessarily im-
plies "losses" for the other.2 75 When minorities seek protection
against discrimination, critics rhetorically cast this claim as an asser-
tion of "special rights.
276
Bowers v. Hardwick is an example of how reliance on rights rheto-
ric can yield absolutist results that alienate majorities from minorities
and vice versa. In Bowers, the Court framed the issue in terms of
rights: Should the Due Process Clause's understanding of privacy
rights be extended to protect a gay man from being arrested in his
own home under a state criminal sodomy statute?277 This win-lose
rights inquiry led to a decision that not only excluded the epistemo-
271. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTs TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL Dis-
COURSE 14-15, 47-76 (1991) (using the term "lone rights-bearer" to criticize the law's nar-
row construction of an individual as an acquisitive agent without responsibilities to the
community); id. at 47 ("The American dialect of rights talk implicitly encodes an image of
the possessor of rights. His qualities, or lack of them, help to explain why our rights claims
are so stark and our responsibility concepts so inconspicuous.").
272. Id. at 15-17, 4446, 175-78.
273. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMIT-
MENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 27, 30-31, 145 (1985) (describing Jeffersonian republicanism in an
effort to explain America's cultural tradition of individualism); GLENDON, supra note 271,
at 18-46 (linking the Founders' Lockean understanding of property to the principle that
governmental authority must be limited); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEwoRK AND ITS LEGACY
203-76 (1990) (discussing the relation of private property to an individualistic conception
of rights).
274. See generally BELLAH ET AL., supra note 273, at 142 (stating that individualism is at
the core of the American culture and is fundamental to the American identity).
275. See GLENDON, supra note 271, at 9 ("[1]n its simple American form, the language of
rights is the language of no compromise. The winner takes all and the loser has to get out
of town.").
276. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996) (noting, and rejecting, Colo-
rado's argument that Amendment 2 did no more than place gay men and lesbians in the
same position as others by denying them special rights).
277. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) ("The issue presented is whether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy
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logical perspective of gay men and lesbians, but further legitimized
the majority's depiction of gay men and lesbians as immoral actors.278
The Court was troubled by the prospect of extending a right of dubi-
ous constitutional pedigree (privacy rights) to a disfavored group (gay
men and lesbians) in a controversial situation (oral sodomy between
gay men). Electing to interpret rights as "trumps" 279 placed the Court
in a difficult position. Should the Court grant gay men and lesbians
"rights" protection for private acts of sodomy when this controversial
activity had resoundingly been condemned by all fifty states?
If, instead, the Court had examined the intergroup issues using a
method of constitutional adjudication in which results could' be less
absolutist and more tailored, perhaps Bowers would have been decided
differently. The Court, for example, could have used a rationality
ends-means review to inquire whether the stated purposes of the legis-
lation-to further traditional values-was furthered by selectively
targeting a disfavored minority.211 Other national supreme courts fac-
ing a similar legal issue have applied a proportionality test to deter-
mine if the state unduly burdened personal privacy rights,
acknowledging that state regulation of sodomy might be permissible
in other contexts.21 The facts of Bowers supported a less adversarial
result. Because the state statute defined sodomy in neutral terms,
2 2
the Court could have proscribed targeted prosecution of gay men.
2 3
and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and
have done so for a very long time.").
278. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text; see also GLENDON, supra note 271, at
151-55 (criticizing the Court's lack of nuance in Bowers v. Hardwick, and characterizing the
Court's rights rhetoric as a battle between the "Yahoos and perverts"); SANDEL, supra note
151, at 103-05, 107 (criticizing the Bowers decision for its anti-communitarian aspects).
279. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY Xi (1977) ("Individual rights are
political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a col-
lective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals,
to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon
them.").
280. See infra Part V.A.1.
281. See Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., No. 488/1992, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 6.8 (1994) (finding that Tasmanian sodomy criminal
statute violated Article 17 (right to privacy) of the International Human Rights Covenant
because the selected enforcement of the criminal statutes was not a "proportional response
to the perceived threat to the moral standards of Tasmanian society"); Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40, 58, 115 (1980) (interpreting Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, "right to respect for private life," to invalidate
a Northern Ireland prohibition on consensual homosexual acts involving persons over 21
years of age because the prohibition was not proportional to its purpose of protecting
morality), affid, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981).
282. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.1 (1986).
283. See Dudgeon, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 53-54, 94-95, 101 (finding the criminal penalties
at issue "heavy" and the "absolute legal prohibition" of consensual homosexual acts a sub-
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Or, the Court could have established that the selective prosecution of
gay men involved in consensual sodomy was not a proportional re-
sponse to the perceived threat to the State's moral standards.28 4 In-
stead, the Court's overbroad and unnuanced decision in Bowers
requires gay men and lesbians to leave an important part of their hu-
manity in the closet.2 8 5 From a minority position, this is a drastic con-
stitutional position.
Rights rhetoric masks too easily the fact that, in the area of group
conflict, the Court communicates important assumptions about mi-
norities. For example, cases like Plessy, Keyes, and Davis express, at var-
ious levels, disregard for the fact that African Americans continue to
occupy a relatively subordinate status.2 8 6 By ignoring or assuming
away a problematic social text and a structure of systemic discrimina-
tion, the decisions communicate, implicitly or explicitly, a notion that
securing minorities' (reasonable) assent to its decisions is not neces-
sary. These cases instead ought to require an acknowledgement of
the systemic majority-minority problem and then a justification as to
why the Court believes adjudication cannot address those systemic
harms. This approach to adjudication would serve better to resolve
intergroup disagreements.
IV. A RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK: DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSION
How can intergroup conflicts be resolved in a way that both ma-
jorities and minorities perceive as legitimate? Can judges escape their
epistemological precommitments? Can constitutional adjudication
promote connection rather than adversity?
This Part proposes that in majority-minority conflict cases the
Court should adopt a "relational" interpretive strategy.287 This ap-
proach incorporates the outsider critiques set forth in Parts II and III
stantial interference on private life, while at the same time acknowledging that the State
could regulate morals).
284. See Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., No. 448/1992, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 6.8 (1994) ("[T]he very fact that the laws are not en-
forced against individuals engaging in private, consensual sexual activity indicates that the
laws are not essential to the protection of that society's moral standards.").
285. See supra note 169.
286. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 86 (1976) (ascribing the unleashing of Jim
Crow in part to the Supreme Court's "[h] aving validated racial separation by its narrow, if
popular, reading of the Civil War amendments").
287. See supra note 12 (explaining the "relational approaches" of Professor Minow and
Professor MacNeil).
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into a foundational framework that adopts the process safeguards and
substantive values of a pluralist communicative democracy model.
288
A. Foundational Values of a Pluralist Communicative Democracy
Pluralist communicative democracy, as applied to the problem of
majority-minority constitutional adjudication, treats as primary the val-
ues of including all members of the polity and treating them as equal,
coparticipants in constructing the fundamental values of the polity.
James Madison, in Federalist No. 39, emphasized inclusion of all
the polity's members as fundamental to the constitution of democ-
racy. Exclusion of significant sectors of a polity "degrade [s] . . . the
republican character" of government, because "[i] t is essential to a [re-
publican] government that it be derived from the great body of the
society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of
it."' 289 As already argued, the problem of exclusion of minorities con-
tinues today in judicial decisions, albeit in a much more subtle and
complex form than it has previously existed. The Supreme Court's
failure to acknowledge, include, and engage the minority perspective
effectively excludes minorities from participating in the formation of
important principles upon which our society is founded.
29 °
Including minorities as well as the majority in forming the polity's
values ensures that all members have a stake in the polity. At social,
political, economic, and communicative levels, minorities are not ma-
jorities' coequals. Yet democracy's political terms and symbols con-
tend that minorities and majorities are coequal, coparticipant. 291 A
polity's stability requires that minorities be able to believe that the
288. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (contrasting Rawls's model of pluralist
democracy in civic republicanism).
289. THE FEDERAuST No. 39, at 112 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).
290. Accord Michelman, supra note 26, at 1529 (arguing that "the pursuit of political
freedom through law depends on 'our' constant reach for inclusion of the other, of the
hitherto excluded-which in practice means bringing to legal-doctrinal presence the hith-
erto absent voices of emergently self-conscious social groups").
291. For Judith Shklar, this gap between aspiration and reality is a fundamental paradox
of liberal polities. SeeJUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICEs 77 (1984) (describing egalitarian-
ism in America as a pretense that social standings are a matter of indifference); Judith N.
Shklar, Injustice, Injury and Inequality: An Introduction, in JUs-nCE AND EQuALrrv HERE AND
Now 13, 32-33 (Frank S. Lucash, ed. 1986) (defending representative democracy from
those who would prefer communitarian harmony, but also noting that, because excessive
inequality can destroy plurality and legality, such democracy requires empathy for the
marginalized). Similarly, Frank Michelman's brand of civic republicanism emphasizes the
values of inclusion and citizen participation in constitutional jurisprudence. See
Michelman, supra note 26, at 1499, 1502-03 (arguing that these values are not nostalgic but
reflective of what Americans understand constitutional democracy to mean). Citing Bowers
v. Hardwick as an example, he eschews authoritarian constitutional interpretation for 
a
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polity's fundamental terms can fulfill their aspirations and acknowl-
edge their sense of self. In the words of Justice Douglas:
The sense of belonging is important to man. The feeling
that he is accepted and a part of the community or the na-
tion is as important as the feeling that he is a member of a
family. He does not belong if he has a second-class citizen-
ship. When he feels he does not belong, he is not eager to
assume responsibilities of citizenship. Being unanchored, he
is easy prey to divisive influences that are designed to tear a
nation apart or to woo it to a foreign ideology. 292
John Rawls has argued that inclusion and discursive engagement
of each member of the polity ensures the stability of democracy. It
means that "likes" and "unlikes" strive to construct the polity's terms
of their coexistence.293 In a closed political system, where no citizen
or group can opt out, each member is invested in the long-term suc-
cess and stability of the polity.294 Rawls argues further that in such a
closed system each citizen and political institution has the obligation
to exercise political power in a manner that autonomous agents would
agree treats citizens as free and equal. 295 This substantive fundamen-
tal requirement of meaningful inclusion and engagement ensures the
social cooperation necessary for long-term stability.29 6
Under Rawls's analysis, exclusion of the minority perspective also
undermines the Court's legitimacy.2 97 The Court's legitimacy in a
democratic polity depends on its ability to claim that it is neutral, and
'modern context of equality of respect, liberation from ascriptive social roles, and indissol-
uble plurality of perspectives." Id. at 1526.
292. DAVID M. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY 105 n.8 (1954) (quoting Justice William 0.
Douglas).
293. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at xli (asserting that "the problem of politicalliberalism is to work out a political conception of political justice . . . that a plurality of
reasonable doctrines . .. may endorse").
294. Id. at 15-28 (describing a just society as one in which members recognize a reci-procity of interests with other members, in part because there is a mutual interest in ensur-
ing the survival of the society as a whole, and proposing as a framework the "veil of
ignorance"-those principles to which rational agents would agree in advance if they did
not know their subsequent social position); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42(1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE] (applying this framework to construct political
principles).
295. RAwLs, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 14, 15-18.
296. Id. at 15-22.
297. Cf id. at 137 (defining the substantive sense of legitimacy as the "exercise of polit-ical power ... in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals
acceptable to their common human reason"); id. at 428 (defining the procedural sense of
legitimacy).
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that it attempts in good faith to interpret principles of justice for the
well-being of all social groups.298
Thus, the Court's failure to include and engage minority perspec-
tives in constitutional adjudication cases means that minorities are not
meaningfully included in the dialectic of formulating the substantive
values of the polity, thereby threatening both the stability and the le-
gitimacy of the institution. If the Court fails to engage minorities'
epistemological framework in its dialectic process, the Court's final
decisions do not appear neutral to minorities, but instead as an exer-
cise in choosing arbitrarily competing social "truths" or moral under-
standings. 299 Equally or more significantly, the Court's imposition of
a majority epistemological perspective on minority members of the
polity can be seen as an act of oppression.300
In sum, it is crucial for the Court to employ a model of "public
reason" that recognizes and engages both minority and majority per-
spectives when it decides cases involving intergroup disputes. This ap-
proach does not require that the minority perspective prevail, but
only that it be taken seriously enough to lead to a meaningful dia-
logue in which, through reasoned discourse, it may prevail. The fol-
lowing section elaborates on this model.
B. The Relational Model of Public Reason
The task of including the "other's" epistemology as coequal, and
of treating the "other" as coparticipant, is difficult, and some might
argue impossible, because social norms, history, economics, and social
position tend to exclude the "other." To break this cultural and social
bind, a revamping of legal methodology is needed.
1. Inclusion and the Problem of the Socially Positioned Judge. -The
first step in reconstructing a more inclusive legal method is to ensure
that judges do not summarily dismiss, ignore, or take as nonexistent
minorities' epistemological position.
298. See id. at 231-40 (discussing the Supreme Court as the exemplar of public reason).
For a similar interpretation of adjudicative legitimacy that arrives at a different conclusion,
see POSNER, supra note 248, at 124-57 (reconciling the gap between law's indeterminacy and
judges' need to appear neutral by arguing that law can be related to economics); see also
DwORKIN, supra note 279, at 110-23 (proposing a model of adjudicative legitimacy similar
to Rawls's, but adding a paradigmatically positivist component ofjudicial neutrality rooted
in method).
299. RAwLS, LiBERAUSM, supra note 26, at 236-37 (arguing that, as exemplars of public
reason, judges cannot invoke their own morality or the ideals of morality generally, but
must interpret the Constitution in light of the public conception of justice).
300. See id. at 137 & n.5 (noting that political power is illegitimate if not exercised in a
manner that all citizens as free and equal can be expected to endorse).
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a. The Assumption of Plurality and Contestation. -Social sci-
ence research supports the proposition that if judges were aware of
the multiplicity of epistemologies, they would be less likely simply to
choose one social "truth" over another without discussion. Cognitive
and social psychologists report that when subjects have a clearly de-
fined evaluative structure the incidence of biased decision making de-
creases.3" 1 Anthropologists suggest that awareness of one's cultural
and social position is a necessary first step in dealing with those who
are different. 0 2 A self-conscious and self-critical methodology is es-
sential in addressing the epistemological precommitment judges face
in intergroup conflict cases.
Suppose judges were to assume that the polity is pluralistic, and
that any social "truth" ajudge would assert in a case in which minority
rights are at stake is likely to be contested.30 3 Under this scenario,judges would have to be conscious that other social truths and ideolo-
gies exist beside their own and would have to consciously justify their
choice of which parameters to employ in making judgments about
equality.30 4 The newly acquired awareness that the majority's "truth"
can be contested and de-centered can serve as a form of constraint.
In the cases already critiqued, Keyes and Davis, this approach would
require judges to go beyond the common law endeavor of distinguish-
ing precedent, citing policy concerns of institutional prudence, and(re)interpreting prior holdings. In addition, judges would have to fo-
cus on whether the social facts and "truths" in these cases, social facts
that "make sense" from a White perspective, had been adequately sub-
stantiated and justified from a minority perspective. While critical
301. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 104, at 85 (analyzing and summarizing a series
of social psychology experiments and concluding that "[w]hen norms are clear, bias is
unlikely to occur; when norms are ambiguous or conflicting, discrimination is often
exhibited").
302. See RAYMONDE CARROLL, CULTURAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS: THE FRENCH-AMERICAN Ex-
PERIENCE 124-26 (Carol Volk trans., 1988) (urging individuals to accept that "my truth isprecisely that, 'my' truth... I must become able to conceive that the 'aberrant' behavior
that wounds me . . . may be informed . . . by the truth of the . . . other. . . ."); ROSALDO,
supra note 176, at 169 ("In discussing forms of social knowledge, both of analysts and ofhuman actors, one must consider their social positions. What are the complexities of the
speakers's social identity?... Does the person speak from a position of relative dominance
or relative subordination?").
303. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 35-40 (attempting to provide the frame-
work for moral disagreement between free and equal participants in a polity, without desta-
bilizing or disunifying a well-ordered society).
304. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 884 (1990)("[I]f truth is understood as partial and contingent, each individual or group can ap-
proach its own truths with a more honest, self-critical attitude about the value and poten-
tial relevance of other truths."); Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 12, at 32 (arguing thatjudges should be aware of their unstated point of reference when judging).
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theorists and social scientists have debated the possibility of tran-
scending one's own perspective,3" 5 " [t] he point is not to find the new,
true perspective; the point is to strive for impartiality by admitting our
partiality."3 °6 Thus, the first step judges should take in deciding inter-
group conflict cases is to become self-conscious and self-critical of
their initial epistemological position.
b. The Tension Between Epistemological Inclusion and Universal
Truth.-The relational framework's insistence on epistemological in-
clusion of the minority perspective has an important consequence.
To include more than one epistemology also requires that we aban-
don the certainty that our own "truths" about the relevant social world
are the universal truths30 7 and open ourselves to the possibility that
the "truth" we have come to accept is contestable.30 8 The relational
approach advocates that judges destabilize their own assumptions
305. Compare Stephanie M. Wildman & Margalynne Armstrong, Concluding Thoughts on
Noticing Privilege, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 106, at 177, 177-80 (advocating that
Whites recognize privilege in order to create room for conversations about how to achieve
goals that require systemic changes) and Flagg, supra note 114, at 970-73, 991-93 (arguing
that it is possible to transcend one's own perspective and privilege by becoming more self-
aware, self-reflective, and humble) with ROsALDo, supra note 176, at 169 (arguing that our
own subjectivity can never be abandoned, so that inquiry requires an awareness of our own
social position in light of the dynamics of relative dominance and subordination).
306. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 376; see also SEYLA BENHABIB,
CRITIQUE, NoRM, AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL THEORY 340
(1986) (advocating that we address the "concrete other" with a concrete history, identity,
and affective constitution); Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 12, at 76 ("I conclude that
I must acknowledge and struggle against my partiality by making an effort to understand
your reality and what it means for my own .... The solution is not to adopt and cling to
some new standpoint, but instead to strive to become and remain open to perspectives and
claims that challenge our own.").
307. The complex question of how to determine what is the "truth" in law is not ad-
dressed here. See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAw AND TRUTH (1996). Rather, the discussion is
limited to the empirical claim that majorities and minorities hold distinct social truths and
differ the most about how to interpret the social dynamics that divide them. See supra notes
184-227 and accompanying text.
308. See MiNow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 376 ("The perspective of
those who are labeled 'different' . . . is a corrective lens, another partial view, not the
absolute truth."); POSNER, supra note 248, at 460-69, 465 (arguing that pragmatism looks at
legal problems with full awareness of "limitations of human knowledge, the difficulty of
translations between cultures, the unattainability of 'truth,' the consequent importance of
keeping diverse paths of inquiry open, [and] the dependence of inquiry on culture and
social institutions"); Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and
Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 57, 106 (1995) (arguing
that pluralism requires that we abandon the comfortable, self-assured-but illusory-de-
terminacy afforded by homogeneity); see also supra note 302.
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about social "truths" and accept a notion to which traditionalists have
been hostile, relativism.30 9
The insights of postmodernism on the interrelationship between
truth, knowledge, and power can help us approach this tension. 1 0
Postmodernists conceive of law not as a unified discourse capable of
answers that are singular, stable, and "true," but as a discourse based
on multiple narratives and alternative constructions of knowledge and
"truth." '311 Truth and knowledge cannot be isolated from a social con-
text.3 12 Modernity's tendency to think in terms of unitary constructs
and assume that there is an objective social text313 permits one social
group to lay claim to a putatively universal truth. In the
309. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAw 15-34 (1997) (attacking a hodgepodge of CRT and
CLS ideas that the authors construe as "radical" multiculturalism for a variety of reasons,
including anti-Semitism); Richard A. Posner, Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth
in American Law, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40 (calling postmodemism "radical
rational fringe" and critical race theory the "lunatic core").
310. See FOUCAULT, supra note 123.
311. This is one way to describe the many ideas and theories which we now describe as
"postmodernism." For example, neopragmatists accept this distinction. See POSNER, supra
note 248, at 466 (acknowledging that "[t]here is knowledge if not ultimate truth"). So
would those who would focus on law as narrative. SeeJerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Telling a
Black Legal Story: Privilege, Authenticity, "Blunders, " and Transformation in Outsider Narratives,
82 VA. L. REV. 69, 69-71 (1996) (asserting that autobiography and other forms of narrative
are good methods for -challenging the status quo in society and law); Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2414(1989) (contending that narratives and storytelling are effective methods for changing the
complacency of law and for minority groups to gain support and understanding from the
dominant group); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 608(1994) (arguing that narrative legal scholarship, or storytelling, provides perspectives on
legal issues from viewpoints that are seldom considered). But see Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv.
807, 840-52 (1993) (calling for objective standards to evaluate the worth of narrative schol-
arship). See generally GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRU-
DENCE AT CENTURY'S END 224-29 (1995) (arguing that "[p]ostmodernists do not deny that
there can be knowledge of reality; what they deny is that we can rely on theory and lan-
guage to objectively fix the meaning of reality").
312. The anthropological work cited supra note 302 can be viewed as postmodernist in
this sense. See also Dennis Patterson, Introduction to POSTMODERNISM AND LAW xi, xiii-Xv
(Dennis Patterson ed., 1994) (arguing that the truth or falsity of any statement cannot be
assessed in isolation from everything else we take to be true).
313. The proposition advanced is not the profound skepticism about any universal
claim. This is another way in which to interpret postmodernism. See, e.g., PATrERSON, supra
note 307, at 160-61 ("[P]ostmodernist conceptions of the word-world relation see the mod-
ernist picture of propositional, representationalist truth as unintelligible; a project that
never gets off the ground." (citation omitted)); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF P.AGMA-
nSM xxvi (1982) (setting forth reasons why "truth," as a correspondence between language
and facts, is not objective). The claim made here, that minorities have a distinct social
epistemology, can be viewed as an empirical claim rather than a claim based on profound
skepticism. See supra notes 184-227 and accompanying text.
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postmodernist view, truth is a manifestation of social power;"1 4 unitary
"truth" must be regarded with skepticism.3 1 5 To avoid hegemonic
constructions, postmodernism accepts a plurality of intermediate and
tentative positions, sometimes inassimilable and divergent.
316
Postmodernism teaches to avoid "essentializing" ;317 to be wary of cate-
gories that exclude modes of thinking and relationships that are valid
and important;" 8 to eschew dichotomies that hide the range of pos-
sibilities in between polar extremes;"' to "locate the subject" so that
we do not come inexorably to "logical" conclusions that lend false au-
thority to our own value judgments and epistemological process.3 2 °
Thus, we must avoid imbuing with heightened authority what may be
only our own perspective.
Can judges deal with the proposition that social truth is relative
and yet interpret the law, without losing themselves in the sea of nihil-
ism? The attempt to answer this question is what Professor Gary
Minda has recently called the postmodem project.3 21 A number of
scholars argue that "postmodernism" cultivates a plurality of perspec-
tives that can coexist with a commitment to finding interpretations of
the law that reflect central political values.3 22 As Anna Yeatman ex-
314. See Michel Foucault, Afterword to HUBERT L. DREvFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL Fou-
CAULT: BEYOND STRUCrURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208, 212 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing how
discursive practices, such as law and medicine, constitute a "form of power [that] applies
itself to immediate everyday life"); Winter, supra note 177, at 742.
315. Cf Bartlett, supra note 304, at 884 ("[P]ositionality . . . makes clear that current
disagreements within society at large and among feminists... reflect value conflicts basic
to the terms of social existence. If resolvable at all, these conflicts will not be settled by
reference to external or pre-social standards of truth.").
316. See JEAN-FRANCoIs LYOTARD & JEAN-LouP THtBAUD, JUST GAMING 94-95 (Wlad
Godzich trans., 1985) (discussing the postmodern view of language games, which replace
totality with diversity and critique political judgment by attending to divergent notions of
justice); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential
Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7 (1989).
317. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
319. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 130, at 1373-74 (discussing the bipolar categories
applied to Whites and African Americans); Halley, supra note 145, at 1748-50 (discussing
the bipolar identity and conduct categories applied to gay men and lesbians).
320. See Schlag, supra note 249, at 1646-56 (discussing how American legal formalism
invokes a transcendental subject that conceals the function of particular interpretive
communities).
321. MINDA, supra note 311, at 243-57; see also DOUGLAS E. LITowrrZ, POSTMODERN PHI-
LOSOPHY AND LAW 20-34 (1997) (identifying the postmodern legal project as addressing the
gap between outsider perspectives and the perspective of internal legal actors).
322. See Hayman, supra note 308, at 106 (arguing that postmodernism's exposure of the
myth of a unifying tradition can lay the groundwork for a genuine unity premised on
mutual respect); Allan C. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 NEw
ENG. L. REv. 1173, 1192 (1992) (describing postmodernism as an attempt to account for
experience without reducing it to an authoritative source of knowledge).
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plains, "[t]he project of developing the norms and institutions of a
universal culture of individualized agency is a coherent project. It is
one which situates . . . plurality ... within a democratic ethic. 323
This interpretation views law as a process in which judges of good
faith struggle with multiple perspectives, yet avoid those errors that
arise as a result of assuming that their socially positioned perspective
is the exclusively relevant social truth.324 Judges' search for "truths"
should reinforce the polity's democratic values, not the judge's episte-
mological precommitments. If a judge must choose an epistemologi-
cal perspective, he should do so consciously, provide justification to
the group whose epistemology is being confronted, and demonstrate
how the decision furthers the polity's values.
This model and its social text, of course, are themselves subject to
the very arguments set forth in this Part. Some "truths" must be se-
lected in every model to avoid foundational nihilism. Part IV.A pro-
posed "truths" founded in a framework of pluralist communicative
democracy and based on principles of inclusion and equal copar-
ticipation. Applying the approach of public reason, the rest of this
Article sets forth reasons why this framework, even if not the ultimate
"truth," best solves the majority-minority epistemological conflict
problem discussed in Part I.
2. Using a Relational Concept of Public Reason to Engage Opposing
Epistemologies as Coequal.-This Article does not advocate that judges
accept a minority perspective, but only that they engage and address it.
Thus, judges must provide an explanation, or "public reason," for
their choice to adopt a particular epistemology. This Part proposes
that Rawls's concept of public reason be part of the legal method
judges apply to majority-minority conflict cases. The proposed model
of public reason would require judges to: (a) justify their key choices
of text, doctrine, and policy in terms the "other" might reasonably
accept; (b) communicate that epistemological differences in perspec-
323. Anna Yeatman, A Feminist Theory of Social Differentiation, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERN-
ISM 281, 290 (LindaJ. Nicholson ed., 1990).
324. A number of scholars view the judge as an actor engaged in a good faith struggle
searching for justice. See MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 376-77
(suggesting thatjudges struggle in good faith against partiality); POSNER, supra note 248, at
460-69 (claiming that the judge seeks knowledge with the goal ofjustice in mind); cf Bart-
lett, supra note 304, at 884 (arguing that there are no fixed, discoverable foundations, but
also that we can grasp the significance of positional meaning through a self-critical stance);
Seyla Benhabib, Epistemologies of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder toJean-Franpois Lyotard, in FEMI-
NISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 323, at 107, 125 (arguing that minimal criteria of validity
for discursive and political practices are possible despite the absence of foundational
guarantees).
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tives are reasonable and have an equal place in the political dialogue;
(c) refrain from imposing epistemological frameworks on any group;
and (d) seek to justify decisions to both majorities and minorities on
narrow, mutually acceptable common grounds.
a. Providing a Justification the "Other" Might Reasonably Ac-
cept.-A key concept of the pluralist model of communicative democ-
racy is that public deliberation should be constrained by an ethic
which Rawls refers to as reciprocity.125 In such a democracy, partici-
pants would not impose a particular "comprehensive doctrine"3 26 on
one another. Instead, we would justify our actions by giving reasons
the "other" will understand and reasonably accept.3 27 Reciprocity
helps mediate strong disagreement among participants who hold nu-
merous "comprehensive doctrines" because these participants are sim-
ilarly motivated by mutual regard to want to justify their actions by
reasons the "other" will understand and reasonably accept. 328 Each
participant attempts to understand that other coparticipants' political
views are formed by their experiences. 329 The epistemological and
philosophical position of each member is respected, because this is
what we would expect for ourselves. Respecting the integrity of each
person's deeply held beliefs as well as "ways of knowing" means that
no participant is coerced into accepting ways of knowing or moral
frameworks.3 30 This ensures a baseline of coequality that provides the
necessary minimum conditions for long term stability.
33 1
325. RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 49-50 (defining "reciprocity" as a willingness to
accept reasonable principles of fair cooperation and grounding this concept in our desire
for a social world in which such cooperation is possible).
326. Rawls's term "comprehensive doctrines" is somewhat similar to the sense of "episte-
mology" that Parts I and II have developed. See id. at 13, 36-37 (defining a "comprehensive
doctrine" as one covering all recognized values and virtues within a precisely articulated
system and noting that such doctrines are not simply a product of class interest, but a
product of free practical reason, so that liberalism must address them).
327. Id. at xliv; see also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 26, at 55 ("When citizens
deliberate, they seek agreement on substantive moral principles that can be justified on
the basis of mutually acceptable reasons.").
328. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 137; see also GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra
note 26, at 73 ("A deliberative disagreement is one in which citizens continue to differ
about basic moral principles even though they seek a resolution that is mutually
justifiable.").
329. See supra note 326.
330. Cf RAwLs, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 49 ("Persons are reasonable ... [when]
they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to
abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. Those norms
they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as justifiable to them.").
331. See id. at 15-18 (discussing "the fundamental organizing idea of justice as fairness"
as the source of stability).
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How would Rawls's concept of "reciprocity" constrain public rea-
son in intergroup conflict cases? First, judges would test their conclu-
sions by determining whether those who lose in the adjudication can
reasonably accept the judges' proffered justification. The attempt to
justify decisions to the losing group obliges judges to imagine the
other's perspective and interests, to consider the impact of their deci-
sions on that group, and to assess whether the court's proffered justifi-
cation is sufficiently persuasive and reasoned to appear "neutral" and
rational to that "other." Reciprocity would require judges to imagine
and counter the arguments that a hypothetical dissenter might
make.332
Second, reciprocity also serves a moderating function.33 Part I
argued that in cases like Bowers and Keyes, the affected minority would
not have accepted the Court's outcome because it entirely excluded
their perspective and implicitly denied the validity of minority groups'
social experience.33 4 Had the Court asked itself whether gay men and
lesbians or African American parents could reasonably accept the de-
cision, the Court might have reconsidered and perhaps moderated
the tenor and the reasoning of its decisions.335 Such moderation
would have been feasible.
332. Actual dissents may not suffice for this purpose because they may be premised on
the same world view as the majority opinion. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
189 (1986) (refusing to adopt the minority homosexual perspective that statutes prohibit-
ing sodomy violate the fundamental rights of those engaging in homosexual activity) with
id. at 214-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (also failing to adopt the minority homosexual per-
spective). Cf HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 220 (1961) (discussing the pro-
cess of judging as an "anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must
finally come to some agreement"). This kind of reasoned engagement is distinct from
what humanist empathy proponents propose, namely, "projecting oneself into the other's
place as subject of her experience." DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH, THE CIRCLE OF ACQUAIN-
TANCE: PERCEPTION, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND EMPATHY 112 (1989). See generally Lynne N. Hen-
derson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1579 (1987) (setting forth a definition
of empathy); Matsuda, supra note 187, at 324 ("Looking to the bottom-adopting the per-
spective of those who have seen and felt the falsity of the liberal promise-can assist critical
scholars in the task of fathoming the phenomenology of law and defining the elements of
justice."); Shklar, supra note 291, at 32-33 (discussing Rawls's thought and arguing that a
claim of right is an appeal for "rational empathy").
333. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 26, at 79 (describing mutual respect as re-
quiring "a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with
whom one disagrees"); MACEDO, supra note 26, at 71 (arguing that we moderate our claims
in the face of reasonable claims of others).
334. See supra notes 131-137, 138-171 and accompanying text.
335. "Splitting the difference" would not always be appropriate in majority-minority con-
flict cases because "reasonable people will continue to disagree and moral perspectives will
remain divergent." See MACEDO, supra note 26, at 71. The Court remains responsible for
deciding these cases in a manner that ensures that the democratic process is not thwarted
by irrational majority-minority dynamics. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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Third, reciprocity would help the Court to be more persuasive in
a polity made up of diverse communities with distinct epistemologies.
Where the Court at least recognizes and addresses alternative view-
points it is more likely to win the support of members of the minority
as well as the majority community. Decisions in which the Court does
not even consider minorities' epistemology are not persuasive and are
exclusionary in the deepest sense.336
b. Communicating That Epistemological Divergence Is Reason-
able.-Rawls's model elaborates how members of a pluralistic demo-
cratic polity can handle confrontation between epistemologies that
cannot be reconciled. His concept of reciprocity suggests that public
reason requires decision makers to credit the reasonableness of those
whose epistemologies we may not understand.
3 7
Reciprocity requires judges to move beyond tolerance and recog-
nize distinct epistemologies as equally reasonable.3 8 They must reject
the impatient view, held by many who believe in a universal truth, that
those who have a different epistemology from that held by the major-
ity simply "don't get it,"3 3 9 are disunifying the polity,3 40 are undermin-
ing our cultural values and traditions, 41 or lack civic virtue. 4 2
Judges must also reject the view that an idea is unacceptable sim-
ply because of the identity or social position of its author. If social
ideology dictates ex ante that one speaker is inherently inferior, then
it is less likely the Court will engage the speaker's perspective. 343 This
336. See supra Part I.
337. RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at li.
338. See MACEDO, supra note 26, at 70 ("Achieving a common moral framework allows us
to express in politics our common reasonableness, it allows us, in effect, mutually to recog-
nize one another as equally reasonable moral beings.").
339. RAwLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 61 ("[T]hose who do insist on their beliefs also
insist that their beliefs alone are true: they impose their beliefs . . ").
340. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 74, 96-99, 112-18
(1992) (criticizing multiculturalism in education on the basis that it undermines American
traditions and disunifies the polity).
341. See, e.g., ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 28-34 (1987) (arguing
that cultural relativism is incompatible with the natural rights foundation of the American
Constitution); PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRA-
TION DISASTER 9, 137-201 (1995) (arguing that the inflow of "third world" immigrants
threatens America's economy, culture, public health, and environment).
342. This could be the implication of the civic republicans' emphasis on deliberation as
a way of learning civic virtue that ultimately leads to a formulation of the public good. Cf
Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1554-55 (arguing that "[r]epublican theories ... rely on the
deliberative functions of politics and on practical reason, and embrace the notion of the
common good as a coherent one" (footnote omitted)).
343. Cf ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 25 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Random House, Inc. 1954)
("It is not true ... that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing
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failure to engage minority epistemology is yet another form of exclu-
sion. For example, in the race relations cases discussed in Part I.A,
the Court's implicit adoption of the White viewpoint as universal ex-
cluded the opposing perspective of African American parents. 44
It is important for judges to recognize that differences between
majorities and minorities are reasonable disagreements and not mat-
ters of "right" and "wrong." Not only does this increase minority ac-
ceptance of the courts' own decisions, it also facilitates debate about
moral and political issues in the community. As will be discussed in
Part IV.C, courts' handling of these issues has a tremendous influence
on the discussion of majority-minority conflicts throughout the polity.
c. Refraining from Imposing Epistemological Frameworks.--Once
we recognize epistemological difference as part of the polity's perma-
nent social context, we must also accept that multiple reasonable posi-
tions must find room for coexistence . 3 14 Unity and agreement cannot
be attained with respect to an epistemological confrontation unless
one either assumes away the problem by pretending that the polity is
homogeneous or ignores the existence of another epistemological
view.34 6 Insisting on agreement would imply, at some level, coercion
of those who are in the weaker political position. 47 Because the ma-
jority will dominate political processes and can define what the polity
accepts as the "common sense" of the social world, majorities are in a
position to tell those in politically and socially powerless positions
to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most
effective means of persuasion he possesses.").
344. See supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text (discussing Keyes's single focus in the
context of busing); supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text (discussing Davis's adoption
of a White perspective of racial discrimination).
345. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 26, at 92 ("A deliberative perspective . .. must
reject the unqualified quest for agreement because it must renounce the claim to compre-
hensiveness."); MACEDO, supra note 26, at 71 ("Moderation allows us to accept the fact that
a large and diverse group of reasonable people will never completely unite on precisely the
same moral platform."); Michelman, supra note 26, at 1528-29 ("The legal form of plurality
is indeterminacy... the precondition of the dialogic, critical-transformative dimension of
our legal practice .... ").
346. See generally Lazos Vargas, supra note 33 (discussing the pervasive effects of the as-
sumption of homogeneity in how the Court fails to address adequately majority-minority
conflicts).
347. The critics of civic republicanism make this point most cogently. See, e.g., Bell &
Bansal, supra note 26, at 1611 (arguing that the republican view has historically suppressed
the needs of Blacks in America "in order to promote the common good of whites"); Gey,
supra note 26, at 870-72 (setting forth the republican argument for the political correction
of improper attitudes); Sullivan, supra note 26, at 1722 (noting the tension between the
republican enterprise and acceptance of heterogenous groups with incommensurable
values).
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what the "truth" is. As previously argued, however, Rawls's concept of
freedom and coequality means that no epistemological framework
should be imposed upon dissenters, be they majorities or minorities,
lest such an imposition undermine the legitimacy of state power.
3 48
The task of judges, therefore, is to find doctrinal resolutions that
both majorities and minorities can "reasonably accept." The following
section spells out how judges can do so.
d. Seeking to Justify Decisions on Narrow Mutually Acceptable
Common Ground.-To accommodate widespread reasonable disagree-
ment, judges should attempt to render narrow decisions that do not
require them to choose one group's view of the world over that of
another group.3 49 Requiring judges to apply the constraints of reci-
procity and to issue narrow decisions in intergroup conflict cases
leaves key aspects of our method of constitutional adjudication intact
and even reinforces it. Professor Sunstein has argued that constitu-
tional adjudication reflects a process akin to "overlapping consensus"
because it is pragmatic, reaches solutions incrementally, and allows
judges to solve problems in a highly particularized factual and doctri-
nal context.35° Constitutional adjudication maintains its integrity and
coherence because judges decide cases discretely and do not always
reach for broad theoretical statements that may not reflect what the
entire polity agrees are its fundamental values.35' In constitutional
348. See supra notes 293-296 and accompanying text.
349. RAWLs, LIBERALSM, supra note 26, at 164-68 (discussing the concept of "overlapping
consensus" as a discrete and prudential process of developing narrow bands of agree-
ment); id. at 150 (arguing against the adoption or rejection of any comprehensive doctrine
in favor of consensus established through the public political culture). Other theorists also
have advocated such an approach to resolving disputes in the polity at large. See BARBER,
supra note 26, at 170 ("[S]trong democracy embodies .. . openness and flexibility ....
[T]he objective is to find working maxims rather than fixed truths and shared conscious-
ness.. . ."); GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 26, at 85-93 (discussing the concept of
"economy of moral disagreement" as a process of encouraging citizens to discover what
aspects of their first-order moral beliefs could be accepted as principles and polices by
other citizens with whom they fundamentally disagree, so that citizens may achieve a sec-
ond-order agreement); MACEDO, supra note 26, at 70 (arguing that, instead of striking a
balance between comprehensive moral doctrines, we should put these aside in favor of
mutually acceptable common ground); Michelman, supra note 26, at 1529 ("[P]olitical
freedom through law depends on 'our' constant reach for inclusion of the other ... .
350. SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 37, 52.
351. This sounds like Professor Bickel's theory of "passive virtue." See supra note 257 and
accompanying text. However, the relational approach distinguishes itself from Bickel's vi-
sion by requiring the Court to engage the perspective of the "other" as a precondition to
adopting a prudential stance. The approach also advocates that as part of setting the pa-
rameters of dialogic exchange, the Court ensure that the majority not abuse its superior
numbers and dominant social and political position.
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law there are what Professor Sunstein calls "incompletely theorized
agreements, ' 352 which form practical agreement on particular out-
comes, despite having diverse theories as to why the outcome is cor-
rect, or even no articulate theory at all. 53 Equal protection, given its
complexity and subtlety, may lend itself more than most constitutional
issues to incompletely theorized agreements.3 54
Sunstein further argues that, with respect to very divisive issues,
when agreement within the polity is not possible, it is prudent for
courts to defer final determination until the polity has had an oppor-
tunity to flush out ideas and positions.355 The Court can then recon-
sider the issue when it is "ripe, ''3 56 or resolve difficult cases on
narrower grounds. This would leave the court and the polity free to
be able to work out areas of principled commonality.357 Attempts to
formulate high level abstractions about principles of justice should be
avoided until substantial consensus has been formed within the pol-
ity. 358 For example, Part III.C suggested that Bowers v. Hardwick
should have been decided on narrower grounds, applying principles
of proportionality and discretion, as did the high courts of Great Brit-
ain and Tasmania when confronted with the same issue.359 Part L.A
similarly argued that the resolution of Keyes and Davis unnecessarily
overreached by unduly limiting constitutionally cognizable
discrimination.360
It may not always be possible for a court to issue a narrow deci-
sion that avoids an epistemological choice. There will be cases, not as
clear cut as those discussed in Part I, in which mutually acceptable
352. SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 5.
353. Id. at 7, 14-16, 35-37; see id. at 37 ("What I am emphasizing ... is that when people
diverge on some (relatively) high-level proposition, they might be able to agree when they
lower the level of abstraction. Incompletely theorized judgments on particular cases are
the ordinary material of law.").
354. Cf id. at 37 ("High-level theories are rarely reflected explicitly in law.").
355. Id. at 17-18, 42 (noting that the law focuses on specific judgments rather than gen-
eral principles, and that it is not the Supreme Court's job "to offer a fully theorized con-
ception of equality"); see also BicKEL, supra note 257, at 28, 239-43.
356. SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 41-44.
357. Id. at 41-46.
358. For Sunstein this is an issue regarding the legitimacy of the function of judicial
review. See id at 47 ("A special goal of the incompletely theorized agreement on particu-
lars is to obtain a consensus on a concrete outcome among people who do not want to
decide questions in political philosophy."); id. at 53 ("For reasons of both policy and prin-
ciple, the development of large-scale theories of the right and the good is a democratic
task, not ajudicial one."). This is Professor Bickel's concern as well. See Bickel, supra note
257, at 236-37.
359. See supra notes 281-284 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
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ground may not be attainable. The goal then should be "understand-
ing" in Professor Iris Marion Young's sense of the term.3 6 1 Professor
Young argues that deliberative politics should increase the ability of
majorities and minorities to understand what divides them. 6 2 This
position acknowledges that socially situated actors cannot overcome
their own social position, but advocates that they should seek to
"spea[k] across differences of culture, social position, and need,... so
that other social positions learn . . .that there remains more behind
that [other's] experience and perspective that transcends their own
subjectivity."3 63
This concept of narrow decisions is admittedly a substantive con-
straint, which can be as subjective as other "constraints" in other con-
stitutional adjudicative frameworks. Specifically, the model requires
judges to determine what should be "reasonably acceptable" to both
majorities and minorities in the context of what judges understand to
be the fundamental values of the polity. Judges must also determine
which issues are constitutionally essential, which substantive values are
fundamental to the polity, and ensure that these determinations are
inclusive and bound by the principle of reciprocity. The following
section argues that judges are capable of this endeavor.
3. It Is Feasible for Reason and Rationality to Bridge the Epistemologi-
cal Gap.-Many might question the framework that has been pro-
posed, asserting that it places too much reliance on reason and
rationality. 4 Specifically, critics might charge that judges who are
socially positioned will not, despite their best efforts, be able to under-
stand or articulate the epistemological position of the "other." Such a
critique must be taken very seriously. Feminist critics of democracy
have argued convincingly that those who are on opposite sides of the
epistemological divide are radically limited in their ability to interpret
361. See YOUNG, supra note 186, at 68 (defining "understanding" as speaking across dif-
ferences without collapsing these differences in an act of mutual identification).
362. See id. (arguing that communicative democracy is better conceived as
"[u]nderstanding another social location").
363. Id.
364. Rawls's emphasis on reason and rationality has been criticized, and the workability
of the process of overlapping consensus has been questioned. See, e.g., Gary C. Leedes,
Rawls's Excessively Secular Political Conception, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 1083, 1091-95 (1993) (com-
menting that Rawls's account of reasonableness does not adequately explain peoples' moti-
vation to endorse the "justice as fairness" principle); see also Heidi M. Hurd, The Levitation
of Liberalism, 105 YALE L.J. 795 (1995) (reviewing JOHN RAwLs, POUt!LCAL LIBERALISM
(1993)) (concluding that Rawls's piece fails to motivate individuals to understand "justice
as fairness" because his argument either "levitates liberalism" beyond the group of both
"internalists and externalists," or it "exceeds the grasp of people who do not already hold
such a belief").
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and understand the perspective of the "other."365 They have ex-
plained that minority perspectives are often dismissed and excluded
because, from a majority perspective, they do not appear rational or
reasoned, or because the majority hears assent when the response is
dissent. For example, Jane Mansbridge argues that, from a male-
gendered view of rationality, women's ways of communicating on
political issues can be viewed as unduly emotive and therefore not
worthy of engagement. 66 Professor Lynn Sanders emphasizes that
persons in lower status positions are not as likely to be heard.367
This challenge to judges' ability to engage in the reasoned elabo-
ration proposed in this Article can be answered at many levels. First,
social science data reveals some reason to be optimistic that judges of
good faith, even if they are majority group members, will be able to
translate and understand minority perspectives. The sociological data
show that majorities and minorities share core democratic values that
could form the basis for establishing basic guidelines of coexis-
tence.368 At first glance, therefore, it would seem that mutual assent
as to discrete core norms might be achievable. Admittedly, however,
the issues around which majorities and minorities are most likely to
disagree are volatile, difficult to handle, and can easily lead to unrea-
sonable, defensive behavior that accentuates exclusionary tactics.
These issues include disagreements centered on issues of discrimina-
tion and fair treatment.3 69
Even recognizing this difficulty, social and psychological studies
suggest the plausibility of a relational model. In their study of Arab-
365. See NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE "POST-
SOCIALIST" CONDITION 83 (1997) (arguing that democratic participation requires speaking
in one's own voice, and that any "translation" corrupts the voice of subordinated minori-
ties);Jane Mansbridge, Feminism and Democratic Community, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 339,
358 (Nomos No. XXXV, John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993) (advocating that
democratic community must develop beyond the restrictive dichotomy of "reason/emo-
tion" or "male/female" and develop sympathetic capacities as part of civic education);
Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 349 (1997) (arguing that cer-
tain citizens are "less likely than others to be listened to [and] .. .when this disregard is
systematically associated with the arguments made by those we know already to be systemat-
ically disadvantaged, we should at least reevaluate our assumptions about deliberation's
democratic potential").
366. See Jane Mansbridge, Feminism and Democracy, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1990, at 126,
127 ("Subordinate groups sometimes cannot find the right voice or words to express their
thoughts, and when they do, they discover they are not heard.... [They] are silenced,
encouraged to keep their wants inchoate, and heard to say 'yes' when they mean 'no.").
367. See Sanders, supra note 365, at 366-69.
368. See supra notes 226-227 and accompanying text (discussing Jennifer Hochschild's
analysis of shared cultural values).
369. See supra Part I (discussing conflicting majority and minority experiences of
racism).
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Jewish conflict, socio-psychologists Amir and Ben-Ari suggest that in
cases where distinct groups who are committed to a multicultural
model cannot agree on principles of coexistence, norms at a
macrosocial level could help to subdue intergroup hostility.
3 70 Courts
could provide an avenue to bridge intergroup relations by setting rea-
soned norms that help groups hostile to each other to look beyond
their immediate differences.3 71 At a micro-level, intergroup studies
indicate that hostile groups engaged in joint problem-solving can de-
crease mutual hostility and succeed in creating limited joint coopera-
tion.3 7 2  Finally, micro studies conducted in educational settings
indicate that when majorities actually contend with minorities' view-
points and perspectives, they consider more carefully the impact of
their decisions on these groups.
373
A second response to the feasibility critique is that the Supreme
Court, through certain of its opinions, has already revealed it is capa-
ble of understanding and articulating minority viewpoints. For exam-
ple, Brown can be interpreted as a case in which the Court took the
lead in articulating the perspective of African Americans with respect
to segregation.3 74 Brown inserted into equal protection dialogue the
issue of how racial segregation stigmatized African Americans and ar-
370. Yehuda Amir & Rachel Ben-Ari, Enhancing Intergroup Relations in Israel: A Differential
Approach, in STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE: CHANGING CONCEPTIONS 243, 243-57 (Daniel
Bar-Tal et al. eds., 1989).
371. See JOHN DucmrTr, THE SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 254 (1992) (suggesting
that a constitution can mitigate interethnic conflicts by channeling political tensions along
less volatile cleavages, and citing the Nigerian constitution of 1979 as an example); cf
Cynthia T. Garcia Coil & Heidie A. Vdzquez Garcia, Development Processes and Their Influence
on Interethnic and Interracial Relations, in TOWARD A COMMON DESTINY. IMPROVING RACE AND
ETHNIC RELATIONS IN AMERICA 103, 114 (Willis D. Hawley & Anthony W. Jackson eds.,
1995) ("[T]he task for any particular group is to move from ethnocentric thought to a
more pluralistic worldview in which the perspectives of other racial and ethnic groups can
be understood and accepted, and not be considered a threat to either the group or the
individual.").
372. See DAVID W. JOHNSON & ROGERJ. JOHNSON, COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: THE-
ORY AND RESEARCH 166 (1989) (reporting similar results in research centering on Minne-
sota schools); see generally COOPERATIVE LEARNING: THEORY AND RESEARCH (Shlomo Sharan
ed., 1990) (collecting articles that describe a number of learning strategies that permitted
teachers to structure situations in which mixed ethnic children cooperated with each
other).
373. Cf Heather C. Hill, The Importance of a Minority Perspective in the Classroom, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 7, 1997, at A60 (reporting that the lack of minorities in her political
science class room produced student comments that were much more hostile to the inter-
ests of racial minorities). See generally Beverly Daniel Tatum, Talking about Race, Learning
about Racism: The Application of Racial Identity Development Theory in the Classroom, 62 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 1 (1992) (reporting on the inclusion of race-related content in courses and on
methods of reducing college students' resistance to learning about race-related issues).
374. See supra notes 34-35, 43-44 and accompanying text.
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ticulated that this was a reasonable position, not merely "in the heads"
of African Americans. 375 Where Plessy had previously been outra-
geously dismissive of African Americans' epistemological position that
racial segregation caused substantial stigmatic harms, the Brown Court
raised this issue to the level of constitutional significance.376 The
most notable contribution of Brown therefore may not have been doc-
trinal, but rather how the Court depicted African Americans' social
identity as equal coparticipants. To a notable extent, the Court also
has successfully understood the minority perspective of both gay men
and lesbians and women in certain of its opinions.377
The feasibility critique has a great deal of validity. Many socially
positioned judges, despite their good faith and vigorous effort, may
find it impossible to "translate" minority epistemology as they function
within a highly authoritative and hegemonic legal system. To some
degree we can attempt to solve this problem by focusing on the appro-
priate selection of judges. In selecting judges, we should emphasize
the ability to understand and communicate minority perspectives. 8
This call for epistemological diversity is not exclusively a call for the
appointment of more minority judges. Not all judges who are minor-
ity group members are necessarily capable of understanding minority
perspectives. 79 Moreover, some majority members may demonstrate
a particular skill at being self-critical and open to other perspectives,
375. See Henderson, supra note 332, at 1593 (arguing that Brown "illustrates the exist-
ence of empathic understanding in the Supreme Court"). Brown also illustrates how the
rational coequal engagement advocated here is frequently similar to human empathy.
376. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
377. See infra Parts V.A & V.B.1.
378. Not surprisingly, a judge's race appears to be a highly relevant factor in this re-
spect. A complex survey of federal judges measured salient differences according to thejudges' race regarding issues that might be said to measure the ability of the judge to
engage the "other." See Lyles, supra note 235, at 223-42. Only 18% of African American
respondent-judges agreed that Black litigants are treated fairly in the justice system, while
83% of White judges agreed that Black litigants are treated fairly by the justice system. Seeid. at 237-38. Moreover, African Americans and Latinos shared a common overall cynicism
in the political process. For instance, 47% of African Americans and 47% of Latinos sur-
veyed agreed that court judges' confirmations are too "political," and 78% of African
Americans and 79% of Latinos believed partisan politics dominate and control district
court appointments. See id. at 231. In addition, 47% of African Americans responded that
they believed a few big interests run the government; only 18% of Whites held this belief.
See id. at 242. In contrast, there was only a slight variance on these issues between male and
female respondents. See id. at 263.
379. Whether it is cause or effect, those minority group members who rise to a "pinna-
cle" such as the Supreme Court may often be persons who have been acculturated to the
majority perspective. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (discussing the dy-
namics that might account for this phenomenon).
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because of their disposition, training, and education.38 ° However, it
will often be true that members of a particular minority group will be
better able to understand the viewpoint of that particular group be-
cause they will have experienced the subordinate social and cultural
context upon which that viewpoint is founded2 8. ' Amicus briefs by
public interest groups and others can also help the Court to under-
stand the minority perspective in constitutional adjudication.3" 2
Finally, even to the extent that judges are currently not capable of
understanding and articulating minority perspectives, the very pur-
pose of this Article is to work out a framework that can help judges
overcome these limitations. This Article seeks to describe the method
a judge should follow to be more inclusive and to further the goals of
participatory democracy. The task of interpreting and presenting to
the polity the minority epistemological position may be daunting, but
the importance of the task is also immense. If judges can understand
the dynamics of epistemological divergence, they can write opinions
that help to connect majorities and minorities and avoid exacerbating
the adversarialness that is a product of the current method of consti-
tutional adjudication. Such opinions may also facilitate communica-
tion between majorities and minorities in the polity at large.
C. The Court's Role in Furthering Majority-Minority Discourse in the
Polity At Large
Part IV.B has described a model of public reason which ensures
that the Court's decisions in intergroup conflict cases engage the mi-
nority perspective. This Part discusses another crucial role the Court
must play in mediating intergroup conflicts. The Court must help to
facilitate majority-minority discourse in the legislative and executive
branches of government, as well as within the polity at large.
1. The Role of the Court and the Polity in Formulating Constitutional
Principles. -There are three principal reasons why it is critical that ma-
jority-minority discourse be facilitated throughout the polity. First,
380. For example, some of the best work in antidiscrimination law and CRT has been
authored by White legal scholars. See, e.g., MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note
12; WILDMAN ET AL., supra note 106; Brest, supra note 36; Colker, supra note 39; Fiss, supra
note 39; Freeman, supra note 42; Karst, supra note 39. This is not, by any means, an ex-
haustive list.
381. See supra notes 184-187, 378 and accompanying text.
382. SeeJames F. Spriggs & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at
the Supreme Court, 50 POL. Rs. Q. 365, 381 (1997) (concluding that courts utilize informa-
tion provided by amicus curiae briefs only when the briefs focus on the issues set forth by
the parties).
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there is the issue of legitimacy. In a democratic polity, all political
power ultimately comes from the people. 83 Judges do not decide for
the polity what its constitutional values should be; instead, the polity
as a whole, through other deliberative processes, determines its val-
ues.384 Judges must not obstruct resolution of what are essentially
political issues to be made by the polity. 85 For Rawls, judges' (sub-
stantive) legitimacy lies in their being able to reflect, within a reason-
able range, the fundamental values of the polity.386 Thus, under this
model, a dialectical process must take place between "we the people"
and the judiciary, as both bodies jointly endeavor to give meaning to
the Constitution. 87
383. See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (arguing that the
United States governmental scheme is a "dualist democracy" in which constitutional au-
thority resides with "we the people"); RAwLs, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 231 & n.12(agreeing with Ackerman's "we the people" theory and arguing that the Court is the high-
estjudicial interpreter but not the final interpreter of the people's will); Cass R. Sunstein,
TheRight to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1161 (1997) (urging that the polity should determine
controversial constitutional issues, such as abortion, right-to-die, and freedom of religion);
see also Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution,
69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 619, 659-67 (1994) (discussing Rawls's constitutional theory). This
Article emphasizes that the Court's legitimacy depends on its ability to be and appear neu-
tral in intergroup conflict cases to both majorities and minorities, by reconciling pluralism
and democratic coequality.
384. See 1 ACi KERMAN, supra note 383, at 139, 262-64 ("It is not the special province of thejudges to lead the People onward and upward to new and higher values. This is the task of
citizens who may, after the investment of great energy, succeed (or fail) in gaining the
considered assent of a majority of their fellows."); RAw.s, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 232("Ultimate power is held by the three branches in a duly specified relation with one an-
other with each responsible to the people."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 53 (arguing that
legitimacy resides in achieving the polity's assent to controversial judicial decisions).
385. Rawls and Sunstein can claim an antiauthoritarian position because they also envi-
sion a society that can coexist without necessarily agreeing about fundamental principles ofjustice. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 35-37; SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 35-61(arguing, in light of his account of "incompletely theorized agreements," for judicial cir-
cumspection with respect to areas where there is not yet a consensus in the polity).
386. Rawls explains:
UJ]ustices cannot, of course, invoke their own personal morality... [nor] their or
other people's religious or philosophical views .... Rather, they must appeal to
the political values they think belong to the most reasonable understanding of
the public conception [ofjustice as fairness] and its political values ofjustice and
public reason. ... These are values ... that all citizens as reasonable and rational
might reasonably be expected to endorse.
RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 236; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implement-
ing the Constitution, 111 I-I v. L. REv. 56, 144-45 (1997) (applying Rawls's argument tojustify the Court's antimajoritarian role). Bickel's concern with legitimacy arose from his
observation that the Court was an institutionally weak player that could not command obe-
dience to constitutional norms out of sync with the values of the majority. See BIcKEaL, supra
note 257, at 244-72.
387. This is the core proposal of Bruce Ackerman's "we the people" model. See I ACKER-
MAN, supra note 383, at 139, 159-62, 262-65. As discussed in Part IV.C.2.a, infra, the model
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Second, there is the relationship between the normative function
of law and democracy. Ultimately, the polity itself is responsible for
setting out the terms of coexistence.388 In a pluralist democracy, the
Court's pronouncements of norms of coexistence, which can generate
a high level of majoritarian resentment, must become accepted by a
significant portion of the majority in order for these norms to have
any meaning. Judges can educate, mandate, and attempt to prosely-
tize. But their articulation of values remains only written law if the
polity fails to view these norms as reflecting their own understanding
of the polity's constitutional values. The polity's individual partici-
pants must also accept these interpretations for the Court's pro-
nouncements to become law, i.e., norms that reflect the polity's
commitment to a certain vision of the Constitution.389
Third, there is the issue of multiple epistemologies and how these
relate to a polity's search for constitutional values. In a pluralistic
political environment, ° where multiple perspectives contend and
must coexist in tension, resolution of majority-minority confrontations
must be tentative and ongoing.391 The centralization of this task in
one institution, courts, and one set of actors, judges, would under-
mine the democratic commitment to inclusion. Such a system would
be biased because it would favor the judiciary's understanding of truth
and constitutional values over the understanding of other groups. In
light of the current method by which we select judges, confidence that
they can overcome their epistemological commitments by the method
presented here or any other method may very well be unwarranted.
92
In sum, it is unwise to trust only one institution to carry the burden of
an ongoing process of finding those values that a diverse citizenry can
reasonably accept.
proposed here also emphasizes that the Court has a principal role to play in setting basic
minimum safeguards that would protect minorities.
388. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 431 (arguing that political authority derives
from citizens themselves, who are thus responsible for the enactments and legislation of all
institutional procedures, and that the principle of justice as fairness is substantive in
nature).
389. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term- Forward: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-9 (1983) (arguing that society's norms balance legal concepts with
reality to create a legal tradition).
390. See supra Parts II, IV.
391. MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 383 (arguing that, in dealing
with problems of difference, "[tlhere is no ultimate resting place but instead an opportu-
nity for dialogue, conversation, continuing processes of mutual boundary setting, and ef-
forts to manage colliding perspectives on reality").
392. See supra Part IV.B.3; see also Fallon, supra note 386, at 148-49 (arguing that the
Court may not be sensitive to the "diverse and fluid public moral sensibilities" because the
current Court is "dominated by lawyers and academics of generally narrower experience").
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2. The Role of the Court in Facilitating the Discussion of Majority-Mi-
nority Issues. -
a. Setting Parameters for the Discussion. -In order to facilitate
the polity's discourse in the area of majority-minority interaction, the
Court must set certain limits on this discourse to prevent the majority
from dominating, to the point of oppression, minority groups or their
interests. The Court is the democratic institution best positioned to
undertake this function. First, the Court has great cultural, and some
argue moral, authority in setting forth what are to be the fundamental
constitutional values of the polity. 9 3 Second, the Court, protected
from the political fray, is in a better position to take the long-term
view.3 94 The Court sets these parameters by using two familiar de-
vices: process theory and rights.
(1) Process Theory. -Professor John Hart Ely's process the-
ory3 95 begins from the position that the democratic process does not
always produce reasoned results. Democratic politics is subject to cap-
ture by majoritarian interest groups whose motivations may not be
aligned with the values of the polity as a whole.3 96 From a sociological
standpoint, socio-psychologists might explain that majorities use their
power to favor members of majorities like themselves,39 7 or that inter-
group dynamics lead members of the majority to view minority groups
as competitors.3 98 Professor Ely observes that representatives do not
393. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 237 (discussing the Court's ability to give
public reason vitality within the public forum).
394. See BICKEL, supra note 257, at 23-38 (arguing that questions of principle are more
likely to be at the forefront ofjudicial deliberations, as opposed to political processes that
appear erratic and given to excess, and that courts take the long term view).
395. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDiCLAL REVIEW(1980). This Article discusses only that aspect of Ely's theory which explains why certain
minorities may sometimes be excluded from the political process, and which argues that
their rights must therefore be protected. For a critique of the more complete and contro-
versial version of his theory, see Tribe, supra note 259, at 1064 (arguing that the "process
theme by itself determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its
content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values"). See also supra
note 245.
396. Rawls supports process review. See RAWLs, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 239 (dis-
cussing the court's role of "forc[ing] political discussion to take a principled form").
397. See generally Lazos Vargas, supra note 33, at 1567-68 (discussing the various dynamics
that divide majorities and minorities).
398. See Brest, supra note 36, at 8 (explaining that preferences for members of our own
racial group "may also result from a desire to enhance our own power and esteem by
enhancing the power and esteem of members of groups to which we belong" as well as
"from our tendency to sympathize most readily with those who seem most like ourselves");
Lazos Vargas, supra note 33, at 1569 (describing that, under certain conditions, competi-
tion arises for limited resources because "each group constitutes a real threat to the other,
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always represent minorities' interests, because majorities lack em-
pathetic understanding, or because they are hostile or prejudiced.399
Such dynamics "'provid[e] the "majority of the whole" with that "com-
mon motive to invade the rights of other citizens" that Madison be-
lieved improbable in a pluralist society."'"40 Citing to Carolene Products
footnote four,4" 1 Professor Ely argues that judicial review is appropri-
ate wherever the Court might deem there is prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities.
40 2
Process theory is "participation-oriented, [and] representation-
reinforcing" because the Court ensures that the democratic process
represents all members of the polity, not just the majority.40 3 Accord-
ing to Ely, the function of the Equal Protection Clause is to ensure
that majorities do not unduly abridge political rights of minorities.40 4
Minorities, even with an unfettered right to vote, might not have the
leverage necessary to be part of a political marketplace in which they
would be able to "strik[e] deals" with other groups to protect their
because they are directly competing in a zero-sum game"). See generally DucKr, supra
note 371, at 96-109 (discussing the premise of Realistic Conflict Theory that prejudice is a
result of relationships between groups that involve real conflicts of interest).
399. See ELY, supra note 395, at 81 (explaining the transition to stronger centralized
government as due in part to the recognition that "the existing constitutional devices for
protecting minorities were simply not sufficient[,]" and that neither a finite list of entitle-
ments nor mechanisms of pluralism suffice to eliminate "all the ways majorities can tyran-
nize minorities").
400. Id. at 153 (quoting Goodman, supra note 90, at 315).
401. Id. The famous footnote 4 states:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutional-
ity when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those polit-
ical processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesir-
able legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation ....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of stat-
utes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities[ ]: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordina-
rily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspond-
ingly more searching judicial inquiry.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted).
402. ELY, supra note 395, at 77 (explaining that such judicial review "focus[es] not on
whether this or that substantive value is unusually important or fundamental, but rather on
... processes by which values are appropriately identified and accommodated").
403. Id at 87.
404. Id. at 82.
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own interests.4 °5 Thus, process theory can be interpreted broadly to
require that judges protect minorities' rights to participate in the
political process.4"6
(2) Rights as Checks on "Majority Wins" Democracy.4 0 7 -While
the Court must allow the polity to engage in a robust discussion of
majority-minority issues, it must also step in at critical moments to en-
sure that minorities are not excluded from this discussion. The Court
uses "rights" as well as process theory to play this protective role. That
is, rights not only reinforce the democratic process but also ensure
substantive legitimacy 4° s and enforce the basic liberalism of the pol-
ity.4°9 In protecting minority rights the Court often employs various
forms of antidiscrimination doctrine.4 10 While courts and scholars
continue to debate the correct form of such doctrine, all of the ver-
sions serve the purpose discussed in this section: protecting majority-
minority relations within the polity.
Certainly a tension exists between the Court's role as definer of
rights and its role as supporter and facilitator of robust debate in the
polity. While the Court must be a sufficient protector of rights for
minorities to take part in moral and political debate in the polity, it
must not issue decisions that truncate the polity's own discussion of
important moral, political, and epistemological issues. However, this
does not mean the Court should back off from its role as a protector
of rights. In fact, if the Court were to adopt a broader understanding
of rights, minorities would be more protected than they are now. 41 '
405. Id. at 135.
406. Id. at 152-59.
407. "Majority wins" is but one version of democracy. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10(James Madison) (noting that even a majority of the whole can constitute a faction that is
adverse to the interests of the whole); LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:. FUN-
DAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (discussing the problem of mi-
nority representation within contemporary politics).
408. See RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 137 (discussing the substantive principle of
legitimacy as the exercise of political power in accord with a constitution whose essentials
all citizens as free and equal can reasonably be expected to endorse).
409. See DWORKIN, supra note 279, at 184-205 (arguing that in a democratic system in
which majorities by definition rule, minorities must be able to maintain faith that the polit-
ical system will treat them as equals).
410. See supra notes 34-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's application of
forms of antidiscrimination doctrine).
411. See GLENDON, supra note 271, at 44-46, 171-83 (arguing for a "fuller concept" of
human potential that recognizes our ability to be reasonable and recognize complexity);
KARST, supra note 42, at 42 (arguing that constitutional adjudication should take into ac-
count the history of exclusion in order to reinforce the individualism and egalitarianism
that are "central to the larger group identity of the American nation"); Charles R. Law-
rence III, Forward: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L.
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Although the relational framework would not foreclose such a pro-
ject,41 2 it instead emphasizes the importance of the construction of
rights in influencing majority-minority political coexistence. The
Court may reconcile its two important roles with respect to minority
rights by providing an example to the polity of how to address minor-
ity-majority issues most appropriately.
b. Leading by Example.-Judges play an educative role.
41 3
Particularly in highly contested areas, such as majority-minority con-
flict, the Court is a cultural and institutional key participant in shap-
ing political dialogue.4 1 4 Judges interpret minority identity in their
adjudication of majority-minority conflict cases.4 15 These cases pres-
ent the Court with the opportunity to play a positive role by educating
the majority, by teaching it that a minority perspective, being based on
a distinct and subordinate social space, may represent more than a
mere disagreement of opinion. Judges can present a narrative of mi-
norities' worthiness and reasonableness that provides a counterimage
to a social reality in which minorities inhabit relatively subordinate
social space.4 16
On the other hand, constitutional discourse can maintain and le-
gitimize the social framework in which minorities hold a negative so-
cial identity. Where judges fail to address, or explicitly reaffirm, the
dynamic of subordination, the result will be greater political and so-
cial distance between majorities and minorities. Majorities will feel
REv. 819, 824 (1995) (discussing race as a "substantive societal condition" as well as an
"individual right to be treated without reference to one's race as primary"); Mari J. Mat-
suda, Voices of America: Antidiscrimination Law and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction,
100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1390 (1991) (arguing that public law should recognize the right of
people "to be what they are," and that certain aspects of cultural identity, such as accent
and language, should be subject to protection under antidiscrimination and equal protec-
tion law).
412. Critical race theorists are among those who remain the most committed to continu-
ing and reconstructing discourse on rights because the latter have been an important ave-
nue for minorities to seek fundamental changes in the way political power is distributed.
See Crenshaw, supra note 130, at 1357-58 (arguing that rights are helpful to Black aspira-
tions and combat a hostile racial environment).
413. See RAwLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 26, at 237 ("[T]he court's role as exemplar of
public reason . . .give[s] public reason vividness and vitality in the public forum.").
414. See id. at 224-36 (arguing that the Court has no inherent authority in interpreting
constitutional values, but that its authority depends on its ability to persuade by following
the strictures of public reason and to approximate the values of the polity).
415. Cf MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 12, at 383 (describing rights
litigation as an opportunity "for describing and remaking patterns of relationships").
416. See Cover, supra note 389, at 9 (discussing the use of narrative in law to envision
alternatives to existing affairs).
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justified in looking down at minorities as "others" who do not fit some
version of the universal norm.
The judges' task, therefore, is to address the minority perspective
in a manner that ensures its recognition in the broader polity. In neg-
ative terms, the Court must endeavor to ensure that minority identity
is not so stigmatized that judges or majorities cannot conceive of en-
gaging their perspective. This is a primary task of antidiscrimination
doctrine.417 In positive terms the Court should interpret the role of
minorities as coequal participants in the polity. This is the task of
both process theory and judges' public reason.418
Judges, through the exercise of public reason, provide a model
for majorities and minorities alike as to how those who would appear
to be inextricably at odds can engage in reasoned discourse. The
Court's minority-identity narratives establish for the polity "paradigms
for behavior," '419 namely, a willingness to engage the other viewpoint
and to tolerate disagreement between reasonable opponents. The
successful application of public reasoning in Brown demonstrates that
majority-minority equality is an achievable goal.42°
c. Refraining from Truncating the Polity's Discussion. -As dis-
cussed above, judges appropriately intervene in the democratic pro-
cess in order to hold in check harmful majority-minority dynamics.
Judges can, however, unduly preempt necessary majority-minority
political dialogue that should take place in other political discursive
spheres.42'
Where the stakes in a dispute do not infringe on the constitu-
tional minimums needed to safeguard coequality,422 and the context
does not require immediate resolution of a majority-minority con-
flict, 4 23 the nature of the disagreement can be viewed as political. In
these cases, judges should endeavor to ensure that political disagree-
ments be resolved through other discursive spheres rather than
through the courts. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick,4 24 the Court
could have narrowly overturned the State's selective prosecution of
417. See supra notes 34-100 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 393-396, 405-406 and accompanying text; supra Part 1V.B.
419. Cover, supra note 389, at 9.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 374-376.
421. Cf Sunstein, supra note 383, at 1150 (citing Roe as a possible example of the propo-
sition that "judicial judgments may truncate ongoing processes of democratic
deliberation").
422. See supra notes 395-406 (discussing process theory as a means to safeguard
coequality).
423. See supra Part IV.C.2.a.
424. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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gay men under criminal statutes, and still have left unresolved the
political issue of how to accommodate private conduct of an unpopu-
lar lifestyle in the face of majority sentiment that this conduct under-
mines traditional values.4 25 In this role, the Court's work is to ensure
that the political dialogue takes place on a level discursive field in
which majorities and minorities can deliberate about volatile issues as
coequal citizens.
V. THE RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK AS APPLIED TO RECENT MAJORITY-
MINORITY CONFLICT CASES
The following Part applies the relational framework to three re-
cent decisions that will be significant in the Court's development of
majority-minority relations jurisprudence. These cases deal with dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual preference, gender, and race.
A. Romer v. Evans: Majority Targeting of a Minority-and Democracy
Romer v. Evans4 2 6 is a remarkable case in many respects. Although
the Court did not use the language of majority-minority conflict, the
dynamic of the majority targeting of minorities drives this decision. At
issue was the validity of Amendment 2, passed by referendum as an
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution in 1992. Amendment
2 provided as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisex-
ual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any
of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, polit-
ical subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall en-
act, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or other-
wise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons
to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, pro-
tected status or claim of discrimination.4 2 7
Characterizing Amendment 2 as "unprecedented in our jurispru-
dence, ' ' 21 "imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a sin-
gle named group,"429 of "sheer breadth . . . so discontinuous[,] '' 43 °
425. See supra notes 280-285 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 408-410.
426. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
427. Id, at 624.
428. 1& at 633.
429. Id. at 632.
430. Id,
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and containing overly "broad language,"43 the Court struck it down.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion opened by citing the Plessy dissent
for the proposition that the Equal Protection Clause does not "toler-
ate classes among citizens."432 The Court held that Amendment 2 sin-
gled out gay men and lesbians as a "solitary class" because it prevented
them from petitioning their local government and state legislature for
legislation barring discrimination.433 The Court noted that Amend-
ment 2 would strike down local ordinances, including one in Boulder
that prohibited a retail store from denying services to gay men and
lesbians,434 and another in Denver that prohibited restaurants, thea-
ters, and other common carriers from denying services to gay men
and lesbians.4" 5
The Court also found Amendment 2 to be overbroad because its
scope reached both transactions in the private sphere, such as in the
sale of real estate, and laws and policies, including those specific
prohibitions against discrimination against gay men and lesbians, and
perhaps even general laws and policies prohibiting arbitrary discrimi-
nation in governmental and private settings. 3 6 Administrative deci-
sions, such as a police department's decision to crack down on
physical gay bashing,437 could be subject to the proscription of the
Amendment. At the very least, such actions might be discouraged
given the additional administrative burden of determining whether in
such a case "homosexuality is an arbitrary and, thus, forbidden basis
for decision."43 8
431. Id. at 630.
432. Id at 623 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
433. See id. at 627 (concluding that the Colorado electorate imposed an absolute legal
disability on gay men and lesbians alone by "withdr[awing] from homosexuals, but no
others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination").
434. Id. at 628-29.
435. Id. at 623-24. The Court discussed the origin of such local statutes. See id at 627-28
(noting that "[t ] he common law rules [of antidiscrimination by providers of public accom-
modations] . . .proved insufficient in many instances, and it was settled early that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress a general power to prohibit discrimina-
tion[]" so that, "[i]n consequence, most States have chosen ... [to] enact[ ] detailed
statutory schemes").
436. Id. at 629-30.
437. Compare Oral Argument of Pet'rs, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No.
94-1039), available in 1995 WL 605822, at *27 (questioning whether Amendment 2 would
prohibit this police policy) with Romer, 517 U.S. at 644-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court's portrayal of Coloradans as given to hate-filled gay-bashing is false, and that
any animus against homosexuals consists simply of the view that their conduct is reprehen-
sible). This debate as to the significance of antigay sentiment is part of a legitimate major-
ity-minority cultural debate.
438. Romer, 517 U.S. at 630.
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Justice Kennedy concluded that Amendment 2 can have no legiti-
mate state purpose. "[L] aws of the kind now before us raise the inevi-
table inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected." '439 If no identifiable legitimate
purpose can be found, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits "'a bare
... desire to harm a politically unpopular group.' 440 Accordingly,
Amendment 2 failed under the Court's minimal level of scrutiny be-
cause the State did not establish a legitimate purpose.441
Romer v. Evans makes several points that demonstrate how the re-
lational framework, at various levels, already reflects the Court's ana-
lytical approach. The discussion below also suggests that the
relational framework could help us to understand why, at other levels,
the Court's analysis is not satisfactory.
1. Who Is a Minority?-An often-raised objection to the proposal
that the Equal Protection Clause applies to intergroup conflict is "how
would judges identify minorities? '442 The use of the term "minority,"
"class," or "protected group" implies that there are stable characteris-
tics, and that we can determine which of these are relevant to a major-
ity-minority conflict analysis. The approach advocated here is
contextual, because the relational framework is concerned with the
social dynamics between majorities and minorities.443 In each case,
the court should determine whether a social group is a "minority" by
looking to whether the social, political, or cultural context subjects it
to a dynamic of subordination. Status is relevant because what may
439. Id. at 634.
440. Id. (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
441. Id at 631-32 ("[W]e will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a
rational basis to some legitimate end. Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conven-
tional inquiry." (citation omitted)). Commentators have provided various explanations as
to whether the standard of review applied in Romer was actually the minimal scrutiny that
the Court claimed to have applied. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitu-
tional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REv. 297, 329-34 (1997) (describing "purpose scrutiny" as a
search for illegitimate purposes that leads to automatic invalidation, and describing the
issue in Romer as whether the purpose of "animus" is prohibited per se or only against a
protected class); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 257, 264 (1996) (explaining that the Court's invocation of minimal scrutiny was an
accurate description of the level of review, and that the unique aspect in Romer was that the
majority "single[d] out a group for pariah status"); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court,
1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 4, 78 (1996) (connecting
Romer with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and describing
these cases as using "rationality review 'with bite' when prejudice and hostility are espe-
cially likely to be present").
442. See Oral Argument of Pet'rs, supra note 437, at *24 (posing the hypothetical of
whether blue-eyed people could be considered minorities).
443. See supra notes 184-228 and accompanying text; Part IV.A.
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trigger majority animosity, prejudice, or opprobrium is a visible differ-
ence, such as a physical characteristic or a mode of behavior-for in-
stance, atypical gender mannerisms. In addition, the Court should
take into account history (such as a history of stigmatization in the
case of segregation and racial minorities), cultural ideology (a "com-
mon sense" that places a group in an inferior or restrictive role), and
psychology (a documented showing that the majority regards the mi-
nority as inferior or subordinate to them in some respect). The na-
ture of the inquiry will vary with context because different minority
groups are subject to different kinds of prejudices and power dynam-
ics. Thus, to answer the hypothetical mentioned above, it is unlikely
that blue-eyed people ever would be regarded as a minority because
our history, cultural ideology, and psychology do not indicate that any
majority might want to discriminate against this group.
The Court applied this sort of analysis concerning minorities in
Romer v. Evans. The Court's review of the purpose of Amendment 2
was not triggered by the status of gay men and lesbians because homo-
sexuality is not a protected class."4 Instead, the Court's scrutiny was
based on concern that Amendment 2 reflected an intent to
subordinate a minority group." By describing Amendment 2 as a
referendum that singled out an "unpopular" group4 4 6 for a "far-reach-
ing"447 disadvantage, the Court properly situated Amendment 2
within its social context. This approach was not outcome determina-
tive, but properly served as a background against which the Court
scrutinized the rationality of the legislative action.
While the Court asserted that it was applying rational basis re-
view,"4 its inquiry can also be characterized, in terms of process the-
ory, as an attempt to determine whether the political process had
been used to target an unpopular minority.449 The Court determined
that the majority used its superior voting power to impose a perma-
444. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (asserting that Amendment 2 is invalid because it takes
away from homosexuals rights that others either have or may seek without restraint, but
failing to refer to homosexuals as a protected class).
445. Compare id. at 633 (demonstrating that Amendment 2 denied equal protection of
the law for only one group of citizens) with id. at 634 (referring to homosexuals as a "'polit-
ically unpopular group"' (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973))).
446. Id. at 634 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
447. Id. at 627.
448. Id. at 631-32.
449. See supra text accompanying notes 405-406; Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of
Initiatives and Referendums in which Majorities vote on Minorities'Democratic Citizenship, 61 OHIo
ST. L.J. (forthcoming 1999) (detailing this aspect of Romer v. Evans).
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nent citizenship disadvantage on a disfavored social group.450 This
action did not promote the fundamental values of the polity, because
the only value promoted was intergroup animus. Under the relational
framework, this is precisely the kind of negative majority dynamic
targeted at minorities that the Court has a clear obligation to
invalidate.
2. Results That the "Other" Might Reasonably Accept.-Romer v. Ev-
ans's greatest weakness as an application of the relational framework is
its failure to address majorities' obvious concerns with whether the
decision fetters their ability to legislate cultural values. This concern
arises because the Court does not reconcile Romer with Bowers v. Hard-
wick's45 1 holding that the majority can criminalize gay and lesbian sex-
ual conduct. 452 By not acknowledging or engaging the majorities'
position, 5' Romer does not accord with the relational framework's
construction of public reason.45 4
The Court also failed to educate. The Court's method, to search
out a legitimate purpose in the enactment of the referendum,455 ob
fuscates what should be the substantive concern. In a majority-minor-
ity conflict case, the important issue is the dynamics at work between
majorities and minorities. The Court found inappropriate dynamics,
450. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-36; see Lazos Vargas, supra note 449 (setting forth a test that
ensures democratic co-participation and inclusion of minorities in cases where majorities
can diminish minorities' democratic citizenship).
451. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see supra notes 138-171 and accompanying text.
452. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In holding that homosexuality
cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court contradicts... Bowers v. Hard-
wick." (citation omitted)). Failure to reconcile these cases has generated uncertainty as to
how Romer should be interpreted. See, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, Bowers v. Hardwick, Romer v.
Evans, and the Meaning of Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 2 NAT'LJ. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L.
208, 211 (1996) <http://sunsite.unc.edu/gaylaw> (arguing that Bowers did not apply in
Romer because, contrary to Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, Romer dealt with a denial on
the basis of the status of basic civil rights accorded members of the polity); Thomas C.
Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. Rav. 373, 386 (1997) (arguing that
Romer overrules Bowers v. Hardwick because these cases are inconsistent); Halley, supra note
139, at 440-41 (suggesting that Romer is not dependent on the special status of gay men and
lesbians as a despised class, but on a majority selecting out a group, which could just as well
have been "blondes or burglars," for "feudal" treatment). Indications are that lower courts
will have differing views in how to interpret these cases. See, e.g., Equality Found. of
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 295-96 (6th Cir. 1997) (arguing
that Romer does not apply to Cincinnati city ordinance, although the ordinance contains
language very similar to Amendment 2), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
453. By the term "majority," this Article does not mean all heterosexuals, but the domi-
nant view that gay men and lesbians do not deserve a place as coequals in the polity.
454. See supra Part IV.B.
455. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36 (discussing the state's asserted purpose in Amendment
2).
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but it explained the majority-minority conflict in conclusory terms:
(1) Amendment 2 is unusual; (2) therefore the "inevitable" inference
is that the majority enacted the Amendment out of "animosity." '456 An
analysis in accord with the relational framework would explain why
the manner in which Amendment 2 operated was contrary to constitu-
tional values. Amendment 2 is inappropriate because the majority
makes use of the political process, "majority wins" politics, to deny gay
men and lesbians a fundamental aspect of citizenship in the polity,
namely, the ability of any person to petition its government for an-
tidiscrimination protection.457 This is a form of exclusion from the
polity that the democratic concept of coequality and coparticipation
does not tolerate. Had the Court expressed itself more clearly as to
what it regarded as "out of bounds" in the majority-minority dynamic,
it would have better performed its educative function, and perhaps
been more persuasive.
3. Negative Social Identity and Its Effect on Discursive Dynamics.-
From the perspective of the relational framework, Justice Scalia's dis-
sent458 illustrates an important consequence that results from the ma-
jority's unwillingness to reconcile Romer with Hardwick.459 It leaves in
place Hardwick's legitimization of homosexuals' negative social
identity.
Justice Scalia rejected the Court's finding that the majority in Col-
orado had impermissibly targeted gay men and lesbians on the basis
that Hardwick resolved the issue.46° Justice Scalia argued that majori-
ties should be able to determine the polity's moral values,46' a propo-
sition that would permit the majority to exclude gay men and lesbians
from important areas of public association. 462 Hardwick's generalized
identity finding, that gay men and lesbians are not the majority's so-
cial coequals, permits Justice Scalia to resort to tired and discredited
456. See id. at 634; supra notes 439-440 and accompanying text.
457. For further detail on process analyses of Romer, see Lazos Vargas, supra note 449;
Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L. REv. 361 (1997)
(exploring democratic citizenship aspects of Romer).
458. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating his disfavor with the major-
ity's refusal to follow Bowers v. Hardwick).
459. See supra notes 451-452 and accompanying text.
460. Justice Scalia rhetorically made this point by beginning his dissent with the follow-
ing sentence: "The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite." Romer, 517 U.S. at
636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
461. Id. at 645, 648.
462. Id. at 642, 652-53 ("If it is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to
deny special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage
in the conduct. Indeed, where criminal sanctions are not involved, homosexual 'orienta-
tion' is an acceptable stand-in for homosexual conduct.").
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negative stereotypes of gay men and lesbians, and to argue that the
majority's cultural value judgment had a rational basis.46 He analo-
gized gay men and lesbians with convicted criminals, polygamists, and
persons who are cruel to animals.464 Justice Scalia further asserted
that homosexuals have disproportionately great political power and
disposable income.465 He argued that the majority should be able to
combat such an "influential" interest group by employing measures
such as Amendment 2.466
Justice Scalia's dissent is dismissive of this minority's epistemology
and reinforces a negative dynamic of stereotypes that is not only inac-
curate, but demeaning. His use of the very stereotypes that the major-
ity irrationally relies on to target gay men and lesbians legitimizes the
attitudes that impede majority-minority coequal democratic engage-
ment. What gay men and lesbians experience in their daily lives is not a
privileged political position or inordinately high income, but instead
constant awareness, in the form of fear and apprehension, that they
can always be the targets of the majority's opprobrium.467 For the gay
and lesbian community, random acts of life-threatening violence are a
danger against which any prudent member of this minority group
must take precautions.46 Freedom from discrimination and degrada-
tion on the job and in transacting services essential to normal modern
life can never be taken for granted.469 The effort of the Amendment's
opponents to gain the majorities' endorsement that such discrimina-
tion does not reflect the values of a local political community is not, as
Justice Scalia argued, interest group politics as usual,
47 ° or elitist,47 1
463. See id. at 640-43.
464. Id. at 644.
465. Id. at 645-46, 647, 652. The only cited support for Justice Scalia's "facts" is an affi-
davit in the referendum proponents' trial record. Id. at 645.
466. Id. at 645-47.
467. See Fajer, supra note 452, at 209 (contending that under Amendment 2 homosexu-
als would no longer be protected with regard to jobs, housing, and public
accommodations).
468. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
469. See Fajer, supra note 452, at 208 (noting that discrimination is more immediate to
the lives of gay men and lesbians than is the ability of states to criminalize sodomy as
upheld in Bower); see also Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1099 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(upholding the right of an employer to fire an employee on the basis of her sexual orienta-
tion), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
470. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Homosexuals] possess political
power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide. Quite understanda-
bly, they devote this political power to achieving.. . full social acceptance[ ) of homosexu-
ality.").
471. See id. at 652-53 (accusing the majority of taking part in the "culture war" and im-
posing the values of the "lawyer class" on "the more plebeian attitudes that apparently still
prevail in the United States Congress").
2391999]
MARYLAND LAw REVIEW
but instead part of an evolutionary political and discursive process
that promotes a truly inclusive and representative democracy. 472 This
is a vision of the Fourteenth Amendment that the majority endorsed
when it invoked Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent, calling for a Constitu-
tion that "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. 473
B. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan and United States v.
Virginia: Explicating the Social Dynamics of
Minority Stereotypes
Part IV.C.2.b argued that the Court plays an educative role in ma-jority-minority relations. The judge's role is to set the dialectical
framework that enables majorities to engage minorities as equal
coparticipants. Critics might argue that judges are not social scien-
tists, and that they lack the ability to assume this educative function.
Admittedly, Part II described the interpretation of minority experi-
ence and identification of minority epistemology as a complex task.
The model of minority epistemology put forward acknowledges that
there is no single minority identity, only a wide band of common ex-
periences that are subject to a wide array of interpretations.
Nonetheless, this subpart contends that the Supreme Court has
already demonstrated it is up to the challenge. In the area of antidis-
crimination doctrine, specifically gender stereotypes, the Court has
shown it has the ability to engage minority perspectives. Two cases,
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan4 74 and United States v. Virginia
(VM/),4 75 have developed the link between women's social identity and
how the legitimization of stereotypes can result in discrimination
against women. In these decisions, Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg,
writing for the respective majorities in Hogan and VM!, explicate the
relationship between gender stereotypes, single-sex education, and
discrimination.
1. Social Text and Majority-Minority Dynamics.-In Hogan, the
Court invalidated the Mississippi University for Women (MUW) fe-
male-only nursing program. The majority found that the female-only
472. See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the role of the relational majority-minority frame-
work in achieving such a democracy); see also YANG, supra note 166, at 21 (noting that polls
capture increasing tolerance of gay men and lesbians).
473. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
474. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
475. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (VMI); see alsoJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146
(1994) (holding that the use of peremptory challenges to excuse women because of their
gender from serving on juries violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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admissions policy did not further any legitimate state purpose and suc-
ceeded only in continuing to propagate female stereotypes that lim-
ited women's opportunities to occupations such as nursing.476 Justice
O'Connor asserted that a gender classification case "must carry the
burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' 4 77 that
the classification serves "'important governmental objectives. "'478
When lawmakers enact statutes that classify according to gender, the
State must demonstrate a "direct, substantial relationship between ob-
jective and means."4 79 Hogan concluded that no "reasoned analy-
sis"'48 could justify MUW's women-only admissions classification.
Justice O'Connor's opinion spells out how stereotypes can harm
women. She rejected as unsupported the state's amorphous reference
to remedying past discrimination4"' and emphasized that any legisla-
tion that classifies according to gender, even legislation that claims to
be benign, must be enacted "free of fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of males and females" '482 and "archaic and over-
broad generalizations" about women's abilities.48 Justice O'Connor
found that MUW's women-only admissions policy "tends to perpetuate
the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job." '484 She
concluded that legislative decision making based on stereotypes can-
not be permitted under the Equal Protection Clause, even if its effect
arguably benefits women.
485
The social context that supports this argument is found primarily
in the footnotes. Justice O'Connor opened the opinion by noting
that MUW is one of the nation's oldest female-only colleges. In the
footnote to this statement, Justice O'Connor quoted the charter of
MUW, "basically unchanged since its founding,"48 6 which places as its
central purpose "the moral and intellectual advancement of the girls
of the state. '4 8 7 The school's mission was to provide training in what
sociologists now call women's work: "school methods and kindergar-
ten, for their instruction in bookkeeping, photography, stenography,
476. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30.
477. Id at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
478. Id. (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
479. Id. at 725.
480. 1L at 726.
481. Id. at 727.
482. Id. at 724-25.
483. Id at 730 n.16.
484. Id. at 729 & n.14 (citing statistics that, as of 1980, women earned 94% of all nursing
degrees nationwide).
485. 1& at 728, 731, 733.
486. Id. at 720 n.1.
487. Id.
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telegraphy, and typewriting, and in designing, drawing, engraving,
and painting, and . . needlework."4 ' These are gender-segregated
occupations typically remunerated at markedly low rates.48 9 In an-
other footnote, Justice O'Connor noted that not until the 1920s did
White women in the State of Mississippi gain wide access to public
colleges, while White men had enjoyed that privilege since the
1800s.4 90 MUW, like other women's colleges established around the
same time, remained the primary means for women in Mississippi to
gain a higher education until the 1950s.491
Justice O'Connor then criticized rational basis deference to gen-
der classification schemes. Citing Bradwell v. Illinois,49 2 a case that for
her is emblematic of legislative infringement of women's equal protec-
tion rights, 493 she explained that "[h]istory provides numerous exam-
ples of legislative attempts to exclude women from particular areas
simply because legislatures believed women were less able than men
to perform a particular function. 494 Notions of women's "nature,
reason, and experience 49 5 ultimately "preclude women. "496
From a relational framework standpoint, Hogan succeeds in set-
ting forth the relevant social context, even if the bulk of it has to be
uncovered from the footnotes. The origin of social identity stereo-
types is historical. Women's colleges, which may appear to the dissent
to provide "diversity" in the choice of educational environments, 497
488. Id.
489. Alice Kessler-Harris presented a feminist perspective of the social and economic
dynamics of "women's work":
[N]otions of propriety and role served as organizational principles for women's
work force participation. They created a reciprocally confirming system in which
successful job experiences for women were defined in terms of values appropriate
to future home life: gentility, neatness, morality, cleanliness .... Although wo-
men typically chose jobs that reflected home-based values, these choices, regu-
lated as they were by social and cultural norms, could hardly be said to be free.
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 128 (1982).
490. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727 n.13.
491. Id.
492. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873) (refusing to invalidate under the Federal
Constitution Illinois's exclusion of women from the state bar).
493. See O'Connor, supra note 183, at 1550 (citing Bradwell, and stating that after the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and for the first half of the twentieth century,
"the Court continued to defer to legislative judgments regarding the differences between
the sexes").
494. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725 n.10 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1873)).
495. Id. (quoting Bradwell4 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 142 (Bradley, J., concurring)).
496. Id. (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948)).
497. Id. at 735, 743-45 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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appear to Justice O'Connor to represent part of a historical pattern
that reinforces sex segregation and "archaic and stereotypic no-
tions"498 that the law should not endorse because they can impede
women's opportunities to advance.4"'
In VM/, decided fifteen years later, the Court determined the
constitutionality of the men-only admission policy of Virginia Military
Institute (VMI), a prestigious, state-supported, 100-year plus military
institution.500 The State defended its men-only admission policy be-
cause it promoted educational diversity.50 1 This policy was said to be
necessary because admitting women to VMI would destroy its unique
"adversative method," ' 2 because women's cultural and physical differ-
ences made them unable to endure the rigors of this method,
0 3 and
because the alternative women-only academy, instituted at the
prompting of litigation, provided "substantive comparability"50 4 to
VMI. 10 5  VM! applied Hogan's intermediate review standard and
placed on the State the burden of providing an "exceedingly persua-
sive justification" that the gender classification at issue served a legiti-
mate state purpose.50 6
As in Hogan, the Court's review of the State's purpose was rigor-
ous and framed by an understanding of the interaction between tradi-
tional notions of women's capability and how this "common sense"
can restrict women's opportunity. The Court began by rejecting the
State's generalized claim of benign purpose, that VMI promoted edu-
cational diversity. Taking an approach similar to Justice O'Connor's
in Hogan, Justice Ginsburg reviewed the Commonwealth of Virginia's
history of providing college education to women. She asserted that
the "'struggle for the admission of women to a state university"' was
nowhere as contested and "drawn out... than that at the University of
Virginia."57 She explained that not until the 1970s did the University
498. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
499. See id. at 729 & n.15 (referring to the American Nurses Association's suggestion
that "excluding men from the field has depressed nurses' wages" and stating that not ad-
mitting males "perpetuate[s] the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's
job").
500. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (VM/).
501. Id. at 535-36.
502. Id. at 540.
503. Id. at 535, 540-46.
504. See U.S. v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1237, 1239 (4th Cir. 1995) (devising the "substan-
tive comparability" test), rev'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
505. VM!, 518 U.S. at 551.
506. Id at 524 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982)).
507. Id. at 537 (quoting 2 THOMAS WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 254 (1929)).
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of Virginia, the most prestigious school in the State, open its doors to
women.5 °8 Following this litigation, Virginia's other fifteen public in-
stitutions of higher learning adopted coeducational admissions poli-
cies, except VMI, which remained "'unique [ly] "509 the only single-sex
institution. 10 In contrast to these nationally prestigious institutions
that facilitated men's higher education, women's higher education
from the 1830s to the mid-1900s was primarily limited to single-sex
colleges with markedly inferior opportunities. 511  For example,
Farmville Female Seminary provided instruction in "'English, Latin,
Greek, French and piano' in a 'home atmosphere."'512 The Court
concluded that this history demonstrated that VMI was not established
with the purpose of providing educational diversity; instead, VMI's
policy was part of a pattern of discrimination in which the more pres-
tigious and better opportunities for higher education were reserved
for boys and men.513
With respect to the claims that women would disrupt the adversa-
tive educational method, the Court was confronted with expert testi-
mony that asserted that VMI's method was not appropriate for
women. 1 4 Justice Ginsburg rejected this claim as a 'Judgment hardly
proved" and a "prediction hardly different from other 'self-fulfilling
prophec [ies]' once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities" to
508. Id. at 538 (citing Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 186
(E.D. Va. 1970), the litigation that prompted the University of Virginia to admit women).
509. See id. at 534 n.7 (noting that the Court did not believe itself to be addressing the
general proposition of the validity of single-sex education, but rather the fact that a unique
opportunity-Virginia's premier military institution-remained available only to men).
510. Id. at 521 n.2.
511. Id. at 536-38.
512. Id. at 521 n.2 (citing R. SPRAGUE, LONGWOOD COLLEGE: A HISTORY 7-8, 15 (1989)).
513. Id. at 539-40 ("A purpose genuinely to advance an array of educational options...
is not served by VMI's historic and constant plan-a plan to 'affor[d] a unique educational
benefit only to males.' However 'liberally' this plan serves the Commonwealth's sons, it
makes no provision whatever for her daughters." (citation omitted) (alteration in
original)).
514. Id. at 542-43. For Professor Gilligan's response to the psychologists' opinions sub-
mitted by the State, see Brief Amici Curiae of Professor Carol Gilligan and the Program on
Gender, Science, and Law, United States v. Virginia, 96 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 1996) (Nos. 94-
1667 & 94-1717), reprinted in Opposing All-Male Admission Policy at Virginia Military Institute:
Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Carol Gilligan and the Program on Gender, Science, and Law, 16
WOMEN'S RTS. L. RP'rR. 1, 10 (1994) (disputing the belief of VMI and some of its witnesses
that "a generalization about women is not a 'stereotype' if it has some statistical validity").
Professor Gilligan argued that "'[t]hese stereotypes reflect cultural values .... [H]igher
values are assigned to the competency (male-associated) cluster than to the expressive (fe-
male-associated) cluster. This, of course, has serious consequences for the value placed on
men's and women's activities.'" Id. at 10 (quoting CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DIS-
TINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 84 (1988) (second alteration in
original)).
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women.5 15 As examples of these self-fulfilling prophecies, Justice
Ginsburg cited the resistance to the entry of women in legal education
and "fear" of admitting women to medical faculties.51 6 Such "general-
izations or 'tendencies"'5 1 7 reinforce "'fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of males and females,"' that close the "gates to op-
portunity" to women.51 8 Further, although most women might well
forego the opportunity to participate in adversative education,5 19 their
categorical exclusion bars those who might choose this method, thrive
in such an environment, and benefit from this opportunity for a qual-
ity education. 2 °
In unusually broad and unequivocal language, Justice Ginsburg
provided both an antidiscrimination/citizenship and antisubordina-
tion theoretical anchor as to why the Equal Protection Clause pros-
cribes such a continuation of stereotypes about women. From an
equal opportunity perspective, "a law ... [should not deny] . . . wo-
men, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal
opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society
based on their individual talents and capacities." 2 1 From an an-
tisubordination perspective, "classifications may not be used . . . to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of wo-
men,"522 or to "'preserv[e] tacit assumptions of male superiority-as-
sumptions for which women must eventually pay."'
52 3
2. Negative Social Identity as a Harm.-The intermediate review
applied in Hogan and VM, as noted by Justice Scalia in his VM! dis-
sent,5 24 is in application deeply "skeptical" of the State's proffered
purposes. 5 25 This heightened review is the doctrinal instrument that
515. VM!, 518 U.S. at 542-43 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 730 (1982) (alteration in original)).
516. Id. at 543-44.
517. Id. at 541 (citation omitted).
518. Id. (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725).
519. Id. at 542 (adding that "it is also probable that 'many men would not want to be
educated in such an environment'" (quoting U.S. v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 93 (4th Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (mem.) (Motz, J., dissenting))).
520. Id. at 542, 545-46.
521. Id. at 532 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1981)).
522. Id. at 534 (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)).
523. Id at 535 n.8 (quoting C. JENCKS & D. RJESMAN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION 297-98
(1968)).
524. See id. at 570-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court used intermediate
scrutiny in VM/ in a manner contrary to precedent).
525. See Bhagwat, supra note 441, at 344-45 (noting that the Court views gender classifi-
cations with suspicion in its purpose review); Fallon, supra note 386, at 70 & n.80 (citing
VM! as an example of the type ofjudicial scrutiny that focuses on "the deliberative process
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enables the Court to ensure that a state does not legitimize through its
educational practices a negative social identity of women that harms
them by limiting their opportunities.526 In both cases, the Justices'
understanding of the State's construction of women's social identity,
and how this construction affects women's opportunities, drives the
decisions. This is an important accomplishment from a relational
framework perspective, because the Court is educating the polity as to
the nature of the gender role "disagreement" and explaining the so-
cial dynamics of stereotyping. Stereotypes limit both individual men
and women; however, they have greater impact on women, as individ-
uals and as a minority group.
What are the stated harms? In VM!s case, the State estimated
that ten percent female enrollment would be necessary to attract and
retain women.52 7 In Hogan, no women were shown to be harmed.
The plaintiff was a man who wished, for the sake of convenience, to
enroll in nearby MUW. 52 8 Both in_ and Hogan, however, clearly ar-
ticulate that the constitutional harm lies principally in the State mak-
ing decisions on the basis of gender stereotypes.
In VM, the State concluded that VMI's educational environment
was inappropriate for women based on a generalization that women
lacked the physical and psychological rigor to withstand VMI's unique
teaching method, and that instead, women were better off in an envi-
ronment that emphasized cooperation rather than competition.5 29
With respect to men, the State generalized that they would not be able
to maintain the benefits of VMI's adversative method in a coeduca-
tional environment.53 ° The State proffered expert psychological testi-
mony to support these judgments. Justice Ginsburg challenged the
State's reasoning and the State's psychologists, applying a more so-
phisticated understanding of how socially enforced gender roles limit
women's "choices." State practices that reinforce ideological struc-
tures of what is "natural" to men and women ultimately limit women's
opportunities, even if these are a handful, as they were in Myra
from which a challenged statute or policy resulted"); Sunstein, supra note 441, at 76-79
(arguing that the Court's three-tiered review is blending into a continuum).
526. See Rosenfeld, supra note 42, at 1741 (arguing that constitutional equality should
not be limited to preserving the integrity of the political process, but should extend to
issues of substantive equality such as disparities in education); Tribe, supra note 259, at
1067-72 (arguing that process theory requires substantive judgments).
527. VM, 518 U.S. at 523.
528. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 n.8 (1982).
529. See V1MI, 518 U.S. at 540-41.
530. Id. at 540.
531. See id. at 541 (stating that VMI's experts opined that men tend to need "'an atmos-
phere of adversativeness'" and women need a "'cooperative atmosphere'").
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Bradwell's day. Also, men are limited by the coordinate stereotypic
notions of their potentiality.
In Hogan, Justice O'Connor pointed out that there is an existing
structure, supporting a constructed identity for women, that limits
their opportunities: segregated education (MUW), which leads to a
female segregated occupation (nursing), which limits women's eco-
nomic opportunities (low pay relative to the male-dominated
equivalent, physicians).532 Justice O'Connor used her understanding
of social dynamics to require State actors to reexamine those practices
and policies based on "archaic" stereotypes, and to ensure that the
State was not apportioning benefits based on them.5"
In both these cases, the Justices did a fine job of explicating the
links between history, ideology concerning what is "natural" for wo-
men, and reduced opportunities. It is likely no accident that both
Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg have had first-hand knowledge of
how the social construction of gender can harm women. 3 4 This sup-
ports the view that, if our goal is to promote better understanding
between majorities and minorities, appointments to the bench should
reflect a wide variety of experiences and perspectives.
3. Narrow and Proportional Remedies.-Both Hogan and VM! of-
fered the Court the opportunity to make either broad or narrow state-
ments on a highly contested issue: the appropriate treatment of
gender. For example, Hogan could be broadly interpreted as holding
532. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30.
533. Id. at 725.
534. See O'Connor, supra note 183, at 1548-49 (stating that she has observed "the revolu-
tion in the legal profession that has resulted in women representing nearly thirty percent
of attorneys" and that she was unable, "after graduating near the top of [her] class at
Stanford Law School, . . . to obtain a position at any national law firm, except as a legal
secretary"). Justice Ginsburg headed the Women's Project in New York, where she played
the role of advocate in key gender discrimination cases, including: Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See Maureen B.
Cavanaugh, Towards A New Equal Protection: Two Kinds Of Equality, 12 LAW & INEQUALITY
381, 387 n.27 (1994) (noting that "[t]he pivotal role of then advocate Ginsburg in arguing
the cases which resulted in gender being recognized as 'quasi-suspect' should not be un-
derestimated"). See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United
States as a Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 263, 267-68 (1997) (relating her role in key gender equality litigation of Reed, Fron-
tiero, and Weinberger and explaining the role of these cases in combating limited opportuni-
ties for women based on gender stereotypes); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women's
Progress in the Legal Profession in the United States, 33 TuLsA L.J. 13, 17 (1997) (relating exper-
iences on the bench, in academia, and as a law graduate in which she experienced discrim-
ination and conduct that devalued her individual worth based on stereotypes).
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that current practices that affirm past class-on-class discrimination,
and which reaffirm current stereotypical notions, cannot pass consti-
tutional muster, even when no individual women are cognizant that
they are being harmed. This interpretation would be far-reaching be-
cause a multitude of social and economic practices "box" women into
roles that limit their economic and occupational opportunities. Alter-
natively, both cases could be read narrowly. Both Justices noted that
the issues involved were unique. 3 ' One can infer that the Court did
not intend to make generalized findings about the broad significance
of stereotypes and state practices, but instead that it sought to require
what the relational framework advocates. State decision makers must
endeavor to provide adequate public justification for any decision that
could be influenced by "archaic" gender stereotypes. This ensures
they provide justifications that women, as a minority, "might reason-
ably accept," and that decision makers have thought through the im-
pact of their actions on women.
4. Leaving Room for Reasonable Disagreement.-Hogan and VM!
present a strong and clear interpretation of the significance of wo-
men's present social identity. The Court needed to articulate the mi-
nority perspective in this manner in order to counter the majority
perspective, which can easily trivialize the limitations that gender ste-
reotypes place on women. The relational framework advocates this
sort of approach, so as to establish a context for reasonable disagree-
ment outside of constitutional discourse.
At the same time, the relational framework favors a narrow inter-
pretation of both these cases. The Court should not truncate demo-
cratic disagreement; therefore, these holdings must leave room for
the opposing perspective, expressed in the dissents, that cultural val-
ues are preserved when men and women follow their traditional social
roles.536 This counterbelief merits as much respect as the view that
socially constructed women's differences limit their opportunities.
Under the relational framework, the Court should not mandate or
legitimize one perspective over another. The dialogue and the ten-
sion between these two perspectives will be ongoing and will predict-
ably spill over into other political spheres. The Court's role,
successfully followed in these cases, is to ensure greater understanding
between opposing points of view. Because it would be improper for
the Court to influence future disputes, these holdings should be con-
535. See VM, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720 n.1.
536. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 601-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (praising VMI's attachment to
"such old-fashioned concepts as manly 'honor'" and its gentleman's code).
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strued as being limited to VMI's and MUW's admissions policies in
order to permit room for the polity to continue to work out its differ-
ence in ongoing debates.
C. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena: The Judiciary and Divisive Political Issues
From the standpoint of the relational theory of public reason pro-
posed in this Article, the Court's decisions in City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co.5 7 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena53 8 are mixed and
complex. In both of these decisions, although the Court did address
majority concerns and narrowly tailor its decisions to the facts, it also
failed to address minority views on discrimination and to refrain from
truncating debate on racial issues in the public realm. The following
discussion applies the relational framework to sort out the positive
and negative aspects of these decisions and to explain why they are
still having ripple effects on the polity's racial discourse.
Adarand and Croson mark a significant change in the Court's af-
firmative action jurisprudence. In both cases the Court adopted a
more skeptical stance toward affirmative action programs, shifting to a
strict scrutiny review.53' The test requires programs that use racial
classification to be scrutinized to determine whether the state purpose
is "compelling," whether the program is "narrowly tailored," and
whether less restrictive alternatives are available to attain such ends.
540
In Croson, the Court held unconstitutional a Richmond ordi-
nance that required construction contractors to pledge to subcontract
at least thirty percent of the awarded contract amount with "minority"
owned businesses.54' Richmond's program had attempted to increase
minority representation in an industry in which racial minority repre-
sentation was negligible.542 Richmond had modeled its program on a
similar federal program that the Supreme Court had ruled permissi-
ble in Fullilove v. Klutznick543 under the intermediate review stan-
dard.5 44 However, in Croson the Court found such a scheme to be
537. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
538. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
539. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 221-31; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality opinion); id. at
520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
540. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality opinion).
541. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477, 505-06.
542. Id. at 479-80.
543. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235.
544. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 484.
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"gross[ly] overinclusive[ ],""' akin to a racial "quota system, '"546 and
not sufficiently grounded in legislative factual findings.547
Adarand extended to the federal level the Court's earlier decision
in Croson, holding that affirmative action programs mandated by Con-
gress are subject to strict scrutiny review. 548 Specifically, Justice
O'Connor remanded for further review a program under which the
Department of Transportation allocated monetary compensation for
federal contractors who subcontracted ten percent of the contract
amount to "minority" qualified contractors as defined by the Small
Business Administration regulations.549
1. Adarand and Croson Are Partially Consistent with the Relational
Concept of Public Reason.-
a. Adarand and Croson Require Governmental Units to Nar-
rowly Tailor Their Race-Based Decisions.-As has been discussed, the rela-
tional framework encourages courts and other decision makers to
issue narrow decisions with respect to hotly contested issues in order
to facilitate the accommodation of multiple views. 5 ' Adarand and
Croson are consistent with this approach in so far as they also call for
moderation, narrowness, and proportionality. Following these deci-
sions, governmental agencies cannot justify affirmative action pro-
grams merely by referring to a generalized assumption that racial
classification serves some type of state interest. In Adarand, the Court
rejected the position that race alone can stand as a proxy for socioeco-
nomic disadvantage in a minority set-aside government contract pro-
gram.551 Similarly, in Croson, the Court found that Richmond's
minority contract set-aside program was a "rigid racial quota" unsup-
ported by any findings of fact. 55 2 Both of these cases require a "strong
basis in evidence" ''  upon which to design affirmative action pro-
545. Id. at 506.
546. Id. at 508.
547. Id. at 510-11.
548. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. In so holding, the Adarand Court overturned Metro Broad-
casting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990), which held that the FCC's programs designed to
increase minority ownership of broadcast licenses were constitutional under intermediate
scrutiny.
549. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-39.
550. See supra Part IV.B.2.d
551. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205, 238 (discussing the presumption of federal law that "dis-
advantaged individuals" include minorities and remanding the case to determine whether
this can survive strict scrutiny).
552. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
553. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1985) (plurality opinion))).
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grams. For example: a marked disparity in the representation of mi-
norities involved in the construction industry is not sufficient evidence
of "the precise scope of the injury [the legislature] seeks to rem-
edy";554 findings of discrimination on a national basis cannot justify
local remedial programs; 55 5 and a showing that general structural con-
ditions limit access to an important business institutional network fails
to provide a sufficient link to discrimination to support a local affirma-
tive action program.556
Moreover, even after discrimination has been established, an af-
firmative action program must be narrowly tailored to remedy the
identified injury.557 In Croson, for example, the thirty percent minor-
ity set-aside was found so overbroad in scope that, to Justice
O'Connor, it seemed to rest on an unsupported assumption that
White contractors simply would not hire minority firms. 58 The credi-
bility of Richmond's set-aside program was also undermined by the
inclusion of Eskimos, Aleuts, Native Americans, and Southeast Indi-
ans, a "gross overinclus[ion]" in light of the program's remedial pur-
pose.5 59  In Adarand, the Court cast doubt upon the federal
government's assumption that any individual who belonged to a mi-
nority group was "socially disadvantaged."560 The Court's "narrowly
tailored" requirement can be viewed as a requirement that satisfies
the relational framework's emphasis on issuing limited decisions on
highly contested moral or epistemological issues. If minorities are to
benefit from these divisive programs, the benefits cannot be overly
inclusive or disproportionate.
b. Adarand and Croson Require Governmental Units to Provide
Better Justifications to Whites for Affirmative Action Programs.--The rela-
tional framework conceptualizes public reason as requiring justifica-
tion to be offered to those most impacted by state action with which
they disagree. Adarands version of "strict scrutiny" could be inter-
preted as ensuring that the state will provide reasonably acceptable
justifications to those most likely to be harmed by affirmative action
554. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
555. Id. at 504.
556. Id. at 499 (describing such structural conditions as a "sorry history of... discrimi-
nation ... [that] standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota").
557. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235-37; Croson, 488 U.S. at 506-08.
558. Croson, 488 U.S. at 502.
559. Id. at 506.
560. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237-38 (remanding for review under strict scrutiny the
issue of the government's presumption that race is a proxy for social and economic
disadvantage).
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(Whites) and those who will disagree philosophically and morally with
it. The justification, "it's your race -," is no longer sufficient. 561
Race as a proxy for an identified state need 562 is not a method of
decision making that those who disagree can reasonably accept.
Thus, the Adarand Court found that all race-based affirmative action
programs require "strict scrutiny review," because the Fourteenth
Amendment protects Whites' individual rights that could be harmed
as a result of affirmative action programs, just as it protects racial mi-
norities from the majorities' stigmatizing actions. 56" As the next Part
will discuss, the troubling question left by Adarand and Croson is what
would be necessary for a program to pass "strict scrutiny." Much of
Justice O'Connor's Adarand opinion is devoted to assuring the dissent-
ers that "strict scrutiny is [not] 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,''564
but instead requires only careful judicial examination to "'smoke
out"' illegitimate state purposes.565
2. Adarand and Croson Are Largely Inconsistent with the Relational
Concept of Public Reason.-The Adarand and Croson decisions are largely
inconsistent with the relational model of public reason because they
privilege majority epistemology and fail to engage an alternative mi-
nority view of racial discrimination. These decisions do so by employ-
ing a very cramped vision of what can constitute evidence of
discrimination, thereby severely limiting the discretion of governmen-
tal actors to address racial problems; by interpreting equal protection
as an individual right within a classless, raceless, legal, and social con-
text, without discussing an alternative minority view of the nature of
discrimination and affirmative action; and by truncating discussions
that need to take place in the public sphere.
561. It is this feature of Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en
banc), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997), that in my opinion makes this a rightly decided
case. The only reason given to Taxman for her layoff in favor of an African American
teacher was that the Board of Education had adopted a policy of "diversity." Id. at 1552.
Public reason requires a more rigorous public justification to take a color-conscious action.
562. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 500-01 ("A governmental actor cannot render race a legiti-
mate proxy for a particular condition merely by declaring that the condition exists.").
563. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 ("[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to
demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classifica-
tion subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.");
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 ("[T]he 'rights created by the ... Fourteenth Amendment... are
personal rights.'" (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948))).
564. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235).
565. Id. at 226 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion)).
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a. Evidence of Discrimination Is Narrowly Construed. -In order
to determine in Croson whether the State demonstrated a "compelling
state purpose" that would justify affirmative action, Justice O'Connor
assessed whether the State presented sufficient evidence of discrimina-
tion.5 6 6 Here, Justice O'Connor's understanding of race relations in-
formed her determination of which evidence "counts." Croson
excludes consideration of evidence of historical patterns of racial pref-
erences that influence individuals' current conduct and evidence of
structural economic disadvantage, even though these are precisely the
kinds of discrimination that are most meaningful from a racial minor-
ity perspective.
First, Justice O'Connor rejected as insignificant statistical proof
showing that African Americans represented only .67% of the city's
contracts awards, while the population of Richmond was almost half
African American.5 6 7 Justice O'Connor countered that the relevant
number for comparison is the number of minority businesses cur-
rendy eligible for contract awards, not the total population of Rich-
mond.5 68 She found that it is "sheer speculation"5 69 to account for
discriminatory impact by focusing on how many minority construction
firms could have been engaged in Richmond, absent the City's history
of Jim Crow. Constitutionally cognizable discriminatory effect must
focus only on presently qualified minority contractors.5 70
As Justice Marshall's dissent notes, this approach renders irrele-
vant historical discrimination that has present day impact.5 7 1 For Jus-
tice Marshall, Richmond's program was connected to past Jim Crow
practices that had perpetuated structural racial inequality in the con-
struction industry.572 To focus on minority contractors who are pres-
ently qualified, instead of those potentially qualified, ignores the
566. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506.
567. Id. at 499-500.
568. I& at 501-02 (noting that "where special qualifications are necessary, the relevant
statistical pool.., must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular
task").
569. Id. at 499.
570. 1& at 501-02.
571. Id at 555-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
572. See id. at 544-46 (chiding the Court for ignoring Richmond's "multifarious acts of
discrimination, including, but not limited to, the deliberate diminution of black residents'
voting rights, resistance to school desegregation, and publicly sanctioned housing discrimi-
nation"). One cannot help but feel Justice Marshall's anguish, as a civil rights warrior
nearing the end of his career, when the majority placed no weight on this "sorry" local
history.
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minority view of how these historical patterns of institutional discrimi-
nation affect the present.573
Second, Justice O'Connor criticized Richmond for incorporating
the Fullilove program's Congressional statistical finding that minority
firms were disadvantaged due to past and present nationwide discrimi-
nation in the construction industry.5 4 For example, Congressional
findings had traced credit institutions' practices of restricting African
Americans' credit to how this affected the formation of African Ameri-
can new business. 75 Justice O'Connor, however, found data of na-
tional and industry-wide practices that disadvantaged African
Americans to be too "generalized," '576 and required localities to "iden-
tify that discrimination ... with some specificity."5 77
Third, Justice O'Connor dismissed the City's proffered evidence
of continuing exclusionary practices in the construction industry,
such as affidavits by individuals testifying to continuing discrimina-
tion.5 78 Cronyism, a time honored tradition of favoring those already
established, also was found to be irrelevant. 579 Neither did Justice
O'Connor acknowledge the racial urban and business segregation ex-
isting in Richmond, which continued to affect social and business
practices even after the city had officially ended segregation.580
Justice O'Connor's approach to race discrimination in Croson
contrasts sharply to her approach to gender discrimination in Hogan,
in which she informed her analysis of present state practices by recog-
nizing past practices in which majorities' "common sense" ideology
disadvantaged women.58 ' Justice O'Connor placed no weight on such
dynamics in the context of race. Instead she called this "sorry history"
too "amorphous15 8 2 to support the City's efforts to remedy what it
573. Id, at 542 (arguing that the issue is "whether past discrimination has resulted in the
continuing exclusion of minorities").
574. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504-05.
575. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 511 n.l (1980) (Powell, J., concurring),
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
576. Croson, 448 U.S. at 498.
577. Id at 504.
578. See id. at 500 (stating that "[t]hese statements are of little probative value").
579. See id. at 542 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for not considering
whether past discrimination has resulted in the "continuing exclusion of minorities from a
historically tight-knit industry"); see genwrally McGinley, supra note 101, at 1053-56 (arguing
that affirmative action programs are needed to counter the effects of cronyism).
580. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 540-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
581. See supra Part V.B.1.
582. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
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found to be widespread and historically based discriminatory
5813practices.
Justice O'Connor also failed to explain adequately why she aban-
doned her normally deferential approach toward regulation of state
and local government decisions.584 After Adarand and Croson, local
governments face a higher evidentiary burden, and therefore a higher
transaction cost, if they seek to implement an affirmative action pro-
gram.58 5 Moreover, there is great legal uncertainty (and therefore
greater litigation risk exposure) as to what kind of local set-aside pro-
gram can meet Adarands and Croson's "strict scrutiny. '5 86 Yet, Justice
O'Connor failed to explain why dealing with racial discrimination is
any more amorphous than other complex urban problems that local
governments must address, such as taxation, crime, economic devel-
opment, and regulation. In these areas, the Court applies deferential
judicial review. 587
Justice O'Connor's implicit understanding of racial dynamics
drives this analysis. To identify race as too removed from the present
harms that the government's affirmative action programs seek to rem-
edy is initially a descriptive judgment, but in Adarand and Croson, this
identification becomes substantive because it reshapes legally cogniza-
ble discrimination. Racially discriminatory history is simply "sorry,"
and potentially burdens the "dream of a Nation" in which "race is
irrelevant to personal opportunity. '588 For the Court to make "prefer-
ences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs" and
"'consequent harm suffered"' would be contrary to "the central com-
583. Id. at 476-80.
584. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "the autonomy of a State is an essential component
of federalism").
585. Croson, 488 U.S. at 548 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (noting the "onerous documentary
obligations" imposed by the majority's opinion).
586. Compare Engineering Contractors Assoc. of So. Fla., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 122 F.3d 895, 929 (11th Cir. 1997) (striking down an affirmative action procure-
ment program for underrepresented Hispanics and African Americans in Dade County on
the ground that it did not have a proper evidentiary basis and was not sufficiently tailored),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1186 (1998) with University & Community College Sys. v. Farmer, 930
P.2d 730, 735 (Nev. 1997) (upholding an affirmative action program designed to provide
additional positions and supplementary pay for African American university faculty which,
after three years, resulted in over $10,000 per annum salary difference with a White faculty
member hired the same year with roughly the same qualifications), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1186 (1998).
587. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) ("In areas of
social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect
lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protec-
tion challenge if there is any ... rational basis for the classification.").
588. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
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mand [of] equality."58 9 ' Moreover, generalized assertions of past dis-
crimination have "'no logical stopping point."'5 9
This substantive understanding of racial dynamics is based on a
majority epistemology. Justice O'Connor recognizes only the kind of
discrimination that permits Whites to take comfort that racism is re-
moved from them; has a discernible stopping point; and possesses a
contour that permits Whites to escape racial guilt, anxiety, and re-
sponsibility from the view that Whites participate, unconsciously and
through privilege, in systemic societal racism.591 By contrast racial mi-
norities describe racism as continuous, systemic, widespread, and neg-
ligent.592 Racial minorities' concern is to overcome a past class-on-
class discriminatory history in order to gain a foothold on the ladder
of economic and social advancement. Thus Justice O'Connor chose a
majority perspective when she found, as a matter of constitutional law,
that discrimination must be as narrowly circumscribed and proven as
described in Croson to justify a locality's affirmative action programs.
b. The Nature of Discrimination Is Individually Based.-Adarand
and Croson also adopt, without discussion or justification, majority
views of the nature of discrimination. Specifically, the decisions are
founded on the premises that discrimination is individual rather than
class-based,59 and that discrimination against Whites is no different
than discrimination against racial minorities.594 Both views are highly
controversial and the Court's opinion should have engaged the op-
posing perspective.
In repeatedly stating that antidiscrimination is an individual
right, the Adarand and Croson decisions rejected without discussion a
meaningful and rich history of the enactment of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. While scholarly analysis of the history of
589. Id. at 506 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296-97 (plurality
opinion)).
590. Id. at 498 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1985) (plu-
rality opinion)); see id. at 496-97 ("'[T] he remedying of the effects of "societal discrimina-
tion" . . . may be ageless in its reach into the past.'" (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307)).
591. See supra notes 101-130 and accompanying text.
592. See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
593. SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[T]he Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments ... protect persons, not groups."); Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (estab-
lishing that remedial relief must be tailored to those individuals "who truly have suffered
the effects of prior discrimination").
594. See supra Parts I.A.1-4 (discussing race-based discrimination); cf. Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 224 (asserting the principal of consistency according to which the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review does not depend on the race of those burdened or benefitted by the partic-
ular classification).
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these clauses is far from uniform, 595 there is robust historical evidence
that when Congress enacted these Amendments, it intended to ad-
dress hostile White on Black relations, 596 and more generally class-on-
595. See, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAu, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT V (1981) (arguing that one should look to "the intent of those who
ratified" the Amendment to find its true meaning); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICI-
ARY 407-18 (1977) (questioning the Court's "authority to revise the Constitution" by ex-
tending the Amendment beyond its original limitation to carefully enumerated rights
against state discrimination); HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 7-9 (1908) (providing a "historical judgment as to the purpose and object of
the Amendment"); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
302 (1984) (asserting that "no single objective animated those who proposed and ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment"); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 274-75 (1977) (arguing that the roots of modern
Fourteenth Amendment views originated in the antislavery movement); Bickel, supra note
267, at 29-65 (providing a detailed account of the role played by the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal
Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421, 476-78 (arguing that the Equal Protection
Clause must be interpreted in the context of the entire Reconstruction decade); Alfred H.
Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049,
1086 (1956) (arguing that the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has its origins in
radical pre-war anti-slavery theory, but ultimately "reflect[s] . . . the evolution of demo-
cratic aspiration, will and myth in the American social order on the question of race and
caste"); Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-A Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 499, 540 (1985) (asserting that "[n]o theory of the intent of the drafters"
can be consistent with all the historical evidence, because the evidence itself is inconsis-
tent); Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 968-70 (1984) (arguing that the origin of
section one of the Amendment in moderate republican politics suggests an intent to trans-
fer some authority to the federal government without constitutionalizing general rights of
fairness); Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 245, 247 (1997) (arguing that the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
endorsed "by the majority in the racial gerrymandering cases-though normally attractive,
rhetorically powerful, and politically popular-is profoundly inconsistent with the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985) (arguing that
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that it is not intended to prohibit
affirmative action).
596. Professor Bickel observed that "[e]veryone's immediate preoccupation in the 39th
Congress-insofar as it did not go to partisan questions-was, of course, with hardships
being visited on the colored race." Bickel, supra note 267, at 60. Bickel concluded that the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment shows emphatically that the Black Codes
were the evil that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act were designed to
correct. Id. at 11, 12, 17 & n.42; see also Dimond, supra note 41, at 477 (arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment sought to address not only the Black Codes, but also facially neu-
tral laws used to oppress Blacks and the states' failure to protect against community bias
and private intimidation); Karst, supra note 39, at 49-61 (concluding that in the debates,
Black Codes were described as a means to impose indirectly a kind of servitude equivalent
to slavery, which the war and the Constitution had made illegal); Saunders, supra note 595,
at 268 (arguing that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment considered themselves to
be "devising a plan for the reconstruction of the Union that would secure the principles
for which the North had fought the Civil War").
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class relations. 59 7 Although Congress chose to address this concern by
prohibiting interference with individual rights,5 98 it more broadly
sought to accommodate the many competing societal interests that it
had to consider in the enactment of the clause. 99 Thus, the Court's
narrow construction of the Equal Protection Clause 6 0 in Adarand and
In the debate of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Senator Trumbell (not a Radical) stated
that, despite the abolition of the slave codes, the South now had Black Codes, which "still
impose upon [the freedmen] the very restrictions which were imposed upon them in con-
sequence of the existence of slavery, and before it was abolished." CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). The 39th Congress understood that, after the war, Southern
White society had attempted to reinstate antebellum society through laws and through
state officials' non-enforcement of basic protections of the recently emancipated popula-
tion. The Black Codes were repeatedly characterized as denying the freedmen the most
basic of liberties that civilized men would ordinarily possess: the right to vote, the right to
move freely, and the right to hold property. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3034-35(1866) (statement of Sen. John B. Henderson). Senator Timothy 0. Howe argued that the
freedmen had been deprived of the most basic rights: "The right to hold land.., the right
to collect their wages by the processes of law ... the right to appear in the courts as suitors
. * . the right to give testimony...." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 219 (quoted
in Bickel, supra note 267, at 53).
597. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866) (statement of Thomas Eliot)(explaining that the Equal Protection Clause would "prohibit State legislation discrimina-
tion against classes of citizens"). A proposal designed to limit the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment's coverage to only the freedmen was rejected, in part because the 39th Con-
gress was concerned with possible targeting of White Southerners who had been loyal to
the North, once Reconstruction had ceded control of Southern legislatures to the former
Rebel loyalists. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (1866) (reportingJohn Bing-
ham's assertion that the Equal Protection Clause was aimed at protecting "loyal white citi-
zens of the United States"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1866) (arguing that
the Amendment's purpose was to protect the "loyal white minority" and the "disen-
franchised colored").
598. See supra note 3 (setting forth the text of the Fourteenth Amendment).
599. Accordingly, the Clause lends itself to competing reasonable interpretations. See
supra note 595. Among the competing considerations were (1) President Johnson's hostil-
ity toward radical Republicans and his veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was subse-
quently passed over his veto; (2) the necessity of putting laws in place that would not be
eroded once the former Southern secessionist states were readmitted into the Union, and
specifically, Congress's concern that the Civil Rights Act protections should be a perma-
nent guarantee; (3) avoiding a broad delegation of congressional power that might easily
lead to unwanted intrusions into Northern states' understanding of states' sovereign
power; and (4) Republicans' concerns that their legislative program would not unduly af-
fect their reelection. See Bickel, supra note 267, at 7, 41-65. As M. Russel Thayer of Penn-
sylvania then put it, "As I understand it, it is but incorporating in the Constitution... the
principle of the civil rights bill . . . [so that it] shall be forever incorporated." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866).
600. There is scholarly debate on the "color-blind" interpretation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. See, e.g., JUDrTH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 116 (1983)("The debates... refute the contention that the goal was to eliminate all legislation based
on race."); Nelson Lund, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Racial Politics, 12 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 1129, 1148-50 (1996) (suggesting that the Framers did not intend the Fourteenth
Amendment to force a general rule of color-blindness on the states); Michael W. McCon-
nell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947, 953 (1995) (arguing that
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Croson decontextualizes social dynamics and yet still permits the Court
to use the powerful rhetoric of antidiscrimination doctrine,6"1 individ-
ual dignity,6" 2 and the harm of stigma6 °. to justify strict scrutiny review
of affirmative action programs.60 4
The Court in Adarand and Croson did not justify its assumption
that harm to Whites under affirmative action programs is equivalent
to the harms suffered by minorities under race conscious decision
making. Rather, it simply concluded that in both cases the individual
is subject to being judged on the basis of "'his racial or ethnic back-
ground[,] ... [which] impinge us] upon personal rights.""'6 5 There-
fore, any "race-based" public decision making is inherently suspect
and can potentially harm individual dignity and respect.
60 6 To sup-
port this proposition in Adarand, Justice O'Connor merely cited the
principles of congruence and consistency.607 She asserted that when-
ever the government treats any person-hence even Whites not bur-
dened by a history of discrimination-on the basis of race, then that
"the belief that school segregation does in fact violate the Fourteenth Amendment was
held during the years immediately following ratification by a substantial majority of polit-
ical leaders"); Rodney A. Smolla, The Ghosts of Homer Plessy, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1037, 1080
(1996) ("IT]he Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not understand the law they
were enacting as turning the Constitution color-blind. .. ."); Laurence H. Tribe, "In What
Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color-Blind?," 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201, 204
(1986) ("(W]e know, with as much certainty as such matters ever permit, that the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not think 'equal protection of the laws' made all racial
distinctions in law unconstitutional.").
601. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995) (discussing the
principle of "consistency" in the context of antidiscrimination law).
602. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (arguing that all citizens have "'personal rights' to be treated with equal dignity and
respect").
603. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229 (asserting that the stigma which results from racial
classification supports the requirement for strict scrutiny).
604. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1121-25 (1991) (arguing that race-conscious constitutional construction is necessary
to ensure that aspirations of equal protection are met); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 47-52 (1991) (arguing that it is a misappre-
hension of the nature of race in America to treat it as a formal, rather than historical,
category); Rosenfeld, supra note 42, at 1731-35 (arguing that the strict scrutiny test is inap-
propriate in cases like Croson because it functions "as an abstract, detached, and purely
formal procedure rather than as a substantially fair and practically oriented means to re-
solve conflicting claims").
605. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
299 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
606. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion) ("To whatever racial group these
citizens belong, their 'personal rights' to be treated with equal dignity and respect are
implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public
decisionmaking.").
607. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-24, 229-30.
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person suffers an injury,6 ° 8 and that because affirmative action pro-
grams implicate fundamental individual rights, the Court should not
defer to "'rough compromise [s] "' of "'the democratic process."'60 9
At an abstract, decontextualized level, the argument that affirma-
tive action derogates individual rights is appealing, but on closer anal-
ysis it lacks the substance the relational framework would require.
Justice O'Connor rhetorically recalled Dworkinian hermeneutics by
claiming that the principle of consistency, in the abstract, mandates
her result. 610  Her arguments are primarily self-legitimizing. She
made repeated generalized references to the idea that race conscious
decision making is "contrary to . . . equality" '611 and that race-con-
sciousness per se undermines the "dream of a Nation of equal citi-
zens."612 She emphasized the importance of being judged as an
individual and having "the opportunity to compete" without the out-
come being determined "solely upon [one's] race."6 13  Justice
O'Connor asserted that the Constitution mandates that the Court ap-
ply skeptical review to any public decision making that requires judg-
ing individuals as part of a group.614 Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Adarand made this assertion more generally and with more rhetorical
force by stating at the conclusion to his concurrence: "In the eyes of
government, we are just one race here. It is American." '615 As prece-
dent, Justice O'Connor cited principally her own decisions in Croson
and Wygant, and Justice Powell's Bakke plurality decision.616 In short,
these statements appear persuasive because they are anchored in a
608. Id. at 229-30.
609. Id. at 224 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299).
610. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 279, at 86-87 (arguing that the doctrine of political
responsibility requires that judges "can justify [their decisions] within a political theory
that also justifies the other decisions they propose to make") with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-
30 (noting that the principle of consistency supports the law treating in the same manner
color-conscious actions that impact on Whites and African Americans and then citing the
majority opinion in Croson for support that the strict scrutiny applies). This decontextual-
ized exercise mocks the principle of consistency by failing to engage the full complexity of
the race relations problem presented by affirmative action, but also underscores what has
been argued in Part III, supra, that in majority-minority conflict cases, social context, not
abstract principles, are outcome-determinative.
611. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
612. Id. at 505.
613. Id. at 493 (plurality opinion).
614. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (describing race as a "group classification" subject to
strict scrutiny to ensure the "personal right to equal protection").
615. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
616. See supra notes 581-590, 601-614 and accompanying text (discussing JusticeO'Connor's reasoning process in Adarand and Croson).
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majority perspective of equality, color-blindness, unity, merit, and
competition.617
Yet Justice O'Connor never addressed the most obvious "consis-
tency" issue: whether the social and legal positions of Whites and ra-
cial minorities are sufficiently comparable that skeptical review is
mandated by the Constitution in both cases. Thus she avoided dis-
cussing case law and historical precedent supporting the proposition
that the Equal Protection Clause also emphasizes the caste/subordina-
tion aspect of race relations.61' Even more significantly from the per-
spective of this Article, she also did not attempt to justify her decision
to those who hold an alternative view of discrimination.
To substantiate her claim that governmental classification by race
harms any person-hence Whites as much as racial minorities-Jus-
tice O'Connor offered the powerful rhetoric of stigma. She asserted
that governmental remedial programs that lack adequate rationales
"stigmatize" minority individuals because these programs "'inevitably
[are] perceived . . .as resting on an assumption that those who are
granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that
is identified purely by their race."'619 Thus she equated the negative
assumptions that some Whites make when racial minorities benefit
under affirmative action programs 620 with the segregation stigma of
Brown and the social identity restrictive "box" of Myra Bradwell.621
617. See generally Lazos Vargas, supra note 33, at 1595 (explaining how equality, individu-
ality, and merit are American cultural values and arguing that "[t ] he myth of oneness and
sameness is an ideological construction").
618. See supra note 600 (setting forth alternative scholarly interpretations to the Court's
"color-blind" interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause).
619. Adarand 515 U.S. at 229 (quoting Fullilove v. Kultznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980)
(plurality opinion)); see also City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (noting that "[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic
harm" because "they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority"); Metro Broad. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that "policies may em-
body stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their
thoughts and efforts-their very worth as citizens").
620. This Article does not mean to imply that all Whites oppose affirmative action or
that all Whites would hold on to meritocratic and individualistic mythologies to deny the
past and present suffering of racial minorities. What it means to convey is that White
backlash against affirmative action is part of the psychology and mythology of White racial
innocence. SeeJohn E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the
Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 Iowa L. REv. 313, 333-34 (1994) (arguing that White
Americans' narrative of "neutral absolute standards" serves to distance them from advan-
tages received); Ross, supra note 127, at 298-308 (explaining that affirmative action debate
is framed in the rhetoric of "white innocence," and that this approach avoids dealing with
problems of unconscious racism).
621. See supra notes 492-493 (noting Bradwell and its significance for Justice O'Connor).
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However, once one provides the social context for Justice
O'Connor's argument, it becomes less defensible. According to a mi-
nority view of discrimination, the harm of "benign" discrimination is
not the equivalent of the caste discrimination that African Americans
suffered under school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education622
or the Jim Crow legislation in Strauder v. West Virginia.623 That is, the
loss of government procurement contracts suffered by White contrac-
tors in Adarand cannot be equated with the stigmatization inflicted on
historically oppressed minorities.624 Yet instead of dealing with the
complex question raised by distinguishing between harms caused by
differing kinds of discrimination,625 Justice O'Connor summarily con-
cluded in Croson that this would be a dubiousjudicial enterprise, "con-
trary to... [the] central command [of] equality."626
Additionally, the "stigma" rationale is not fully supported with evi-
dence likely to garner minority support. While it is likely true, as Jus-
tice O'Connor suggests, that affirmative action programs can reaffirm
some Whites' racialized assumptions about minorities and exacerbate
racial prejudice, she cited no evidence that such White backlash is
either widespread or uniform.627 Thus, Justice O'Connor's argument
622. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
623. 100 U.S. 303 (1880), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
624. See supra notes 189-194 and accompanying text (discussing differences in kinds of
subordination). Judicial decisions originally used the term "stigma" in connection with the
caste status of African Americans during the Jim Crow era. See supra notes 43-44 and ac-
companying text (explaining the use of the term in Brown). A White individual suffers a
harm to her dignity when she loses a government procurement program or is laid off
because of her race. This is an arbitrary harm, which is not equivalent to that which a
stigmatized racial minority suffers. Stigma is continuous, part of a context of the continu-
ing devaluing of her social identity and self-worth. This distinction between an arbitrary
harm and a stigmatic harm is at the core of Paul Brest's antidiscrimination principle and
Charles Lawrence's description of cultural context argument. See Brest, supra note 36, at 8-
12 (describing the cumulative, debilitating harm caused by stigmatization); Lawrence,
supra note 41, at 355-62 (proposing the "Cultural Meaning" test which "would evaluate
governmental conduct to see if it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches
racial significance").
625. See supra notes 157-158, 194 and accompanying text (discussing the different types
of prejudice).
626. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989) (asserting that
past harms are "inherently unmeasurable claims" and that courts should not be asked to
"'evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered'" because "such a
result would be contrary to .. . equality" (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 296-97 (1978) (plurality opinion))).
627. This Article does not accept the Court's assumption that White backlash against
affirmative action is sufficiently widespread and vitriolic to rise to the level of a stigmatic
action that merits constitutional solicitude.
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relies on stereotypical "generalizations and tendencies" akin to those
she rejected in Hogan.628
In short, Justice O'Connor, throughout the Adarand and Croson
opinions, failed to engage the epistemology of racial minorities. Pub-
lic reason, as discussed in Part IV.B, would have required Justice
O'Connor to engage the counterarguments that justify affirmative ac-
tion: that racial minorities have been deprived the opportunity to
compete at the same level as Whites because of the historical and
structural effects of discrimination; that affirmative action represents a
response to endemic racism in the form of unconscious discrimina-
tion;62 9 and that dominant Whites view job qualifications in a manner
that reinforces race and class advantage without, however, a strong
relationship to actual job requirements. 63° Affirmative action is de-
fined in distinctly different ways by its opponents and by those racial
minorities and Whites who support it. From the epistemological posi-
tion of racial minorities who experience discrimination as a constant
factor in every transaction they have with Whites, affirmative action
gives minorities the opportunity to compete with Whites. On the
other hand, for Whites who oppose affirmative action, it represents
"group quotas" that grant to undeserving racial minorities an
unearned advantage.631 Instead of addressing this controversy openly,
the Court denied the legitimacy of the minority racial epistemological
position by implicitly adopting a majority perspective.
Adarand and Croson presented the Court with the opportunity to
explicate the complex dynamics of unconscious discrimination and
negative social identity. The Court used such an opportunity in Hogan
and VMI to provide an instructive analysis of a majority-minority dy-
namic in the context of gender.63 2 However, because the Court failed
to recognize the alternative epistemology in the race context, it failed
in its responsibility to educate the polity and reframe a problematic
628. See supra notes 474-496 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Hogan).
629. See supra notes 101, 104-106 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which
Whites engage in unconscious discrimination).
630. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text (explaining the problems associated
with stereotyping).
631. See James Kluegel, "If There Isn't a Problem, You Don't Need a Solution": The Bases of
Contemporary Affirmative-Action Attitudes, 28 Am. BEHAVIOR Sc. 761, 771 (1985) (finding that
the majority of Whites assumed "lack among blacks of the proper motivation and the skills
needed to achieve" as the cause for the Black-White difference in socioeconomic status);
James R. Kluegel & Eliot R. Smith, Whites'Beliefs about Blacks' Opportunity, 47 AM. Soc. REV.
518, 523 (1982) (finding that "a large segment of the white population views blacks' oppor-
tunity as better than average due to reverse discrimination").
632. See supra Part V.B.
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area of majority-minority conflict. Instead, the Court reaffirmed divi-
sive impulses. For example, the Court took judicial notice of White
racial backlash, and used this phenomenon in construing the Equal
Protection Clause.6"' This implies that the Court believes White back-
lash to be reasonable. White backlash is reasonable if affirmative ac-
tion is interpreted as imposing an unfair regime on Whites, one which
gives minorities an "unfair" advantage over Whites.6"4 Finally, as will
be discussed in the next subsection, this privileging of the majority
perspective also affects discussion of majority-minority race issues in
the polity as a whole.
3. The Court's Approach in Adarand and Croson Has Adversely Af-
fected the Polity's Discussion of Racial Issues.-Adarand and Croson repre-
sent remarkable judicial overreaching into an area the polity at large
has found controversial and problematic. Affirmative action has al-
ways split Whites and racial minorities, White conservatives and White
liberals, and sometimes men and women.63 5 In the next decade, af-
firmative action promises to become the main focal point of racial
politics in the United States, as state by state, locality by locality, we
become enmeshed in efforts to eliminate affirmative action. Unfortu-
nately, by centering racial dialogue around affirmative action politics,
we have substituted the rhetoric of "win-lose" rights for the more com-
prehensive racial dialogue advocated in Part IV.
Although affirmative action is unpopular with the electorate, par-
ticularly with the White majority,636 Congress has yet to enact legisla-
tion that repudiates federal affirmative action programs.63 7 However,
in spite of the division with the polity, the Court did not hesitate to
speak with rhetorical and ideological force. In the many passages dis-
cussed in the previous section, the Court not only privileged majority
epistemology, but also communicated multiple messages to Whites
who oppose affirmative action. First, it enunciated that affirmative ac-
633. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
634. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995) (asserting that
"any individual suffers any injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the government be-
cause of his or her race, whatever that race may be").
635. This Article does not mean to imply that all minorities or all women favor affirma-
tive action. Many, clearly, do not. See supra notes 15-16 (citing poll data and political
commentary).
636. See supra note 15.
637. The U.S. Senate has recently rejected Sen. Mitch McConnell's (R-Ky.) amendment
to end the Federal Highway subsidy contract program at issue in Adarand that subsidizes
contracts awarded to construction firms owned by women and minorities. S. Amend. 1708,
105th Cong. (1998), available at 1998 WL 95848.
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tion is contrary to the most fundamental values of the polity. 638 Sec-
ond, it legitimized, at the level of a constitutional harm, aggrieved
Whites' feeling that an arbitrary wrong has been done to them when a
racial minority is advantaged by affirmative action.6" 9 Third, it rein-
forced the narratives of meritocracy and individuality which, from the
minority perspective, are the myths that justify and reinforce Whites'
distancing themselves from racial minorities and racial problems.640
Although the Court claims that affirmative action involves White
individuals' fundamental rights," 1 this finding depends on defining
the content of equal opportunity. Because this is a political task that
ought to be resolved by the polity at large,642 the Court should have
refused to reach this issue. The relational framework advocates that
the Court distinguish between the political issues that require further
majority-minority dialogue and those where its intervention is neces-
sary to protect minority interests, such as when a fundamental right is
at stake, or when majorities unduly target minorities to exclude them
from the political process. Politically divisive and complex issues need
time and reasoned discourse to be resolved in such a way that one
group does not impose its moral or epistemological framework upon
the other.
The Court's defiant, but culturally attuned, construction of equal
protection rights and its implicit interpretation of racial issues may
require extensive analysis to uncover, but the implications are suffi-
ciently clear that they have already influenced the polity's discussion.
Since Adarand, California enacted an anti-affirmative action referen-
dum." 3 Since Adarand, the Senate Judiciary Committee held widely
watched hearings in which the Committee, led by its Chair, Senator
Orrin Hatch, rebuffed the President's nomination of Bill Lann Lee
638. See supra notes 611-612 and accompanying text.
639. See supra notes 605-618 and accompanying text.
640. See supra notes 612-614 and accompanying text. Attitudinal research suggests that
the narratives of individualism and meritocracy prevents Whites from sympathizing with
the need for minorities to receive affirmative action in order to overcome institutional
racism. Cf Kluegel, supra note 631, at 771 (finding that the majority of Whites believe that
individual Blacks are responsible for the gap in socioeconomic status); Kluegel & Smith,
supra note 631, at 523 (finding that many Whites view Blacks' opportunities to be a result
of reverse discrimination).
641. See supra notes 608-609 and accompanying text.
642. See RAwis, LiERALISM, supra note 26, at 228 (distinguishing constitutional essentials
from other political discourses, such as equality of opportunity, and arguing that "while
some principle of opportunity is surely such an essential... fair equality of opportunity...
goes beyond that and is not such an essential").
643. See supra note 8.
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for the position of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 644
Since Adarand, the political wisdom is that affirmative action is under
attack.
Affirmative action was unpopular before Adarand and Croson.
Adarand, however, has skewed the debate and provided cover for
those who do not want to confront the racial distancing that Adarand's
"color-blind" and individualist assumptions imply. The political fight
over the Bill Lann Lee nomination exemplifies this phenomenon.
Senator Orrin Hatch opened testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee by rehashing the rhetoric used in Adarand: "Mr. Lee does
not believe in equal opportunity for all Americans but in equal results
for groups. '6 4 5 He added that opposing Mr. Lee's views was some-
thing that "I believe in my heart, and in my head, to be the right
thing. '6 46 Based on his interpretation that Adarand proscribes all
group preferences, Senator Hatch then claimed that Mr. Lee would
not properly enforce the law if he were assistant attorney general. 647
Mr. Lee had testified earlier that he did not view all affirmative action
programs as illicit, and that he supported them as long as they could
be narrowly drawn in accordance with Adarands strict scrutiny re-
quirement. 648 In Senator Hatch's televised response to Mr. Lee's in-
terpretation of Adarand, the Senator stated, "That view turns the
court's holding on their [sic] head."649
The Court is not responsible for the politics of a few. The Court
does, however, educate and set the framework for majority-minority
dialogue on difficult issues that divide us. In the Bill Lann Lee confir-
mation hearings, Adarands abstract rhetoric of color-blindness, indi-
viduality, rigid racial quotas, and equality of opportunity legitimized
Mr. Hatch's political position. It is no accident that in this high stakes
political battle Senator Hatch patterned so much of his testimony af-
ter the Adarand rhetoric. In his testimony he argued that affirmative
action violates the "ideal of a colorblind America" and that "quotas
and preferences" delay "the progress this country has made toward
644. U.S. Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary Holds a Markup of the Nomination of Bill Lann Lee as the
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights and Other Matters, 105th Cong. (Nov. 6, 1997), avail-
able at 1997 WL 689476 [hereinafter Lee Hearings].
645. Full Comm. Markup & Nominations Vote Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong.
(Nov. 13, 1997) (testimony of Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman) [hereinafter Hatch Testimony],
available at 1997 WL 709709.
646. Id.
647. Lee Hearings, supra note 644.
648. Id.
649. Id.
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racial justice and harmony" and that they "stigmatiz[e] the
preferred."6 '
Epistemological privileging, whether explicit or implicit, not only
truncates racial dialogue, it skews political dialogue to encourage atti-
tudes of intolerance and dismissiveness. No one wins when this
happens.
VI. THE RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK IS CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S
COLOR-BLIND DOCTRINE
The Court's current "color-blind" stance, espoused in such deci-
sions as Adarand3 51 and Croson,652 as well as in voting rights decisions
such as Miller v. Johnson,653 could be interpreted broadly to mean that
any consciousness and generalization of racial difference by a govern-
mental actor is proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. After all,
the rationale for the "color-blind" position is that color-conscious state
decisions violate the equal protection guarantee that individuals be
treated as individuals, and not "'as simply components of a racial, reli-
gious, sexual or national class."' 6 54  Interpreting these decisions
broadly to proscribe any recognition of racial, ethnic, or gender dif-
ferences would leave no room for the approach advocated in this
Article.655
While this Article asserts that the Court's "color-blind" decisions
are flawed, it does not concede that these decisions preclude the ap-
650. Hatch Testimony, supra note 645.
651. 515 U.S. 200, 218-31 (1995).
652. 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 (1989).
653. 515 U.S. 900, 910-15, 920 (1995) (holding that a voting district could be invalidated
if, instead of traditional districting principles, race was the motivating factor in drawing
district lines). Continuing the line of reasoning of Adarand and Croson, the Miller Court
asserted that when the State assigns voters to voting districts on the basis of race, it engages
in racial stereotyping and thereby demeans the individual dignity of the voter. Id. at 911-
12. To do so means that the decision has been made based on an underlying assumption
that voters of the same race "'think alike.'" Id. at 912 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
647 (1993)). Race-conscious gerrymandering is especially disunifying of the polity because
it carries the threat of "'balkaniz[ing] us into competing racial factions.'" Id. (quoting
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657).
654. Id. at 911 (quoting Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983))); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S.
899, 907 (1996) ("Racial classifications are antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment,
whose 'central purpose' was 'to eliminate racial discrimination ... .'" (quoting McLauglin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964))).
655. See supra Part IV.B (advocating that in order to ensure inclusion when addressing
majority-minority conflicts, the Court should be conscious of the other epistemology, and
then engage that view in a way that depicts the "other" as an equal coparticipant in the
polity).
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proach suggested herein. The relational model advocated in this Arti-
cle does not require making stereotypical assumptions that minorities
"think alike." Rather, while recognizing that neither skin color, race,
religion, nor gender necessarily correlate to a particular point of
view, 65 6 it simply advocates that the Court address those minority per-
"spectives that challenge the majority's epistemological framework. In
almost all cases, the minority perspective will not be uniform and will
be contested. The method espoused here does not use either "race as
status" or gender stereotypes to substitute for reasoned analysis, as did
the decision makers in VMI and Adarand. Rather, this method urges
that the Court not unduly assume a truth that others in the polity do
not share. The Court should address the epistemological position
that challenges its assumptions and that, given the context of the con-
flict, represents the minority or majority opposing view.657 There is
no conflict between the Court's holdings in Adarand and other cases,
and the position advocated here.
Nonetheless, there is a tension between the philosophy possibly
underlying the "color-blind" position and the philosophy underlying
this Article. The view that our society is or should be "color-blind"
rests on a premise that all people are or eventually should be cultur-
ally similar, and that their views are or should be the same.6 58 Such a
premise cannot be reconciled with the position expressed in this Arti-
cle. Certainly we all can agree that significant and deep differences
based on race, class, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation cur-
rently exist. My own analysis of the psychological, sociological, and
historical literature demonstrates that, while lines of demarcation will
change, there will always tend to be majority and minority groups.659
We human beings seem to have a tendency to identify ourselves in
groups, and a tendency to protect those who are in our own group
656. See supra notes 184-187 and accompanying text (discussing the sources of different
groups' epistemologies).
657. Given that minority views are multitudinous, just as are majority views, in some
cases this may require that the Court address more than one minority-majority view.
Which of these is the epistemological other? It depends on the context, and on what inter-
ests are at stake. In some cases it may be appropriate for the Court to acknowledge that
the opposing epistemology is not uniform, in which case it should then engage the various
positions that challenge its own position. What the relational framework requires is that
the Court engage in a reasoning process with that perspective which directly challenges its
position.
658. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 340, at 133-38 (supporting the idea of a "common cul-
ture and a single society"). This Article recognizes that this is another paradigm of major-
ity-minority relations. The problem is that most authors that take this position do so on
the basis of intuition, or perhaps wishful thinking, and not from a searching analysis of the
social science and historical data.
659. Lazos Vargas, supra note 33, at 1595.
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and exclude those who are in another group.660 The dynamics of
domination seem to be entrenched in our characters. 66' This behav-
ior may not be inevitable, but it seems likely that it will persist, at least
for our lifetimes. It would be dangerous not to recognize that the
dynamics which operate to construct difference are deep and in-
grained; without confronting them, we risk irreconcilable division.
Finally, the position advocated in this Article is consistent with
the color-blind doctrine's underlying concern that all individuals, ma-
jority as well as minority, be treated in a way that ensures their individ-
ual dignity. The proposed model of public reason shares this same
purpose. It ensures that the Court acknowledge, address, and engage
all members of the polity, majorities as well as minorities, because that
is what a full concept of coequal participation among diverse citizens
in a democracy requires. When the Court provides each member of
the polity with justifications that he or she may reasonably accept, and
when the Court does not impose a foreign epistemology upon a dis-
senting citizen, the Court meets its obligations to treat each partici-
pant, majority or minority, with dignity. Acknowledging and
addressing the epistemological differences between majorities is not
disunifying or stigmatizing. Rather, this approach helps the polity en-
sure harmony by providing majorities and minorities with a frame-
work in which they can disagree as coequals.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the way the Court handles intergroup
conflict cases is in need of reconsideration, and that continued inat-
tention to this problem places the institutional authority of the Court
and judges in jeopardy. Mishandling this category of cases has other
effects as well. Our current strident rhetoric and inability to move
beyond rigidly fixed positions in dealing with intergroup disputes are
telling testimony that the Court has not performed well in its roles as
educator and premier expositor of public reason. We can all surely
acknowledge that harmony and inclusion are goals of a democracy.
However, the goals cannot be taken for granted in a pluralist society.
They require hard work from all democratic institutional actors, in
particular from judges.
This Article has attempted to formulate procedural guidelines
and a substantive framework that can assist judges in addressing this
challenge. At the end of the day, after all of the political theory, case
660. Id. at 1567-68.
661. Id. at 1570-71.
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law, psychological studies, and postmodern insights, the bottom line is
quite simple and one that we already intuit. Traditional judicial tem-
perament is all-important in handling divisive and difficult issues.
Judges must be humble as to their knowledge of what is "truth" and
what is "right." Judges must be willing to be open to unfamiliar ways
of thinking and must be willing to allow their commonsense under-
standing to be challenged by different and even discomforting ways of
thinking. With respect to "hot button" issues, judges must exercise
their judicial authority prudentially, at times ceding power over to
other democratic actors, even if they think those actors' decisions are
wrong.
In the last two decades we have witnessed increased diversity on
the bench. This move has been important in bringing greater under-
standing of epistemological differences to the voice of the judge, as
cases like VM! and Hogan illustrate. However, current politics place
the ideals of 'judicial temperament" and minority inclusion at great
risk. If we select judges with solid ideological precommitments, we
undermine the relational goals of inclusion, coequality, and intercon-
nectedness. We must defeat this short term impulse to impose "win-
lose" politics on the process of judicial selection and instead focus on
the long term needs of our polity.
Judges are admittedly women and men of flesh and blood, social
actors who inevitably bring to their task precommitments, and per-
haps even prejudices. Their responsibilities are great. Judges are
trustees of our belief that our political system is based on important
shared values. They are not only guardians of democracy, but also key
actors in the life of a democratic polity. Hence judges must not tire in
their pursuit of the illusive goals of a democratic pluralistic polity: in-
clusion, coequality, and interconnectedness. They, like all of us, must
continuously struggle in good faith to overcome personal precommit-
ments so that we can reach out to those unlike ourselves.
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